UNION OF INDIA Vs. SUSHILA DEVI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These two appeals raise a question as to the true scope and interpretation of Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The learned single Judge (N.N. Mithal, J.) who has formulated and referred three questions for our opinion, felt that the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Union of India v. Bhagwati Prasad, reported in AIR 1982 All 310, has, while interpreting Section 110 and allied provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, stated the law on the subject too widely and consequently it requires reconsideration. The reference was necessitated because of a preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the Union of India before the learned single Judge. The objection was that the claims giving rise to the two suits out of which these first appeals arise were exclusively cognizable by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and not by the Civil court. After an elaborate consideration of the various authorities cited before the learned single Judge he has posed three questions and referred them for our opinion. The questions are-

(2.) In Bhagwati Prasad's case (supra) a Division Bench of this Court had occasion to consider the question whether a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under the aforesaid Act is competent to take cognizance of a claim for compensation in respect of an accident involving death or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of a motor vehicle against a third party also i.e. a party other than the owner or driver of the vehicle and the insurer of the vehicle. The Division Bench was considering a composite claim directed against both the driver and the owner of a tempo-taxi which had collided with the Allahabad-Saharanpur Passenger as well as the Union of India represented by the General Manager, northern Railway. Upon a schematic analysis of Sections 110 to 110-F, the Bench held that all claims in respect of accidents arising out of the use of motor vehicle must be held to be cognizable by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and not by the Civil Court, the Legislature having provided an exhaustive machinery and the procedure to be followed thereunder for adjudicating upon all claims in respect of accidents arising out of the use of motor vehicles. We shall revert to this case later when considering the specific questions referred for our opinion. We will take up the first and the second questions together as a glance at the second question, in our opinion, would indicate that it is fully covered by the first question. Upon a true interpretation and import of Section 110(1) will depend the answer to the second question formulated by the learned single Judge as well.

(3.) In order to appreciate the scope of Section 110 it will be necessary to examine the nature of claim triable under Section 110 of the Act. In Minu B. Mehta v. Balkrishna, reported in AIR 1977 SC 1248, their Lordships had occasion to consider an identical issue. The main contention urged before the Supreme Court was that negligence in the use of the motor vehicle causing the accident giving rise to the claim for compensation need not be proved under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The argument further was that Chapter VIII of the Act (containing Section 110 etc.) was a consolidating Act relating to motor vehicles and their use on a public place and, as such, it contains the entire law, procedural as well as substantive. That being so, it was argued, the common law or the Law of Torts was not applicable. It was sufficient, therefore, to establish that the accident arose out of the mere use of the motor vehicle irrespective of whether the use of the motor vehicle was negligent or otherwise.