SHOBHA SAXENA Vs. DISTRICT INSPECTOR OF SCHOOLS BAREILLY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner is functioning as an officiating Principal in Shri Raghubir Sahai Jauhari Adarsh Vidyapeeth Kanya Uchattar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Bhoor, Bareilly since 1st of July, 1991. THE writ petition gives various details of a series of litigation between the petitioner and the management and between the petitioner and respondent No. 6, which, the Court is not concerned with. Suffice it to say, in a nutshell, the petitioner, the management of the institution and the respondent No. 6 are at logger heads and do not see eye to eye and, this is the main cause which has resulted in the filing of the present writ petition.

(2.) THE facts leading to the filing of the present writ petition is, that the Committee of Management in its meeting dated 29th November, 2008 resolved to suspend the petitioner by exercising the powers under Section 16-G (5) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). THE requisite papers for necessary approval or disapproval of the action taken by the management was sent to the District Inspector of Schools on 3rd December, 2008, which is alleged to have been received in the office of the Inspector on 5th of December, 2008. It further transpires that simultaneously, papers were also sent by the management for approval of the signatures of the respondent No. 6, who was directed to function as the In-charge Principal during the interim period and whose signatures were duly attested by the Inspector on 3rd December, 2008. THE District Inspector of Schools by an order dated 8th of December, 2008 approved the suspension of the petitioner under Section 16-G (7) of the Act holding that the charges levelled against the petitioner, prima facie, appears to be serious in nature. THE petitioner, being aggrieved, has filed the present writ petition.

(3.) DR. R.G. Padia, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Committee of Management could only suspend the petitioner on such grounds as mentioned in Section 16-G (5) of the Act and that the Committee of Management must form an opinion to the effect that the charges levelled against the petitioner was serious enough to eventually warrant her dismissal or removal or reduction in rank or that her continuance in office could hamper or prejudice the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings or any criminal case for an offence involving moral turpitude against her was under investigation, enquiry or trial. The learned counsel submitted that in the present case, no such opinion was formed by the Committee of Management on the gravity of the charge, and therefore, the entire action of suspending the petitioner was ex facie illegal and against the provisions of the Act. The learned counsel further submitted that assuming without admitting that the Committee of Management had expressed its opinion in its resolution, none-the-less, the requisite papers was not forwarded to the District Inspector of Schools as provided under Chapter III, Regulation 39 of the Regulations framed under the Act and, consequently, the non-supply of the requisite papers also vitiates the suspension of the petitioner. The learned counsel also submitted, that even otherwise, the provision of Section 16-G (7) of the Act stipulates that the Inspector before approving or disapproving the action of the management, was required to give a bare minimum opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, which was not done in the present case. In support of his submission, the learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision in Safya Pal Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2006 (64) ALR 335, in which it was held, that the District Inspector of Schools, while according approval or disapproval of the suspension order passed by the Committee of Management, was required to give reasons and was also required to give an opportunity of hearing to the suspended principal or the teacher, as the case may be. The learned counsel further submitted that the said judgment of the learned Single Judge was affirmed by the Division Bench which is reported in (2006) 3 UPLBEC 2137. The learned counsel also raised a submission that the Committee of Management could only suspend the petitioner after a formal charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner, as contemplated under Section 16-G (5) of the Act. It may be stated here that initially this plea was raised by the learned counsel, but subsequently, during the course of the hearing of the petition; this plea was withdrawn by the learned counsel.