OM PRAKASH Vs. ANANDI DEVI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision has been filed by the defendant agains the judgment and decree dated 21-5-1976 passed by the learned District Judge, Balia who has affirmed the decision of the Judge Small Cause Court. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the plaintiff let out certain premises to the defendant on 1- 7-1970 at the rate of Rs.150/- per month. It is alleged that fresh terms of tenancy were agreed upon by the defendant on 27-7-1970 and thereafter the period of tenancy of the defendant became from 27th of each month to the 26th of the succeeding month. The plaint allega tion further is that the defendant had paid the rent up to 26-1-1970, and there after for the period 2M-1970 to 26-8-1972 a sum of Rs.1050/-had become due as arrears of rent which the defendant had failed to pay in spite of demand. The plaintiff, therefore, filed the suit for recovery of the same. It is worth noting that this suit was filed in the trial Court on 11-9-1972. The defence taken was that there was a bona fide doubt about the title of the plaintiff on account of the fact that some other persons had started claiming themselves to be the owners of the property and in the month of August, 1972 a notice was also served by such persons on the defendant in this respect. It is alleged that on account of the said notice the defendant deposited the amount of arrears of rent under Section 30 (2) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. THIS deposit was made on 23-9-1972. It was urged before the trial Court that the defendant having made the deposit in Court under Section 30 of the Act the plaintiff's suit should be dismissed. The trial Court decreed the suit and the learned District Judge in revision also upheld the same holding that the deposit made by the defendant would not make any difference because the same had been made subsequent to the filing of the suit. In revision, before this Court also the same point has been urged. It is argued before me that there was in fact a bona fide doubt about the title and therefore the entire arrears of rent had been deposited in the Court in proceedings under Section 30(2) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The applica tion moved by the tenant under Section 30(2) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was, however, dismissed on 19-5-1973 but subsequent thereto a revision was filed which is said to have been allowed by the District Judge Balia vide his order dated 4-11-1974. The contention of the learned counsel is that when the tenant has already made the deposit of the entire arrears of rent in the Court then there was no justification in decreeing the suit. The rights of the parties in a lis are to be decided as on the date of filing of the suit. Addmittedly, the amount of rent was due but had not been paid by the defendant up to the date when the suit was filed. The deposit was also made subsequent thereto on 23-9-1972, i. e., about 12 days after the filing of the suit. On the date of filing the suit therefore, the plaintiff was justified in filing the same. However, in order to appreciate the argument of the learned counsel for the revisionist the scope of proceedings under Section 30 of U. P. Act 13 of 1972 has to be seen. The relevant portions of Section 30 of the Act reads as under: " 30. Deposit of rent in Court in certain circumstances, (1) ................... (2) Where any bona fide doubt OF dispute has arisen as to the person who is entitled to receive any rent in respect of any building, the tenant may likewise deposit the rent stating the circumstances under which such deposit is made and may until such doubt has been removed or such dispute has been settled by the decision of any competent Court or by settlement between the parties, continue to deposit the rent that may subsequently become due in respect of such building. (3). The deposit referred to in sub-section (1), or sub-section (2) shall be made in the Court of the Munsif having jurisdiction, (4). ..... ..... .... (5). On a deposit being made under sub-section (2), the Court shall cause notice of the deposit to be served on the person or persons concer ned and hold the amount of the deposit for the benefit of the person who may be found entitled to it by any competent Court or by a settle ment between the parties, and the same shall be payable to such person. (6). In respect of a deposit made as aforesaid, it shall be deemed that the person depositing it has paid it on the date of such deposit to the person in whose favour it is deposited in the case referred to in subeection (1) or to the landlord in the case referred to in sub-section (2)." A perusal of the aforesaid provisions would go to show that once a deposit made under Section:30 of the Act is accepted by the Court, two effects will follow. Firstly, under sub-clause (6) of Section 30 any depost it so made and accepted by the Court will by fiction of law amount to payment of rent on the date of deposit and the tenant's liability will be fully discharged. Secondly, sub-clause (2) of Section 30 authorises the tenant to continue to deposit the rent until the doubt has been removed or such dispute has been settled by the decision of any competent Court or by settelment between the parties. Now if the contention of the learned counsel that the tenant having made the deposit under Section 30, the suit must be dismissed was to be accepted, it would be doing great violence with the language of the Section. As already seen above, sub-section (6) clearly refers to "the date of deposit" as the date relevant for the purposes of discharge of liability. In the instant case, the plaintiff's suit was filed before the tenant had applied for deposit of rent in arrears under Section 30 of the Act. THIS deposit, there fore, cannot in any way discharge the claim of the plaintiff. In any case permitting a tenant to take such a recourse would work very harshly for the landlord/landlady. The tenant will, in such a case, become entitled to deposit the rent in Court till such time as the rival parties have got their claims decided by a competent Court or till they arrive at some compromise. In either case the landlord will not have advantage of the amount of rent in deposit in Court and would be forced to go to the Court in litigation to have the title decided. In my view, therefore, the deposit made by the tenant could not enure for the benefit of the plaintiff who would not be entitled to receive the rent in deposit unless her rights are decided by a competent Court or there is some compromise. Since the deposit made by the tenant in this case will not enure for the benefit of the plaintiff at once the same cannot be taken to be in discharge of tenant's liability. Besides this the defendant is also liable for payment of costs. In a proceeding of this nature deposit is accepted by the Court, conditional upon the determination of the rights of the rival claimants, and Section 30(2) of the aforesaid Act clearly lays down that the money deposited by the tenant cannot be withdrawn by any of the rival claimants unless the alleged dispute between them has been decided. In this manner, the result of such a deposit would be to place the plaintiff in a situation in which she would not be entitled to recover the rent unless she got her title decided by a competent Court. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I find no merit in the revision. The judgment of the learned District Judge does not suffer from any illegality or other infirmity as contemplated under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Ever since the hearing of this revision by me it has been brought to my notice that a Full Bench of this Court in its judgment dated 3-5-1979 has held that a second revision from the judgment of the District Judge passed under Section 25 of Provincial Small Causes Courts Act shall not lie to the High Court. In view of this decision, the revision is not legally maintainable. The revision is, therefore, dismissed with costs.