O L SINGH Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) JAGANNATH son of Kale resident of Partappur District Meerut was prosecuted for an offence under sections 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. He was convicted by the 1st Class Magistrate, Meerut by his order dated 11th July, 1972. The accused having confessed his guilt the Magistrate was inclined to take a very lenient view on the question of sentence. While convicting the accused under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the Magistrate sentenced him to a fine of Rs.150/- (one hundred and fifty) only. In default he was to undergo 1 month's rigorous imprisonment.

(2.) AGGRIEVED thereby a revision was filed by the Food Inspector before the Sessions Judge, Meerut, which was allowed on 18th September, 72. The Sessions Judge relying upon a decision of a Division Bench of our court (District Medical Officer of Health, Lucknow v. Binda Prasad, 1972 CrLJ 1967), took the view that the imposition of a sentence of fine, alone under sections 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, was illegal. In his opinion a sentence of fine as well as of imprisonment should have been imposed. As such he made a reference to this court for setting aside the sentence of fine and for passing a legal and adequate sentence, as may be required by law. In these circumstances Criminal Reference No. 833 of 1972 came up for decision before a single Judge. The learned single Judge could not see eye to eye with the decision of the Division Bench of our court. He was unable to persuade himself to agree with the above view. As such he proposed that the matter be referred to a larger Bench to reconsider the following question :

(3.) IT is clear from the aforesaid section that under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, varying punishments were prescribed for the first, second and third offence committed under the Act. For the first offence a sentence of 1 year's R. I. or a fine up to two thousand rupees or both could be inflicted, but when the second offence was committed by the accused, it became necessary to inflict a sentence of imprisonment up to two years and fine also. For the third and subsequent offences, the punishment was made still more stringent; the term of imprisonment was extended to four years and with fine. Even under the proviso of subclauses (ii) and (iii) where special and adequate reasons existed for taking a lenient view, it was clearly specified that imprisonment and fine was to be awarded. Clause (i) used the conjunction 'or' but (ii) and (iii) clauses used the conjunction 'and'. This clearly indicated that whereas under the (i) clause imprisonment or fine could be imposed in the alternative, under the (ii) and (iii) clauses there was no option left to the court, but to inflict both, a sentence of imprisonment as well as of fine.