SURYA KUMAR ALIAS BHONDA Vs. COMMISSIONER JHANSI DIVISION

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE facts giving rise to this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India briefly stated are that proceedings under section 3 of the U. P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) were initiated against the petitioner on the basis of the report of the Superintendent of Police, Banda, dated 4-7-1988. THE said proceedings were contested by the petitioner and on the basis of the materials the Additional District Magistrate was satisfied that the conditions prescribed in section 3 of the Act existed and it was expedient to direct the petitioner to remove himself outside the district for a period of six months by order dated 16-6-1989. Being aggrieved against the aforesaid order of the Additional District Magistrate the petitioner filed an appeal as provided under section 6 of the Act before the Commissioner Jhansi Division, Jhansi. It appears that an application for staying the operation of the order dated 16-6-1989 passed by the Additional District Magistrate was also filed by the petitioner before the Commissioner. THE Commissioner by the impugned order dated July 18, 1989 was of the opinion that it was not desirable to stay the operation of externment passed by the Additional District Magistrate pending disposal of the appeal and as such rejected the stay application. THE petitioner feeling aggrieved against the said order has come to this Court in the instant writ petition

(2.) SINCE there are no private parties in the writ petition, I have heard Sri R. B. Rao, counsel for the petitioner, and the Standing Counsel on behalf of the State and as provided under the second proviso to rule 2 of Chapter XXII of the Rules of Court the writ petition is being disposed of finally at the admission stage itself.

(3.) AFTER hearing counsel for the parties and for the reasons stated above I am of the definite view that the legislature while conferring power on the Commissioner under section 6 (3) of the Act of staying the operation of the order passed by the District Magistrate during the pendency of the appeal is only discretionary and not mandatory and as such the argument of the counsel for the petitioner that the word 'may' used in section 6 of the Act should be read as 'shall' seems to be wholly fallacious.