VIJAI RATHORE Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Shri M. D. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner had pointed out from the affidavit as well as from the documents annexed as annexures that the petitioner was appointed as paid apprentice by virtue of an order dated 6.1.1990 (Annexure-I). It had come to an end on 22.2.1990 by virtue of an order dated 22.2.1990 (Annexure-II). Thereafter on 18.8.1990, the petitioner was again appointed as paid apprentice till 20.2.1991 after which his appointment should be treated to have been automatically ceased. The said order is Annexure-IV to the writ petition. By an order dated 21.8.1990 (Annexure-V), his appointment was said to have been irregular and as such was cancelled. The petitioner made a representation on 5.9.1990 (Annexure-VI). By an order dated 26.9.1990 (Annexure-VII), the petitioner was alleged to have been appointed in the post of paid apprentice. The said order indicates that the appointment was made at a salary of Rs. 950 per month for doing daily work purely on temporary and ad hoc stop-gap arrangement. The appointment was made till 20.2.1991. The said appointment could be terminated without any notice even before 20.2.1991. It was also indicated that no benefit of the said appointment would be available to the petitioner. The petitioner made a further representation on 15.11.1990. It appears that a letter was issued on 10.8.1989 (Annexure-8B) wherein the Additional Commissioner on behalf of the Commissioner had informed all the Chief Development Officers or the Additional District Magistrate (Development) or the District Development Officer that before making any recruitment in the post of Junior Clerk, in case there are such vacancies should be filled up by the said apprentice through adjustment or absorption for which no duration of period of service as paid apprentice is provided. By a letter dated 2.12.1990 (Annexure-IX), the District Development Officer had sought for clarification from the Commissioner as to what should be done in respect of those paid apprentice who had been claiming regular appointment or promotion to the post of Junior Clerk on account of their temporary appointment as paid apprentice. Whereas by an order dated 27.2.1990, it was directed in respect of all vacancies after the issue of said letter should be followed by recruitment through the Selection Committee. After forwarding request for such selection against vacancies in reply to the said clarifications, the Assistant Commissioner on behalf of the Commissioner had informed through his letter dated 4.12.1990 (Annexure-X) that by reason of a letter dated 18.9.1990, all Group-C posts should be filled up by direct recruitment through the selection board. But there is no impediment for posting paid apprentice in the post of Junior Clerk. Thereafter, by an order dated 12.12.1990 (Annexure-XI). the petitioner was promoted to post of Junior Clerk from the post of paid apprentice. But such promotion was stated to be purely temporary and could be reverted without any reason and without any notice to the post of paid apprentice.

(2.) The service of the petitioner has since been dispensed with by an order.dated 27.4.1991 (Annexure-X) on the ground that there was no necessity of his service as Junior Clerk. This order has since been challenged in this writ petition.

(3.) Shri M. D. Singh had contended that the termination of service has been purported to be made on the basis of U. P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975 without complying with the provisions contained in the said Rules inasmuch as neither notice nor pay in lieu of notice was given to the petitioner while terminating the service. Secondly, he contends, that the said order of termination is a penalty in disguise. It has inflicted civil consequence on the petitioner without giving him any opportunity. The petitioner having been appointed against permanent vacancy on regular basis, 1975 Rules cannot be invoked since definition of temporary service does not include temporary appointment against substantive vacancy. He then contends that since the petitioner was appointed against substantive vacancy on regular basis, his service could not have been terminated in the manner as it has been done, which is violative of the principles of natural justice and equity. According to him by reason of the order dated 10.8.1989 contained in Annexure-VIIl-B and the clarifications contained in Annexure-X dated 4.12.1990, the petitioners appointment shall be treated to be a regular appointment and cannot be unceremoniously terminated in the manner it has been sought to be done.