SRI NATH Vs. PRESCRIBED AUTHORITY JAUNPUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) AN application under Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was filed by Respondents 2 to 9 against the Petitioner before the Prescribed Authority, Jaunpur, Respondent No. 1. This application appears to have been filed in the year 1977, its number being 4 of 1977. During its pendency the Petitioner made an application that the matter had been compromised and a decree be passed in terms of the compromise. No compromise in writing was, however, produced before the Prescribed Authority by the Petitioner. The Prescribed Authority relying on the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Mohd. Anwar v. Additional District Judge 1978, RCC UP 468, wherein it was held that in view of the amendment made by the Allahabad High Court in Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which came into force on 31st August, 1974, no decree could be passed on the basis of a compromise which had not been reduced to writing, dismissed the application made by the Petitioner by its order dated 20th November, 1978. It is this order of the Prescribed Authority which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition.

(2.) IT was urged by counsel for the Petitioner that Section 34 of the Act made it clear that the provisions contained in Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code off Civil Procedure had been incorporated by reference in the act and consequently the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it stood on the date when the Act came into force would alone be relevant and the amendment in the Code of Civil Procedure by this Court in 1974 would be of no consequence. Reliance in -support of this submission was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. M.V. Narasimhan : AIR 1975 SC 1935, where, after considering earlier decisions on the point, it was held:

(3.) HAVING given our anxious consideration we find it difficult to accept the above submission. As was pointed out by the Supreme Court in Collector of Customs v. Sampathu Chetty : AIR 1962 SC 316 there is a clear distinction between a mere reference to or a citation of one statute in another and an incorporation which in effect means the bodily lifting of the provisions of one enactment and making it part of another so much so that the repeal of the former leaves the latter wholly untouched. In the case, however, of a reference or a citation of one enactment by another without incorporation, the effect of a repeal of the one "referred to" is that set out in Section 8 of the General Clauses Act. Here we are concerned with an U.P. enactment and as such it will be pertinent to refer to Section 8 of the U.P. General Clauses Act. It reads: