(1.) THIS matter has come up before us pursuant to the reference made by Hon'ble single Judge vide order dated 18.12.2006, formulating the following two questions to be answered by a larger Bench : (i) Whether the decision in Pallav Seth case, (2001) 7 SCC 549, can be construed so as to apply all the principles enshrined in the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act (except Section 17 thereof) and as to whether the same can be made applicable to proceedings to be initiated under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. (ii) Whether the High Court in exercise of its powers for initiating contempt of its Court or the contempt of its subordinate Court or Tribunal, as the case may be, has the power to condone and waive the delay in initiation of contempt proceedings under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
(2.) THE two questions appear to have been formulated following the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant based on certain observations of the Apex Court in Pallav Seth v. Custodian and others, 2001 (7) SCC 549, relying whereof the learned counsel for the applicant has sought to apply Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1963) to the limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1971") so that if the contempt proceedings are sought to be initiated after one year's delay, the same may be condoned by the Court and proceedings may be initiated even after the above prescribed pe 3. Sri Arvind Srivastava, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that in State of West Bengal v. Kartik Chandra Das and others, (1996) 5 SCC 342, the Apex Court held that Section 5 of Act, 1963 would be applicable to the appeals filed under Section 19 of Act, 1971 beyond the period prescribed therein, empowering the Court to condone the delay. Based thereon he submitted that it cannot be said that Act, 1971 is a complete code in all respect, inasmuch as, if for the purpose of appeal under Section 19 power to condone delay under Section 5 of Act, 1963 can be validly applied, there is no reason to exclude the same for the purpose of condoning delay if contempt proceedings are initiated after the period of limitation prescribed under Section 20 of Act, 1971.
(3.) HAVING heard the above submissions and perusing the reference order of the learned single Judge, the provisions of the Statute and the relevant authorities on the subject applicable on the aforesaid questions, we find that though the questions are simple but has far reaching consequences and therefore need to be answered after careful consideration of the entire law on the subject.