VANTE BICREM GAUNSO Vs. ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL GOA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A suit for eviction was filed by respondent No. 3 against the appellant on 2nd March, 1982 on the ground of change of user, material, alteration and personal occupation. On 25th September, 1985, respondent No. 3 had filed an application under section 32 (4) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act"), for eviction of respondent No. 3 on account of non-deposit of rent during the pendency of the proceedings. Subsequent to this application, respondent No. 3 was directed to quantify the exact amount in default and, as such application dated 2nd May, 1986, was filed wherein respondent No. 3 quantified the amount in default from December, 1981, till the date of filing of the said application. This application was disposed of by the Additional Rent Controller vide Order dated 7th January, 1987, whereby the proceedings were stopped and the appellant was directed to put the landlord in possession of the suit premises. Against this order, the appellant had filed Eviction Appeal No. 10/87 before the Administrative Tribunal. The Administrative Tribunal vide judgment dated 17th January, 1990, dismissed the appeal. The appellant then moved the High Court in Writ Petition No. 154/90, which was disposed of by a learned Single Judge of this Court vide oral judgment dated 21st/23rd September, 1994, against which the appellant has filed this Letters Patent Appeal.

(2.) THE learned Single Judge in his detailed judgment came to the conclusion that the conduct of the appellant was not only cantankerous throughout the proceedings, but the appellant had not made any attempt to deposit the rents at the earliest available opportunity, and on the contrary, had taken up all sorts of pleas and defences solely with the aim of avoiding the payment or deposit of the rent. The learned Single Judge also held that the belated plea raised by the appellant of adjustment of the cost of expenses was totally mala fide as no such plea was taken by him in the written statement.

(3.) LEARNED Advocate Shri Thali, appearing on behalf of the appellant, has urged before us that the appellant had tried to make payment of rent to the appellant, but he had refused to accept the same, as a result of which the appellant had sent Money Order towards the rent in March, 1982, which was refused by respondent No. 3. Consequently, it is pointed out that the appellant was advised by the Advocate not to deposit the rent and, as such, the appellant was under the bona fide belief that the rent was not required to be deposited. Thirdly, the appellant had, in fact, deposited the rent on 4th June, 1986, that is to say prior to the passing of the order by the Additional Rent Controller. According to the learned Advocate for the appellant, the courts below have not taken into consideration all these factors and that the courts have erred in coming to the conclusion that no sufficient cause was shown by the appellant for stopping the proceedings. Relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in (S. Sundaram Pillai v. V. R. Pattabiraman), A. I. R. 1985 S. C. 582 and the judgment of Madras High Court in (Durgai Ammal v. R. T. Mani), 1989 (2) R. C. J. 357, it has been urged by learned Advocate for the appellant that the circumstances of the case under consideration do not establish that there was any wilful default on the part of the appellant. Reliance was also placed on a judgment of this Court in (Suka Ishram Chaudhari v. Jamnabai Ranchodas Gujarathi and others), A. I. R. 1972 Bom. 273, which has in fact, been disposed of on merits of the matter.