LAWS(ALL)-1949-10-18

MUNICIPAL BOARD Vs. B MANGLI LAL

Decided On October 07, 1949
MUNICIPAL BOARD Appellant
V/S
B.MANGLI LAL Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal by the Municipal Board of Agra against a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court allowing an appeal in a suit for damages for malicious prosecution.

(2.) The plaintiff Mangli Lal is a Sub-Post-Master and was on the material date posted at Agra. He had acquired a plot of land from the Nazul Department and was building a house thereon. On 6-1-1940, the Sanitary Inspector was directed to inspect the lavatory built in the house, take measurements of certain constructions and make hia report. On 23-1-1940, the Sanitary Inspector, Iqbal Ahmad, along with his Jamadar and a peon went to the house of the plaintiff. There was no order of the Board under Section 287, Municipalities Act, entitling the Sanitary Inspector to enter the house and he should have, therefore, waited for the permission of the plaintiff. He, however, went straight into the zenana portion of the house to which the plaintiff took great objection. The Sanitary Inspeotor, on his return, made a report to the Executive Officer in which he complained that while he was discharging his duty and stood outside the house he was obstructed by B. Mangli Lal and threatened with dire consequences with the result that he was not able to carry out the duties entrusted to him. He suggested in this report that a notice be served upon the plaintiff according to the provisions of Section 287, Municipalities Act, calling upon him to allow inspection within his compound and also to authorise the officials concerned to make an entry, He further suggested that suitable action be taken against the plaintiff for having obstructed a Municipal servant in the discharge of his duties. The papers were sent to the Municipal Mukhtar for his opinion and on the 2nd of February the Mukhtar gave his opinion that the plaintiff could be prosecuted under Section 295, Municipalities Act and Section 186, Penal Code. On the same date the Executive Officer sanctioned his prosecution. A complaint was thereafter filed against the plaintiff, on 28-3 1940, on behalf of the Municipal Board under the signatures of the Executive Officer for his (the plaintiff) prosecution under Section 295, Municipalities Act and Section 186, Penal Code. The plaintiff was tried and on 7-9-1940, he was acquitted. He thereafter filed this suit on 15-4.1941, claiming Rs. 500 as damages for malicious prosecution. The suit was decreed by the trial Court but it was dismissed by the lower appellate Court, the learned Judge being of the opinion that the Executive Officer had acted in good faith without malice and had reasonable and probable cause. There was a second appeal in this Court. The appeal was allowed and the plaintiff's suit was decreed for Rs. 300. The learned single Judge, however, gave to the defendant leave to appeal under the Letters Patent.

(3.) Mr. Gopal Behari, learned counsel for the appellant has argued that although it is now too late to urge that a Corporation, cannot be held liable for malicious prosecution, the liability of a Corporation is no greater than that of an ordinary individual; and where an ordinary individual, who has acted in good faith after having taken reasonable care--even though the information received by him on the basis of which he so acted may be erroneous--will not be held liable, the Corporation will also not be liable if the officer authorised to act an behalf of the Corporation has acted in good faith, without malice and with reasonable and probable cause. Learned counsel has urged that the person, who was authorised to file the complaint on behalf of the Municipal Board, was the Executive Officer and no matter whether the other aubordinate members of the staff were actuated with malice or not, if the Executive Officer had believed the report made to him and had taken legal opinion he must be deemed to have acted in good faith. Learned counsel has urged that when the findings are to the effect that it has not been proved that the complaint wag brought without any reasonable and probable cause & on account of malice the Corporation cannot be liable. The point has been discussed at some length in the judgment of the learned single Judge & it is not necessary for us to deal with the question at any great length specially as both the learned counsel are agreed on the principles of law that govern such cases.