BHOLA Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application in revision under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code), praying that the order dated 17-11-1977 of the Sessions Judge, Ghazipur cancelling the bail granted to the applicants by the Magistrate before whom they are being prosecuted for offence punishable under Sections 147, 323, 325 and 453 of the Indian Penal Code (Crime No. 60 of 1977), be set aside.

(2.) THE main question involved in this application is whether an order cancelling bail is an 'interlocutory order' within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Code or in other words, whether an application in revision would lie to this court u/Sec. 397 of the Code against an order cancelling bail.

(3.) WHAT is an 'interlocutory order' within the meaning of Section 397 (2) of the Code, has been considered in detail by the Supreme Court in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2185 and Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, 1978 AWC 96, referred to by the learned counsel for the parties. The Supreme Court has held that though the expression 'interlocutory order' has not been used in Section 397 (2) of the Code in the restricted sense of an order which is converse to the term 'final order' as in that case it would almost have rendered nugatory the revisional powers of the court of Sessions or the High Court conferred by Section 357 (1) of the Code. An order which does not decide any of the matters in dispute, or substantially decides any vital issue in the case against the accused touching the merits of the case or the rights of the parties, will be an 'interlocutory order'. It has been observed that it is not possible to make a catalogue of orders to demonstrate which would be purely 'interlocutory orders' within the meaning of Section 397 (2) of the Code and that whether an older is an 'interlocutory order' has to be adjudged keeping in view its effect on the questions of rights of the parties involved in the case. In our view, an order cancelling bail granted to an accused does not in any way affect the questions involved in the criminal case pending against the applicants or the rights of the parties in relation to any of the questions that may be involved in that case. It may be that an order of cancellation of bail deprives an accused of his liberty and for him it may be a matter of moment, but because of the reasons discussed, it cannot escape the bar imposed by Section 397 (2) and is purely an 'interlocutory order'. It may be mentioned that in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana (supra) while giving examples of what is an 'interlocutory order' within the meaning of Section 397 (2) off the Code, the Supreme Court mentioned 'passing orders for bail'. In our opinion 'passing orders for bail' would include 'granting, rejecting or cancelling bail'. We may repeat that nothing could be brought to our notice due to which it could be said that the impugned) order was passed substantially touching some aspect of the case or the merits of the case pending against the accused or affecting some vital questions involved in the case.