AWDESH KUMAR Vs. INDIAN RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION CO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) D. K. Seth, J. By an order dated 22nd January, 1987, the petitioner was ap pointed on daily wage basis w. e. f. 1st January, 87 for a period of six months by the Railway Construction Company, respondent No. 1. Subsequently, he was ac commodated in a scale of Rs. 750-1000 on contract basis for a period limited till 30th June, 1988. The said period was extended till 31st December, 89. The appointment was thus extended from time to time till 31st August, 90 as is appearing from Annexure VI to this writ petition. All these orders are annexed as Annexures 1 to V respectively. Subsequently some of the ap pointees in the post of Civil Engineer, in which the petitioner was working, had ap proached the Apex Court for regularization of their services. The Apex Court in writ petition (Civil) No. 1339 of 1989, by an order dated 7th March, 90, had formu lated a scheme by consent of the parties for absorption and regularization of such ad hoc Civil Engineers. In terms of the said scheme, the petitioner appeared in the test for regularization as provided in the said order but was unsuccessful in the written test. The petitioner's service, therefore, was terminated by an order dated 14th August, 90, w. e. f. 31st August, 90 con tained in Annexure VIII. The said order has since been challenged in this present writ petition.

(2.) MR. R. N. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that since the petitioner had worked almost for three years, namely, more than 240 days without any break, he is entitled to be absorbed and regularized in service. His service cannot be terminated in view of the order con tained in Annexure VII, which does not contemplate termination of services in its terms through it only contemplates regularization of such service. He next contends that the said order having been passed by consent, is an effect and agree ment, in which the petitioner was not a party and, therefore, he is not bound by it. He then contends that many of his juniors as specified in paragraph 16 of the writ petition, have been retained, while the petitioner's service has been terminated. Therefore, respondents had discriminated in his case. He also contends that the petitioner had appeared in a subsequent test in 1991, in which he had succeeded in the written test, but had failed in the inter view. According to him, this failure in the interview was an outcome of mala fide on the part of the respondents, who were an noyed by reason of the filing of this writ petition as well as filing of the contempt petition against them arising out of the interim order passed in this writ petition. He also contends that the respondents had allowed him to continue in service and in the meantime, he had crossed maximum age for Government service. Therefore, the respondents could not terminate his service on this ground. He had relied upon several decisions in support of his conten tion, which I shall be dealing at ap propriate stage.

(3.) ADMITTEDLY, the appointment that was given, was limited by time. The petitioner's appointment was limited till 31st August, 90. The order of termination dated 14th August, 90 indicates that his service will stand terminated w. e. f. 31st August 1990 on account of his being un successful in the scrutiny in terms of the Apex Court's order. From the facts revealed, it is apparent that though the word "termination" has been used in the order dated 14th August, 90, it was in ef fect 'non-extension' of the petitioner's service limited by time. Even if the order of termination was not used in that event in absence of non- extension, the service of the petitioner would come to, an end. In the case of State of U. P. v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, 1991 (1) SCC 691 and Director, In stitute of Management and Development, U. P. v. Pushpa Srivastava, AIR 1992 SC 2070, it has been held that where the appo intment is for limited time, on the expiry of such limited period, no right accrues which such person can enforce legally.