(1.) One of the defendant, in a suit for eviction, initiated under the Provincial Small Causes Courts' Act being S.C.C. Suit No. 15 of 1998 before the Additional District Judge IVth Court, Aligarh. which was decreed, has challenged the same under Section 25 of the said Act before this Court.
(2.) In view of U. P. Amendment of Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts' Act, an order passed by the District Judge or Additional District Judge exercising Jurisdiction of a Judge of Small Cause is revisable under Section 25 of the Act before the High Court. The said amendment was brought about by U. P. Small Cause Amendment Act. 1966 (Act No. 17 of 1966) and U. P. Civil Laws. (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Act No. 36 of 1972).
(3.) The learned counsel for the revisionist Mr. Pramod Bhardwaj had contended that the suit could not be maintained before the Small Cause Court since it relates to an interest in the whole property, which is otherwise prohibited by reason of Section 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He also contends that since the tenancy was for manufacturing purpose, therefore, the same cannot come within the purview of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act. 1972, and as such the suit could not be instituted before a Small Cause Court, in which otherwise suit for eviction under the 1972 Act would lie. He further contends that since it was a lease for manufacturing purpose and since there was no contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for manufacturing purposes would be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable by notice under Section 106 of the Act given for a period of six months ending with the year of tenancy. In the present case, notice having been given 30 days time, the same does not satisfy the test of Section 106 of the Act. He then contends that there was no allegation of sub-tenancy under the defendan Nos. 1 and 2 so far as defendant No. 3 was concerned. Therefore, on the basis of the finding that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were tenants and the notice having been served on defendants Nos. 1 and 2, no order of eviction could be passed as against the defendant No. 3. Then again there cannot be any eviction even against the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 unless there was an allegation of subtenancy vis-a-vis defendant No. 3. No pleading of sub-tenancy having been incorporated, there could not be any decree of eviction as against defendant No. 3. He then contends that apart from defendant Nos. 1 and 2, the mother of defendant Nos. land 2 was also a tenant and no notice was served on her. According to him, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 could not become tenants since on the death of original tenant, Abdul Bari, one of them was one and half years old and therefore, they could not enter into any contract except without the mother. In absence of any notice on the mother, there could not be any eviction as against the defendant Nos. 1 and 2, which could bound the defendant No. 3- He further contends that the plaintiff had been receiving the rent from ihe defendant No. 3 regularly and had been executing rent receipts and, therefore, the plaintiff had admitted the defendant No. 3 as his tenant and as such, the suit could not be maintained as against the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 without serving a notice on the defendant No. 3 and without impleading the defendant No. 3 as the principal defendant. On these grounds he assails the order impugned.