BAHADUR SINGH Vs. HAR BHAGWAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a defendant's revision filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed against a judgment of the Fifth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Meerut, dated February 3, 1978. The plaintiff opposite party was the owner and landlord of a house, of which the defendant applicant was a tenant. The house had been let out to the defendant-applicant on mothly rent of Rs.125/-. On February 21, 1975, the plaintiff served a notice on the defendant-applicant under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating his tenancy and asking him to vacate the house after the expiry of one month of the service of the said notice. Since the defendant did not vacate the premises, the suit was filed. The defendant contested the suit on the ground that as the house had been constructed in the year 1964 and not in the year 1968, as pleaded by the plaintiff, the plaintiff could not get a decree for ejectment against the defendant, without establishing the requirements of Section 20 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The defendant also asserted that the notice served on him was invalid. On the pleadings of the parties, as many as five issues were framed. We are concerned only with Issue No. 3, which reads as under: 'Whether U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is applicable to the accommoda tion in suit?' As observed above, the case of the plaintiff was that the house had been 4 constructed in 1967-68, whereas the case of the defendant was that it was built in 1964. Both the courts below found against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiff, viz., that the house was constructed in 1968. In accordance with the view which was prevailing in this Court, if the house was constructed in 1967-68, the Act did not apply to the building. When the suit was filed. The result of the same was that the plaintiff was entitled to get a decree for ejectment against the defendant without establishing or making out any of the grounds mentioned in Section 20 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 for ejectment of the tenant. This view had been taken by the High Court on the interpreta tion of Section 2 (2) of the Act. Section 2 of the Act provides for the exemptions from the operation of the Act. The relevant portion of subsection (2) of Section 2 reads as under: 'Except as provided in sub-section (5) of Section 12, subsection (1-A) of Section 21 Sub-section (2) of Section 24, Sections 24-A, 24-B, 24-C or sub-section (3) of Section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years-- from date of which its construction is completed.' The expression 'from the date of which its construction is completed' contemplates as including within its ambit the constructions made before the enforcement of the Act as well. The effect of this interpretation was that even the houses and buildings which had been built within ten years of the enforcement of the Act were also exempt from the purview of the Act. In this view, the High Court has been consistently holding that a landlord of a nature like the present would not be required to establish any of the grounds stated in sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act. The construction does not cover only the cases of the buildings made before the Act, but also the buildings made after the Act. For the above interpretation, reliance had also been placed by the High Court on Sections 39 and 40 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972. On the language of Section 39, a Division Bench of this Court is held that the word 'commence ment' means the date on which the period of ten years is completed. But, now in view of the recent decision of the Supreme Court given in Ratan Lal Singhal v. Smt. Marti Devi, Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 40 of 1979, the above view of the Allahabad High Court can no longer be considered as good. Although the Supreme Court rejected the Special Leave Petition filed by the tenant before it but while rejecting it made certain observations which concluded the controversy against the landlord of the present case. These observations are: 'Shri G. L. Shanghi, counsel for the petitioner, has raised a neat point of law, as he describes it, that Act 13 of 1972, by which new buildings constructed during the period of ten years should be given exemption from the operation of the Act, does not apply to buildings constructed prior to the amendment. His contension is that ordinarily a statute like this is prospective in operation unless there is clear legisla tive intent to the contrary. We are inclimed to agree with him that legislation is not retrospective and would have gone further to give him relief on that basis.' The above observations leave no room for doubt that the benefit of exemption conferred by Section 2(2) is prospective and applies to buildings constructed after the enforcement of Act. Landlord's concerned, however, contended that since the Supreme Court had rejected the Special Leave Petition, the observations made by the Supreme Court are not binding on this Court. I am afraid, the submission cannot be accepted. Under Article 141 of the Constitution, the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on the High Court. It is pertinent to point out that in the present case the Supreme Court had even indicated its mind that the view which was being taken by it in the aforesaid case should be treated as the law declared by it. Even if the Supreme Court would not have said that, the decision of the Supreme Court fulfils the requirement of law, and the High Court is bound to follow the same. Sri V. K. Goel counsel holding the brief for the landlord, further contended that since the Supreme Court did not consider the various sections of the Act, the observations made by the Supreme Court are obiter, parti cularly when the Supreme Court rejected the petition in limine. I am unable to subscribe to the view of the applicant's learned counsel. Even if it may be true that the Supreme Court had not made a pointed reference to the various provisions of the Act, but that would not take away the effect of the judgment. The judgment of the Supreme Court even in the said case is binding on the High Court, and in view of the above the benefit of Section 2 (2) cannot be given to the constructions made prior to the enforcement of the Act. Counsel also placed strong reliance on the sentence That Act 13 of 1972 is prospective and applies only to buildings brought into being de novo after the Act came into force. in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the afore said case, and submitted that the Supreme Court since laid down that the Act was prospective, as such, the constructions made before the coming into force of the Act were not governed by the Act and, accordindgly, a landlord who constructed his building or house before the Act was not required to establish any of the grounds of Section 20 and could get a decree against his tenant without fulfilling any or one of the requirements stated in Section 20 of the Act. The Supreme Court does not mean to lay down that the Act is pros pective. What the Supreme Court meant that exemptions given by Section 2(2) were prospective, and not the Act, if the judgment of the Supreme Court was interpreted in the manner, as was pleaded before me by the learned counsel for the landlord, there would be an anomalous position. It would mean that the Act would not apply to all the constructions made before the Act, and it would also not apply to the constructions made after the Act came into force. This would mean that the Act would apply to the constructions only after 1982. That could not be and was not the intention of the Supreme Court. The judgment of the Supreme Court has to be read as a whole. Read ing the judgment as a whole, one is left with no doubt that the Supreme Court was considering the limited question of exemption and if found that the exemption granted by Section 2(2) of the Act was prospective. it is the settled rule of interpretation of a provision that it must be read in a manner that it gives effect to the judgment given by a court. Reverting to the merits, I find that since the Act was applicable to the building in question, there was bar imposed for filing a suit for ejectment of the tenant, except on grounds mentioned in Section 20. Admittedly, the landlord of the present case has not established any of the grounds mention ed in Section 20. Consequently, he was not entitled to any decree. In the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed. The judgments of the two courts below are set aside, and the suit of the plaintiff for ejectment of the defendent is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.