IRSHAD HUSAIN KHAN Vs. OM PRAHLAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is the tenant's writ petition arising out of an application under Section 21 (I) (a), of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regula tion of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Both the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge acting as appellate authority have upheld the land lord's contentions which were threefold in nature: - (a) That the landlord needed the shop for his own use. (b) That the shop was in a dilapidated condition and required to be reconstructed and that the landlord would use it after reconstruction. (c) On the question of comparative need, the hardship to the landlord, if the application were rejected, would be greater than the hardship to the tenant if the application be allowed. The learned counsel for the petitioner has agrued at the out-set that the application being based on the need for reconstruction, it was necessary for the landlord to comply with the provisions of Rule 17 of the Rules made under the Act. It is well settled that this Rule applies only to an application under Section 21 (1) (b) and not to an application under Section 21 (I) (a ). The reason behind this distinction is that in respect of an application under Section 21 (1) (a) the landlord has to prove his bonafide need to also while in an application under clause (b) he does not have to prove his need. It was further contended that the judgments of the Prescribed Authority and the appellate authority are vitiated by their having taken into considera tion the allegation of the landlord that the petitioner had sub-let part of the shop to a third person. The finding of the two authorities that the petitioner had taken the shop for carrying on the business of bicycle repair while he had sub-let a portion to a watch- maker. The finding of fact in this regard is not open to challenge. The learned counsel has, however contended that sub-letting is a ground of eviction under Section 20 (2) (e) and as such the question of sub-letting was a matter falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court in which a suit for eviction could have been instituted on this ground. It is true that the bar imposed by Section 20 (I) on a landlord's suit for eviction of a tenant stands removed if any of the grounds men tioned in sub-section (2) is made out. But it does not follow from this that if the sub-letting can be a relevant factor in a. proceeding under Section 21, the same cannot be considered by the Prescribed Authority. As observed in Smt. Prem Kumari Jain v. The District Judge 1979 U. P. Rent Control Cases 68, "the fact of sub-letting may become relevant for the purpose of deciding the question of hardship and if the tenant is found to have sub-let a premises, the landlord may contend that the requirement of the premises by the tenant is not genuine. " of course the landlord cannot succeed in an application under Section 21 on the mere ground of sub-letting as such. He will succeed or fail on the ground of his own bonafide need, but before allowing his application the Prescribed Authority is required to take into consideration and balance the likely hardships to the respective parties. It is only for that limited purpose that the fact of sub-letting, if any, may, among other things, become relevant, though by itself it is no ground for allowing the application under Section 21. It cannot, therefore, be said that the impugned order stands vitiated merely by the authorities this fact of sub-letting, Inter alia, into con sideration while balancing the respective hardships to the parties. I thus find no force in this writ petition. It is hereby dismissed. The petitioner is however given three months' time to vacate the premises. No order as to costs. .