SORABJI HORMASJI LAKDAVALA Vs. BROACH BOROUGH MUNICIPALITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE two appeals arise from the judgments of the District Judge of Broach. The dispute relates to the legality of the levy of license fees from the appellants under a rule which is No.208 (a) passed by the Broach City Municipality and sanctioned by Government on July 2, 1934. The plaintiffs, in the two suits Nos. 330 and 331 of 1934, from, which these appeals arise, are respectively traders in fire-wood and charcoal, and manufacturers and sellers of sweetmeats and confectionary, and carry on their business within the Broach Borough Municipal limits. They alleged that the Municipality proposed to levy yearly a license fee according to the new rule upon their trade and claimed a declaration that the Municipality had no right to recover any sum whatever from them under the pretext of license fees particularly when the avowed object of the levy was to enable the Municipality to meet educational expenses, They also claimed injunction against the Municipality preventing that body from recovering those fees. The Courts below have held that the levy was legal, and in consequence the suits were dismissed with costs. Against those decrees the plaintiffs have brought these two appeals.

(2.) IT seems to me that the case of the plaintiffs who are dealers in fire-wood and charcoal can be distinguished from the other case in which the plaintiffs are manufacturers and sellers of sweetmeats and confectionary. IT will be convenient to deal with the case of the former plaintiffs first.

(3.) AS I have pointed out above, the levy of license fee is the subject of special procedure in the statute and it is sufficient to say that the formalities--prescribed--I have been gone through in making the rule. Merely because the Municipality before making the rule had in a public notification indicated the object for which it was to be applied--here it was said "to cope with the increased expenditure of the education department"--it would not in my opinion render the formality observed unsuitable or unauthorised. That the object of the application of a fee or tax does not determine the procedure is evident from the definition of "municipal fund" in Section 65 of the Act and particularly proviso (b) thereof. Under the term "municipal fund" is included all taxes, fines and penalties paid or levied under the Act. The definition is comprehensive enough to include fees, for the proceeds of all impositions levied constitute municipal fund. The Municipality is also given power in proviso (b)\ to set apart any portion of the municipal fund for a particular purpose, such as for schools or dispensaries, subject to the Commissioner's approval, and to apply any sums properly so credited exclusively to the special purposes for which such sums were received or set apart. Therefore the object is not the determinative factor in observing the formality for the levy.