(1.) BY order dated 16th November, 2009, the following preliminary issue was framed :-
(2.) THE defendant, however has filed affidavit in lieu of evidence. The learned Counsel for plaintiff submitted that he would like to ask only a few preliminary questions and also stated that plaintiff did not wish to lead any evidence on this issue.
(3.) ON the other hand, Dr. Virendra Tulzapurkar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of plaintiffs submitted that it is not disputed by defendant that the plaintiffs have registered office in Mumbai and that the trade mark of plaintiffs is a registered trade mark. He submitted that section 62 of the Copyright Act and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act made an exception to the general rule laid down in section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code and permitted plaintiff to file a suit at the place where he is carrying on business in cases where there is infringement of his trade mark or of a copy right and clause 14 of the Letters Patent also permitted combining of different causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. He submitted that, so far as judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Gold Steal Engineering Products Pvt. Ltd and others 1992-PTC-8 on which the reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for defendant is concerned, the said judgment has been set aside by the Division Bench of this Court in Appeal No.505 of 1992 and the matter was remanded and directed to be heard afresh. He submitted that, therefore, no reliance can be placed on the said judgment. He further submitted that so far as judgment of the Madras High Court in Brooke Bond India Ltd. (1993) 2 MLJ 132 is concerned, the Apex Court in M/s Arte Indiana v. M/s P. Mittulaul Lalah and Sons AIR 1999 Bom 369 : 1999(4) Bom CR 239 had observed that in Brooke Bond India Ltd (1993) 2 MLJ 132, the Madras High Court declined to grant leave on the facts of the said case. He further pointed out that, in the said case, the Court had, at the stage of considering whether leave should be granted or not under clause 14, had declined to grant leave. He submitted that, in the present case, leave was already granted after the defendant was heard. Appeal against the said order was also dismissed. He submitted that the leave was granted after the defendant was heard and, therefore, ratio of the said judgment in Brooke Bond India Ltd. (1993) 2 MLJ 132 on which reliance is placed by the defendant, therefore, would not be applicable to the facts of this case.