LAWS(ALL)-1999-7-235

STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. GURUNATH

Decided On July 13, 1999
STATE OF KARNATAKA Appellant
V/S
GURUNATH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) We have heard the learned Addl. S.P.P. on merits because there is an I.A. for condonation of delay and in principle, unless this Court is satisfied that there exists a good case on appeal, we do not share the view that notice be issued to the respondents and they be asked to appear before this Court even on the LA. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the I.A.A. is allowed and the delay is condoned.

(2.) As far as the merits of the case are concerned, the prosecution had alleged that pursuant to a quarrel between the parties, that an assault had taken place with a stone and some relatively minor injuries had resulted. Undoubtedly, there was some doubt as to whether a fracture had occurred and therefore Section 326, IPC has been invoked. The case was referred to the Lok Adalat because the parties had virtually settled their grievances and since, the law does not permit compounding, very correctly, the trial Court has recorded a conviction and has imposed a sentence of one day till the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 50/- in default, ten days' simple imprisonment. Amazingly enough, the State of Karnataka has come up in appeal on the technical ground that under Section 326, IPC, compounding is not permissible but more importantly that the punishment awarded is inadequate.

(3.) As far as the first place is concerned, we need to observe that even the Supreme Court recently in the decision reported in 1999 AIR SCW 566 : 1999 Cri LJ 1342 had occasion to observe that in a case under Section 326, IPC where the offence is not (sic)impoundable under Section 320, Cr. P.C., (sic) at it is still permissible for the Court if the (sic) parties have virtually patched up, to impose (sic) lenient sentence in that case, the Court imposed a very lenient sentence and as the accused had been in custody for six months the Court held that the sentence be reduced to the period already undergone. It is the application of this principle that has guided us into holding that in appropriate cases the interest of justice would be served if the Court were to impose a punishment that is in consonance with the spirit of the compromise but more importantly the status of the parties, the type of injury and other relevant circumstances.