VINOD KUMAR RAJPUT Vs. DISTRICT INSPECTOR OF SCHOOLS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The vacancy was alleged to have been notified. But for two months, it was not filled. Thereafter a notice was pasted in the Notice Board on 13th November, 1991, by the Manager inviting applications for filling up the post on ad hoc basis. Admittedly, the vacancy was substantive in nature. A Selection Committee was constituted by the Management on 24th November. 1991, on which date the petitioner had appeared before the Selection Committee, who had passed a resolution on the same date appointing the petitioner in the post of Assistant Teacher in L.T. Grade and the Manager had issued the appointment letter on 25th November, 1991 pursuant to which the petitioner had joined on 26th November, 1991. The approval was sought for by the letter dated 24th November, 1991, from the District Inspector of Schools, who by his letter dated 28th November. 1991, informed that there was no prior approval and, therefore, the appointment could not be approved. On these grounds, learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Surendra Prasad contends that the appointment being ad hoc, the petitioner's appointment should have been approved since the appointment was made under Section 18 of the U. P. Secondary Education Service Commission and Selection Boards Act. 1982. According to him, the appointment having been made under Section 18 of the said Act, the provisions of the U. P. Secondary Education Service Commission (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the First Order) has no manner of application.

(2.) I have heard Mr. Surendra Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned standing counsel at length.

(3.) Section 18 recognised the power of the Management to appoint on ad hoc basis. But Section 18 does not prescribe any procedure. Section 16 creates an embargo to the extent that any appointment made except in accordance with the provisions of the Service Commission Act, all such appointments shall be void. Section 33 confers authority on the State Government to pass order for removal of difficulties. Pursuant to Section 33, the First Order has since been issued. Though it was specified that the said order would be of a limited duration, but in fact, no further order having been issued, the said order should be treated to be the procedure for making such appointment to be made under Section 18. Since Section 18 did not specify any procedure and procedure having been laid down in the First Order, the same has to be treated to be a procedure under which such appointment could have been made, since such order has been issued under Section 33 of the said Act. Section 18 and the First Order are supplementing each other and cannot have separate or distinct or independent existence. This view finds support from the decision in the case of Radha Raizada v. Committee of Management, 1994 (3) UPLBEC 1551.