SHIVAJI EDUCATION SOCIETY Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER SCHOOLS TRIBUNAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the judgment and order of the School Tribunal, Aurangabad, dated 1st December, 1989 in Appeal No. 81 of 1989-A.

(2.) BRIEFLY stated, the respondent No. 2 was in the employment of the petitioners School for over a period of 15 years. The respondent No. 2 was charge-sheeted and enquiry was held by issuing show cause notice which contained following charges :

(3.) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner mainly argued that the Tribunal has clearly acted in excess of jurisdiction inasmuch as after it had recorded a finding that necessary mandatory procedure has been complied with, there was no reason for the Tribunal to examine the matter any further. It is further contended that the Tribunal would get jurisdiction only when it is found that the termination order is illegal and improper being in contravention of any law, contract or conditions of service and in no other circumstances. It is further contended that the Tribunal although vested with Appellate Courts Jurisdiction cannot re-appreciate the evidence on record before the Enquiry Committee and substitute its opinion to the one taken by the Enquiry Committee or the Management. It is further contended that in any case, the finding recorded by the Tribunal suffers from perversity inasmuch as the reason indicated by the Tribunal for discarding the evidence adduced by the Management was that the evidence was recorded after lapse of three years. The other reason indicated, contends the learned Counsel for the petitioner that to establish the relevant fact, all the witnesses were not examined and for that reason, the witnesses who were already examined, were held to be untrustworthy. The learned Counsel has criticised the approach of the Tribunal on the ground that the appreciation of evidence has been done as if the Tribunal was examining the evidence in a criminal case to find out whether there is proof beyond reasonable doubt. The last contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the Tribunal having held that the charge Nos. 6 and 7 have been proved, it was not open for the Tribunal to interfere with the order of termination by reducing punishment to one of stoppage of two annual increments as has been done by the Tribunal.