MAHMOOD Vs. BALWANT SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a claimant's appeal against the order dated 31-1-1972 passed by the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, Saharanpur dismissing an application filed by him under Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

(2.) It was claimed by the appellant that he was a workman employed by the respondents for the last one year for the purpose of thrashing wheat in village Bongla, Pargana and police station Jamalpur, district Saharanpur, that on 6-5-1971 at about 9 a. m. he received personal injuries during the course of his employment from a thrasher which was run by a tractor belonging to the respondents, that on the date of the accident when the wheat of the respondents was being thrashed by the appellant his right hand below the elbow was crushed in the machine and the same had to be amputated later on. The appellant claimed the loss of earning capacity to the extent of 80 per cent and demanded a lump sum of Rs. 7,340/- as compensation on the basis that he was being paid Rs. 150/- per month as pay. The respondents resisted the application and contended that the appellant was never in their employment nor was the injury sustained by him during the course of any such alleged employment. The application, was however, rejected by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner on the preliminary ground that the appellant was not a workman covered by the definition contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act.

(3.) Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the appellant was fully covered by the definition of the term "workman" and the contrary view of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner was erroneous. He further urged that this was a substantial question of law involved in the case. In order to appreciate the contention raised on behalf of the appellant as to whether he was a workman within the meaning of the term as used in Section 2 (1) (n) of the Act it is necessary to examine the definition and its applicability to the facts of this case. The material part of it so far as applicable to the present case is quoted below: