CHANDA DEVI Vs. TARA PAD SINHA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The point which has arisen for determination in these appeals is as to whether the tenants Sita Ram (since dead and his heirs brought on record) and Ram Sewak had incurred forfeiture of their tenancy and had become liable for ejectment under Section III (g) of the Transfer of Property Act. The material facts may be briefly stated : Dr. Tara Pad Sinha and his wife Smt. Savitri Devi brought two suits against Sita Ram and Ram Sewak respectively with similar allegations. It was stated that they were the owners of house No. 92 situate in Mohalla Sainyer Gate, Jhansi and the defendants aforesaid were tenants in a room in the lower portion and a room in the first floor of the house in question on a monthly rent of Rs. 9/-and 11/- respectively. They were separately tenants of the two rooms since the time of their predecessors-in-title. At the time of the purchase of the house bv the present plaintiffs the defendants promised to pay rent regularly at the said rate but they committed default and hence they were served with a notice dated 20th September, 1966 on 21st September, 1966. They did not vacate the house and instead sent a reply to the composite notice aforesaid, alleging, inter alia, that the plaintiffs had no right of ownership as the previous owner and all his heirs did not execute the sale deed in the plaintiffs' favour. The two suits were consolidated by the trial court and were disposed of by a common judgment. They were decreed in the plaintiff's favour and the defendants filed two separate appeals. The plaintiffs also filed a cross-ob-iection but the lower appellate court dismissed both appeal and the cross objection. Aggrieved by the same the defendants have filed two connected appeals, which I find it convenient to dispose of by a common judgment.

(2.) I have already formulated the question which arises for consideration. The appellants raised two contentions before me. Firstly, it was submitted that on a perusal of the reply of the defendants to the plaintiffs' notice, it would be apparent that there had been no denial of title by the defendants. It is not possible to demur to the proposition that in order to constitute a disclaimer of title for purposes of Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act there must be a direct repudiation of the relationship of landlord and tenant, and the denial must be by clear and unambiguous words and to the knowledge of the landlord. In the present case the defendants in their reply dated 10th October, 1966 to the plaintiffs' notice had clearly stated -

(3.) To my mind, there cannot be a more unequivocal and defiant disclaimer of the title of the landlord and this was enough to entail forfeiture of tenancy of the defendants. Both the courts have also an appraisal of evidence recorded a categorical finding that the appellants had knowledge of the transfer of the house in the plaintiffs' favour. In fact, it was admitted by Sita Ram appellant that he came to know of the transfer in favour of the plaintiffs on 18-9-1966. Still, however, on 10-10-1966 he and Ram Sewak in their replies to the notice made the disclaimer which I have extracted above. What is significant is further recital in reply to the notice that the plaintiffs had obtained a registered sale deed of the house in their favour but that had been obtained by practising fraud on the other co-heirs and co-sharers of the property. This averment in reply to the plaintiffs' notice leaves no room for doubt that the defendants were fully aware of the fact that the plaintiffs had become the owners by virtue of a registered sale deed. In the teeth of such ostensible proof of title surely it did not lie in the mouth of the tenants to impute fraud and ulterior motive to the plaintiffs and hold as (if) it were a brief on behalf of the other possible claimants to the property. This is far from being a bona fide enauirv into the real ownership of the property or quest of the person to whom the tenants may legally pay rent and discharge their liability as lessees. The phraseology of their reply to the notice is consistent only with a determined resolve on their part not to treat the plaintiffs as the owners entitled to realise rent from them. This is wholly beyond the province of a lessee and amounts to unabashed disclaimer of the landlord's title. The facts in AIR 1934 All 103 (Madho Lal v. Lal Bahadur Singh) were more or less similar. A rent suit was brought by the landlord and therein the tenant contended that the plaintiff was not the landlord and he was nobody's tenant. It was held that this amounted to disclaimer of the landlord's title and he was entitled to eject the tenant. I have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the appellants had incurred forfeiture of tenancy and the pro-visions of Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act were fully attracted by the facts of the present case.