(1.) THIS second appeal has been field by the defendant who has lost in both the Courts blow. The only point for consideration before this Court is as to whether the property in question was constructed before or after 1-1-1951. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that this is a jurisdictional matter and if the finding of fact recorded about the date of cons truction of the disputed building was wrong it will effect an exercise of juris diction by the lower Courts. I do not agree with this contention for the simple reason that the Court had the jurisdiction to decide a suit for ejectment of the tenant irrespective of the fact whether the accommodation was a pre-1951 construction or a post 1950 construction. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction the Court was to adjudicate the rights of the parties. If the Court on the evidence on record, concluded that the building in question was a post 1950 construction the provisions of the U. P. Act III of 1947 would not apply. If, however, the Court decided to the contrary, the Court will have to consider its effect in view of the provisions of the U. P. Act III of 1947. Thus, a decision on the question as to whether the building was post 1950 or pre-1951 construction will only affect the final relief to which the plaintiff may be entitled but it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the Court at all. I have gone through the judgments of the two Courts below and in agreement with the Courts below came to the conclusion that the building in question was a new construction raised after demolishing the old building and this was done after 1-1-1951. In view of this, the U. P. Act No. III of 1947 could not be said to apply to the building in question and the plaintiff was fully competent to file a suit without complying with the conditions laid down in Section 3 of the U. P. Act No. III of 1947. Nothing has been pointed out against the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and no other point has been pressed. In the circumstances, stated above, I do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is hereby dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their own costs of this appeal.