MADHUKAR BABURAO ACHARI Vs. SHIKSHAK SMARAK SANSTHA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner has challenged the award dated 23-7-87 given by the Labour Court, Ahmednagar, rejecting the Reference (I. D. A.) No. 28/85 referred by the State Government for adjudication of the industrial dispute raised by the petitioner against the respondent College praying for reinstatement with full backwages and continuity of service. The Labour Court has rejected the reference for want of jurisdiction to entertain the industrial dispute in view of the other independent remedy available to the petitioner under the Poona University Act of 1974.

(2.) THE facts are in a very narrow compass. By an order dated 7-1-1982 the petitioner was appointed as a peon in the prescribed scale with effect from 1-7-1981 on purely temporary basis and the appointment was subjected to approval of the Director of Education. It was also stipulated that his services were liable to be terminated without any notice and without assigning any reasons. It is an admitted position that he continued to be employed till he was terminated by an order dated 24-4-1984 with effect from 1-5-1984 on the ground that the Director of Higher Education did not accord his approval to the petitioners appointment being in excess of the staffing pattern proposed by the Government. Being aggrieved by the said order of termination he raised the present industrial dispute and challenged the legality and propriety of the termination order and prayed for reinstatement with full backwages and continuity of service. Both the parties filed their pleadings before the Labour Court. The respondent-management raised a preliminary point of jurisdiction and maintainability of the reference before the Labour Court. The College management questioned the powers of the State Government to refer such an industrial dispute for adjudication to the labour Court and also questioned the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to adjudicate such a dispute on the ground that the petitioner employee was governed by the Poona University Act, 1974 and that under section 42-A he had to file an appeal before the College Tribunal under the said Act. In view of the provisions of the said Act the remedy of the petitioner was restricted to the said Act and that he had no right to raise an industrial dispute under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. By the impugned award the Labour Court accepted the preliminary objection of the College management and held that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was ousted in view of the provisions contained in section 42-B to 42-E of the Poona University Act, 1974. The reference was thus rejected.

(3.) THE petitioner is challenging the said award and order of the Labour Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Shri Shelke, the learned Advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the remedy under the Poona University Act, is an additional remedy and that the petitioner being a workman within the meaning of section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, he was entitled to raise an industrial dispute to challenge the propriety and legality of the termination order under the provisions of the I. D. Act. It was submitted by the learned Advocate that since the College continued to be an industry as defined under the I. D. Act, and the petitioner being a workman was entitled to raise an industrial dispute against the respondent employer i. e. the College management. He further submitted that there was no implied or express bar under the Poona University Act, to resort to any other alternative remedy available to the petitioner and it was his choice to prefer a forum and therefore, the findings of the Labour Court were not sustainable. Shri Shelke further submitted that the order of termination was in contravention of section 25-F and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and therefore, it was illegal and void ab initio for want of compliance of the mandatory provisions of the Act. It was further submitted that the respondent College was getting 100% grant from the Government and hence it was a State instrumentality within the meaning of Articles 12 and 226 of the Constitution of India and therefore, it was amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court and therefore, instead of remanding the matter back to the Labour Court or requiring the petitioner to approach the College tribunal, this Court itself should decide the dispute as 17 years have passed from the date of the termination. The learned Advocate has also relied on a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court (B. H. Marlapalle, J.) in (Satyawadi Ganpatrao Pimple and others v. Aruna Ganpatrao Narwade and another), 2000 (3) Bom. C. R. (A. B.)322 : 2000 (2) Maharashtra Law Journal 322. The learned Advocate has submitted that the point before the learned Judge was similar as the controversy in that case was whether a suit under section 9 of the C. P. C. would lie or appeal provided under section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 alone would be available. My pointed attention was drawn by the learned Advocate to the following portion of the judgment. The employees in private schools may consist of teaching and non-teaching and so far as non-teaching employees are concerned, they may have a remedy of a dual nature inasmuch as to approach the school tribunal under section 9 in respect of the matters provided thereunder or any other grievance and alternatively, to approach the Labour Court/industrial Court, under the provisions of the M. R. T. U. and P. U. L. P. Act. 1971. "