SAKHUBAI Vs. DIVISIONAL SOIL CONSERVATION OFFICER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner has challenged, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the judgment and order of the Industrial Court dated 8th December, 1988 in Complaint (ULP) No. 611 of 1984 wherein the petitioner had made a grievance of unfair labour practices under Item 6 of Schedule IV of the M. R. T. U. and P. U. L. P. Act, 1971, that he was continuously employed for a period of more than twelve years as temporary and that he was not made permanent, to deprive him of the benefits of permanency. The respondents filed their written statement and contested the complaint. It appears that a preliminary point regarding the activities of the respondents, being industry, was raised. It further appears from the discussion in the judgment that the learned Member of the Industrial Court was mislead and misguided by citing the amended definition of "industry" in section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is an admitted position that the said amended definition of "industry" has not been so far brought in force and, therefore, the old definition of "industry" still continues to be in force. The learned Member has decided the question, whether the activities of the respondents were covered by the definition of "industry" as per the amendment which has not been as yet brought in force. The learned Judge has proceeded on entirely erroneous premise that the amendment in Clause (j) of section 2 definition the "industry" was brought in force and on that basis he has held that agricultural operations have been excluded from the definition of the "industry". The learned Judge has committed a grave error of law in applying the definition of "industry" which is not brought in force so far. It appears that he had proceeded to decide the complaint only on the preliminary point and, therefore, it further appears that the petitioner did not adduce any oral evidence on merits of the case. Though the learned Judge had framed an issue regarding the merits of the complaint, since the petitioner was given an impression that only the preliminary point was being decided he appears not to have adduced any oral evidence. The Industrial Court has committed a grave error of law in deciding the complaint on merits without giving an opportunity of leading evidence to the petitioner and to the respondents to lead evidence in rebuttal. The Industrial Court ought not to have considered the amended definition of "industry" and ought to have decided the question on the basis of the existing definition of "industry" given in section 2 (j) of the Act. He further ought to have decided the merits of the complaint by giving opportunity to the parties to adduce their respective evidence. The Industrial Court has dismissed the complaint on merits in the aforesaid circumstances. The judgment and order of the learned Judge is illegal and perverse. It deserves to be quashed and set aside.

(2.) THE impugned judgment and order of the Industrial Court is hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remitted back to the Industrial Court to decide the complaint afresh by giving opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence on the merits of the complaint as also on the question of, whether the activities carried on by the respondents fall within the definition of "industry" given in section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act as in force. The complaint is of 1984. The Industrial Court is hereby directed to dispose of the complaint as expeditiously as possible within three months from receipt of the writ from this Court. The petition is disposed of accordingly. Rule is made absolute. No orders as to costs. Petition allowed.