(1.) THIS petition arises out of the proceedings under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. The facts, in brief, are these : the petitioner was issued notice under Section 10 (2) and he filed his objections. They were decided by the Prescribed Authority by his order dated 5th June, 1976, a true copy whereof has been annexed to the petitioner and marked as Annexure-1. Thereafter an appeal was filed and the same was heard and decided by the 4th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Saharanpur by his judgment dated April, 28, 1977, a certified copy whereof has been annexed to the petition and marked as Annexure-2. Now, the petitioner has come up in the instant petition. Two points are involved in this petition. Firstly, it is claimed that the sale-deed dated It-11-1971 executed by the petitioner in favour of Smt. Hajra should have been accepted. In my view, looking to the language of Section 5 (6) of the Act, the authorities below were justified in ignoring the documents and in not giving the benefit of clause (b) of the proviso to Section 5 (6). There is no such infirmity in the verdicts of the authorities below as will entitle this Court to interfere in its limited writ jurisdiction. The other controversy is in respect of plot No. 281 whereof 8 bighas 16 biswas 5 biswansis area is claimed to be grove land. Mr. Shah, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that this controversy should be decided in view of the law laid down in Mohd. Yamin v. State 1978 A.W.C. 793, So far as the said case is concerned, in my opinion, the same is not applicable because even if it were to be interpreted as laying down a mandatory duty on the part of the Prescribed Authority to make a local inspection. With the deepest respect to my learned brother I do not think that he really meant to lay down such imperative duty. My learned Brother only emphasised the expediency and disirability of spot inspections in deciding a controversy about a grove, still it should be seen that in the instant case a spot inspection was made. So far as the other case is concerned i.e. Mahendra Singh v. State 1978 (4) A.L.R. 356, G. S. P. Singh, J. laid down that the real test is that it should be shown that the trees were planted before 24th January, 1971, and when fully grown will preclude cultivation. I cannot see how any excep tion can be taken to the said proposition because it is there in the definition of grove land itself in the ceiling Act. Reliance has also been placed on Hameed Husain v. State,(3) where importance was attached to the words "considerable portion thereof " in Section 3 (8) defining grove land. It seems to me that in the facts of the instant case the controversy has been examined correctly on the basis that it was for the petitioner to have discharged the burden of showing that the trees had been planted before 24th January, 1971. Normally it should be seen that in the case of genuine groves one would expect khasra entries and the absence of such entries is bound to cause considerable scepticism about the claim of a grove on the land in dispute. The inspection note has not been relied on by the appellate Court, and, in my opinion, the appellate Court was justified in underlining the fact that apart from making general and vague statements that there were many trees on plot No, 28[, nothing specific was said to how many trees stood within a particular area. In the absence of these details it will be impossible to say whether the trees when fully grown could be said to preclude cultivation in such area. The appellate Court underlined the fact that the petitioner himself in his statement did not say that the trees had been planted before 24th January, 1971. I should like to emphasise that in a controversy which is a pure controversy of fact depending on the assessment of the evidence and material on the record, it was absolutely open to the appellate Court to assess the particular pieces of evidence in its own wisdom. THIS Court cannot in its writ jurisdiction tell the authorities below as to how they should assess the evidence and the material on the record. If the appellate Court did not feel satisfied with the evidence on the record and felt that the petitioner had failed to discharge the burden of proof that the plot had any portion of a grove on it, then in my writ jurisdiction which has to be distinguished from an appellate jurisdiction, I cannot take exception to the finding recorded by the authorities below. I should like to emphasise that in the writ jurisdiction it will not be expedient to make generalizations as to how and in what manner the authorities below should decide such controversies of fact. It should be seen that different aspects of matter are involved when such questions of fact come up before a trial Court and it is always dangerous to make a general observation as to the manner in which such a controversy of fact should be decided. THIS petition lacks merit and is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.