P J ROGERS Vs. SHRINIVAS GOPAL KAWALE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application purporting to be made under Section 561A of the Criminal Procedure Code, the object of which is to induce the Court to expunge certain observations criticising a witness made by the Additional Sessions Judge of Poona in a criminal appeal which came before him. There has been no application in revision against the decision of the Additional Sessions Judge, and of course no appeal lies; nor has the Court thought fit on its own motion to call for the record, and in granting a rule, this Court queried whether there was jurisdiction to entertain an application to expunge words from a judgment, when the Court is not called upon to pronounce upon the merits of the decision itself. It is obvious that, if the jurisdiction exists, its' exercise must place the Court in an anomalous position. The Court must go through the record of a case in which it is not called upon to act judicially at the instance of a party who is not aggrieved by the decision, and it may well be that the Court will have to come to a conclusion upon matters not in issue in the proceedings.

(2.) IT was held in the year 1922 in Emperor v. C. Dunn (1922) I.L.R. 44 All. 401 that if the Court had such jurisdiction as is claimed in this case, it must be conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code, and the Court came to the conclusion that no such jurisdiction was conferred by the Code. This High Court in Emperor v. Sidramayd (1917) 19 Bom. L.R. 912 had also expressed the opinion that it was very doubtful whether this jurisdiction existed in the High Court. In the year 1923 the Criminal Procedure Code was amended by the addition of Section 561A, and we are told by the learned Government Pleader as an interesting historical fact, but not I am sure with a view to influencing us in any way, that the objects and reasons for that amendment disclosed that the legislature intended to confer this very power. However that may be, we have to consider whether the Section does confer such a power. IT has been held in certain cases to do so, particularly by Mr. Justice Sulaiman, as he then was, in Panchamm Banerji v. Upendra Nath Bhattaeharji (1926) I.L.R. 49 All. 254 and by Mr. Justice Tek Chand in In the matter of Daly (1927) I.L.R. 9 Lah. 269 although both those learned Judges held that the jurisdiction should be exer-cised very sparingly. With all respect to the learned Judges who have taken a different view, I am quite unable to see how Section 561A affects the question. That Section provides that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. So that all that the Section does is to preserve the inherent powers of the High Court without conferring any additional power. In my opinion no Court can claim inherent power to alter the judgment of another Court. All powers in appeal and revision are statutory, and not inherent in the superior Court. When once a matter is duly brought before a superior Court, then no doubt inherent powers may be called in aid to enable the Court to do complete justice, but the power to bring a' matter: in appeal or revision before a superior Court must be conferred by statute or some enactment having statutory effect.

(3.) IN my opinion, the judgment in Emperor v. C. Dunn was right and has not been altered by the introduction of Section 561A of the Criminal Procedure Code, and the High Court has no jurisdiction to expunge passages from the judgment of an inferior Court which has not been brought before it in regular appeal or revision. We must, therefore, reject this application. Sen, J.