ZILLA PARISHAD AHMADNAGAR Vs. RAMESH SADASHIV DUKRE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner, Zilla Parishad, Ahmednagar, through its Chief Executive Officer and the District Health Officer, Zilla Parishad, Ahmednagar are aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 11-3-1988 passed by the learned Member of the Industrial Court, Ahmednagar in Complaint (ULP) No. 306/86 filed by 12 complainants employed under the petitioners as drivers claiming permanency and regularisation in the vacant posts of drivers. It was alleged against the petitioners by the respondents employees that they were recruited on or about 15-3-84 in clear vacant posts of drivers by following regular recruitment procedure i. e. they were required to undergo interview and tests and thereafter they were issued appointment orders. It was their complaint that though they had completed more than 240 days continuous employment they were continued as Badlis/temporary on daily wages and they were deprived of the benefits of permanency. They had invoked the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 and filed a complaint of unfair labour practice under section 28 read with Items 5 and 6 of Schedule IV of the Act. The nub of their complaint was this that they were appointed after following regular recruitment procedure which was prevailing at the time of their employment and they having undergone successfully the tests to which they were subjected, they were issued appointment orders but they were continued only as daily wage earners on temporary basis with an object of depriving them of the benefits of permanency. The complaint filed by the respondents was contested by the present petitioners. Both the parties filed their pleadings and all the necessary documents before the Industrial Court. Both the parties adduced their oral evidence. The learned Member of the Industrial Court on going through the material on record held that the petitioners had engaged in an unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 6, Schedule IV of the Act and directed them to desist from engaging in such a practice and further directed them to make all the respondent employees permanent on the posts of drivers with effect from 30-6-1986 and fix their pay in the cadre of drivers with effect from 30-6-1986. It was further directed that they should be given regular annual increments and other benefits of permanency with effect from 30-6-1986. It was also directed that all the arrears payable to them should be paid within a period of three months from 11-3-1988, the date of the order. The petitioners have filed the present writ petition to challenge the said order of the Industrial Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. At the time of admission of the above petition the learned Single Judge of this Court was pleased to grant interim orders in terms of prayer Clause (C) and also to restrain the petitioners from terminating the services of the respondents. The said interim order is still in operation and the concerned respondents are continuing in employment as on today.

(2.) SHRI Shelke, learned Advocate for the petitioners has pointed out that the respondent No. 6 was dismissed from employment for his act of misconduct and the respondent No. 7 had expired. It further appears that the respondent No. 11 is also not interested to prosecute this petition. I am informed across the Bar by both the learned Advocates that he is not available. Shri Shelke, further submitted that the order of the Industrial Court is not sustainable in law as the recruitment of the respondents drivers was not in accordance with the Rules as their names were not forwarded by the Regional Selection Board and therefore, their appointments were not legal and valid and therefore, they had no right to continue in employment much less to be regularized in service. It was also pointed by him that the petitioners had approached the State Government for permission to regularize the respondents employees but such a request was turned down by the State Government and therefore, they are helpless in the matter. No other point was canvassed by the learned Advocate for the petitioners.

(3.) SHRI Shirsath, learned Advocate for some of the respondents has taken me to the appointment orders issued by the petitioners to show that they were recruited and appointed after following the regular procedure of recruitment prevailing at that time. They had undergone the required interview and tests and were selected and were given appointments in vacant posts of drivers. Though it is a fact that the appointment order mentions that the appointments were on daily wages and for temporary period, it is rather strange that clear vacancies were filled in by appointing daily wage earners and for temporary period. The intention of the petitioners was clear that in view of the exigencies of the situation these appointments were required to be made to fill up the clear vacancies of the drivers. It further appears that by its letter dated 5-8-85 a proposal was also sent by the petitioners to the State Government seeking permission or sanction to fill up the sanctioned posts of drivers by the method of direct recruitment through the employment exchange or from some other agencies. The work of family planning was required to be undertaken on expeditious basis and therefore, the petitioners needed drivers on urgent basis. It was in these circumstances the respondents were also recruited by following the said procedure. The learned Advocate for the respondents also pointed out that there is no dispute about the existing vacancies of drivers available and that the respondents have been continuously working in the vacant posts for daily wages. Their work is to the satisfaction of the administration and there is no complaint of any nature against them, says the learned Advocate. In the aforesaid circumstances, Shri Shirsath, submits that there is no error of law committed by the Industrial Court in directing the petitioners to make the respondents permanent with retrospective effect from the date of the complaint i. e. 30-6-86. Shri Shrinath further submits that this Court should not interfere under the extraordinary jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in the order which is based on facts and there is no error of law committed by the learned Member of the Industrial Court. He has also relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in between (Chief Conservator of Forests and another v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare), A. I. R. 1996 Supreme Court 2898. He pointed out that this judgment was dealing with Item 6, Schedule IV of the very same Act, and therefore, it has direct bearing on the subject.