EMPEROR Vs. CHINUBHAI LALBHAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE first of these appeals is from a conviction by the Sessions Judge of Ahmedabad of the accused under Section 43 (1) (a) of the Bombay Abkari Act, V of 1878. THE other three appeals are by Government against orders of acquittal passed in two cases by the learned Presidency Magistrate, 2nd Court, and in the third case by the learned Presidency Magistrate, 5th Additional Court, Bombay, under Section 43 (1) (a) of the said. Act.

(2.) ALL the said appeals raise the question whether, in popular language, the Prohibition policy of the Government of Bombay is valid. It is necessary to state at the outset that this policy was not carried into effect by passing an Act through the Provincial Legislature, and we are not, therefore, concerned to consider in any way the limits of the powers of the Provincial Legislature. The policy was introduced by means of Notifications by the Government of Bombay issued in terms under Sub-section (2) of Section 14B of the Bombay Abkari Act. In all the cases the notification in question was substantially in the same terms. It was expressed to be in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (2) of s 14B, and by it the Government of Bombay was pleased to prohibit the possession by any person without a pass, permit or license of any quantity of any intoxicants other than those specified in the schedule thereto, in the areas specified in the margin. In the case of Appeal No.105 of 1940 the area specified was the Municipal area of Ahmedabad, the Cantonment of Ahmeda-bad, and twenty-seven specified villages. In the other cases the area specified was the town and island of Bombay, Bombay Suburban District, and that part of the Thana Mahal which is encircled by the Bassein-Thana Creek and the territorial waters appertaining thereto. The question which we have to consider is whether those notifications were justified by Section 14B. (2) of the Bombay Abkari Act.

(3.) THE only real question appears to us to be whether a power to prohibit the possession by any person or class of persons either throughout the whole Presidency or any local area of any intoxicant justifies Government in prohibiting possession by the public generally. As has been stated, the notifications prohibit possession by any person, and it has not been suggested,-nor do we think it could be seriously suggested-, that the persons for the time being in Ahmedabad and its Districts, or within the town and island of Bombay and the Suburban District, who would fluctuate from day to day, and indeed from hour to hour, can be regarded as a class of persons. THE view which appealed to the learned Sessions Judge of Ahmedabad, and which has been strenuously pressed upon us by the learned Advocate General, is that the words " any person " are equivalent to the words " every person " in the Section, as they clearly are in the notifications, and that, therefore, the whole public may be brought within the Prohibition. On that construction it is difficult to see what effect can be given to the words which appear in the Section, but not in the notifications, " or class of persons ". In our opinion, the natural meaning of the expression "any person or class of persons" is a person designated by name or description or a class of persons designated. We are satisfied that if the Legislature had intended that the power of Prohibition might be extended to the public generally, it would have so stated in clear language. Our attention was drawn to the fact that in the amendment of the Abkari Act, Bombay Act VI of 1939, the expression was used in three places " individuals, class of individuals, or public generally ". We refer to this merely as an illustration of the phraseology which the Legislature might be expected to have used if it had intended Sub-section (2) of Section 14B to extend to the public generally.