ADIL PERVAI Vs. SAJID PERVAIZ AND 3 OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Gulrez Khan, learned Advocate for respondent no.1, Shri Shahnawaz Akhtar, learned Advocate for respondent no.2 and Shri Jitendra Singh, learned Advocate for respondent no.3

(2.) The present petition is directed against the order dated 23.5.2018 passed by the District Judge Moradabad in Arbitration Case No.74 of 2018 (Sajid Pervai v. Khalid Pervaiz & Ors.) with the prayer to dismiss the arbitration Execution Case No.74 of 2018 for want of jurisdiction. The Execution Case No.74 of 2018 arose out of an arbitral award dated 22.4.2018. The objections of the petitioner, to assail the order of the executing court, are two folds:-

(3.) Firstly, it is contended that the execution case was premature, inasmuch as, the arbitral award did not attain finality nor it was executable as on the date of moving of such application, in view of Sections 35 and 36(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short 'the Act, 1996'). Section 35 of the Act 1996 as contained in Chapter VIII of Part I attaches finality to the award and makes it binding on the parties, subject to the provisions of that part. Section 36(1) in Part I further provides that the arbitral award is enforceable in accordance with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as a decree of the Court, after the time period of making application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 to set aside the arbitral award is expired. Sub Section (2), however, clarifies that mere filing of application under Section 34 would not render award unenforceable, unless the Court grants an order of stay of the arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3) on a separate application made for that purpose and otherwise it can be executed. Section 34 provides the time period for making of an application for setting aside arbitral award under sub-section (1) of that section, which is three months. Proviso to sub-section (3), however, states that any application beyond the period of three months may be entertained within a further period of 30 days by the Court, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within such period. However, no further extension can be granted beyond the period of 30 days.