RUTTONJI ARDESHIR WADIA Vs. ASSISTANT DEVELOPMENT OFFICER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal from the judgment of the Assistant Judge at Thana in Land Acquisition Reference No.7 of 1932. We are not concerned with the merits of the matter at this stage. The short point which arises for consideration is whether the lower Court was right in shutting out evidence and preventing parties from contending that compensation should be paid as the land was not required by Government for public purposes.

(2.) THE relevant facts are that under a kowl (grant by the Crown) which was granted before any Land Acquisition Act was in force, Government granted the particular property to the claimant's predecessor-in-title. Clause 16 of that grant is in these terms : In the event of any quantity of ground being required by Government for roads or other public purposes, it should be given up by you (the Khot) on the usual terms of the mere remission of the assessment if the land in question be cultivated. In 1931 under the Land Acquisition Act a notification was published where it was declared that the land was required for public purposes. THE necessary steps were taken thereafter for adjudicating upon the claimant's right to compensation. THE matter appears to have passed through the hands of different Assistant Judges and District Judges. THE written statement filed on behalf of the Government contained the contention that because of clause 16 of the kowl no compensation was payable to the claimant. THE claimant urged that the land was not required for public purpose within the meaning of clause 16 of the howl and the Government's refusal to pay compensation was unjust. It appears to have been contended also that the declaration made by the Government that the land was to be acquired for public purposes was not bona fide. As pointed out in the judgment under appeal, the two questions do not appear to have been clearly kept apart but were mixed up. THE result was that different Judges dealing with the matter passed orders, the consequence of which was to shut out evidence to find out whether the land was required for public purposes within the meaning of clause 16 of the kowl. From the judgment under appeal it appears that in the course of final arguments when the learned advocate for the claimant tried to urge that on the evidence on record he could show that the condition recquired for defeating the claimant's right to compensation, namely, that the land was required for public purposes, was not fulfilled, he was prevented from doing so.

(3.) SECTION 11 of the Act postulates an enquiry before making an award by the Collector. If the award involves the ascertainment of the true area of the land, the compensation which in the Collector's opinion should be allowed for the land, and the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land, it must necessarily follow that the Collector must hold an enquiry into the contention of the claimant on the one hand and that to the contrary of Government on the other independently of the latter's decision under SECTION 6 which might or might not be cogent in the consideration of the question. That the Collector in the acquisition proceedings was obliged to make an award is not denied. But what is urged is that in making the award the Collector was bound to accept as conclusive the Government's decision as regards the character of the purpose for which the land was required in determining the compensation payable to the claimant. It may be that Government's view might be relevant as an item of proof. But the argument is not well founded when it says that that view of Government is conclusive. The probative effect given to a particular act of Government for a specific purpose under the statute cannot be given to it for a purpose other than what is expressed. It will lead to obvious injustice if the rights of the grantee under the grant could be concluded by reference to a decision of Government under SECTION 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that view of the matter I think it was perfectly open to the claimant to refute the claim that no compensation was claimable by reason of the terms in clause 16 of the kowl. That could only be done by leading evidence to show that the purpose of the acquisition was not the purpose which was contemplated by clause 16 of the kowl. It was suggested that the same officer who acts upon the Government's declaration could not consistently refrain from viewing that declaration as correct in the interpretation of the clause in the howl. Apart from the embarrassment, which it not impossible to avoid, I think that difficulty could not be allowed to cloud the issue which mainly centres round the right of the claimant to establish independently of the Government's opinion his own contention with regard to the purpose of the acquisition. Therefore I agree that the ordter passed, without allowing relevant evidence to be led, must be set aside and the case remanded for decision on the main question involved as stated in the order proposed by my learned brother.