ILAM SINGH Vs. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE MUZAFFARNAGAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Mr. S. U. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the order of suspension dated 18th November, 1998 contained in Annexure-3 to this writ petition on two-fold grounds. The first is that the alleged misconduct is not related to the petitioner's employment or during the course of discharge of duty in relation to his employment and, therefore, it cannot be brought within the purview of misconduct in employment so as to invite disciplinary proceedings under the relevant rules. The second is that the order of suspension was issued by the disciplinary authority at the behest of his superior without application of mind and as such, cannot be sustained. In connection with the second contention. Mr. Khan had relied on the decision in the case of Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan, v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1997 SC 3400, while he was relying on the decision in the case of M/s. Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd., v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut and others. AIR 1984 SC 505, in support of his first contention.

(2.) Mr. B. K. Rai, learned brief holder for the State on the other hand had contended that by reason of Rule 5A of the U. P. Government Servant Conduct Rules. 1956, appearance in a public place in a State of intoxication is a misconduct on the part of a Government servant and, therefore, on the basis of the allegations prima facie, there are substance or material on which a proceeding can be initiated and if the disciplinary authority is satisfied, an order of suspension can very well be issued and it cannot be termed as without jurisdiction.

(3.) In reply, Mr. Khan had contended that the allegation which has been made are wholly vague and appears to be baseless and cannot form material to come to a conclusion that there are sufficient reasons to suspend the petitioner. Even if for the sake of argument, it can be presumed that there should be material to proceed against indisciplinary proceeding, relying on Rule 7 of the Lekhpal Service Rules, 1958, he contends that the Assistant Collector being the appointing authority as defined in Rule 3 (a), the order issued by him at the behest of the District Magistrate without any application of mind, is squarely covered by the decision referred to by him as above and as such, the order of suspension cannot be sustained.