(1.) The petitioner was Lekhpal. He was suspended by Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sakaldiba. Varanasi on 6.12.1989. He had not participated in the meeting held by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on 5.12.1989. He was charge-sheeted. The inquiry officer held that the charges were substantiality. Its report was accepted by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on 30.4.1990 and he dismissed the petitioner from service. The appeal and representation made by the petitioner to Additional District Magistrate and Commissioner, Varanasi Division, Varanasi were dismissed. The correctness of these orders has been challenged in this petition.
(2.) I have heard Shri B. N. Tiwari, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri S. P. Singh. standing counsel appearing for the respondents.
(3.) The counsel for the petitioner argued that the order of dismissal is liable to be quashed as the inquiry was contrary to the procedure provided in the rules and the order is against principles of natural justice. The learned counsel submitted that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate being the complainant, he could not act as punishing authority. Both the submissions appear to be correct. In Arjun Choubey it. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1356, the Apex Court has held that when the complainant and punishing authority are same, the order is contrary to principles of natural justice. It is one of the basic principles of law that one cannot be judge of his own cause. Therefore, the dismissal order which has been affirmed by the respondents cannot be upheld. As regards the second ground, It is not disputed in the counter-affidavit that a copy of the enquiry report was not supplied, therefore the principle laid down in Union of India v. Ramzan Khan, AIR 1991 SC 471 applied. However, since the impugned order are liable to be quashed on the first ground, it is not necessary to say any thing further.