JHATKU Vs. SPECIAL AND ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE AZAMGARH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) J. C. Gupta, J. This is tenant's writ petition for quashing the judgment and orders dated 29-1-1986 and 25-1-1985 passed by respondent. Nos. 1 and 2 respec tively.

(2.) A suit for rent and ejectment was filed against the petitioners on the ground of default in payment of rent after serving notice on 28-6-1976 which was duly served upon Jhataku petitioner No. 2, who alone contested the suit. Second notice was sent on 17-8-76 to all the defendants which was served upon them by refusal. Rent was Claimed from 1-12-1966 to 15-7-1972 at the rate of Rs. 3 per month and from 16-7-72 upto the date of expiry of notice period at the rate, of Rs. 3. 75 per month. The suit was contested by Jhataku, petitioner No. 2 on the ground that no rent was due. The trial Court decreed the suit holding that the defendants were in arrears of rent and they committed default in pay ment thereof. It also came to the con clusion that the defendants were not en titled to the benefit of Section 20 (4) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act', as the requisite N deposit was not made on the date of first 'hearing. In the revision filed against the decree of the trial Court, the revisional Court modified the decree only to the ex tent that suit for arrears of rent was decreed only for a sum of Rs. 135 and for mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 3. 75 per month and the decree for eviction was upheld.

(3.) THE main thrust of the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the notice in question is bad in law in as much as it is not in conformity with the requirement of Section 106 of T. P. Act. It was submitted that the notice in question terminated the tenancy of the petitioners in presenti and therefore, the same was wholly illegal and invalid and could not be made the basis of suit for ejectment. Ac cording to the learned Counsel for the petitioners, the notice in question simply called upon the petitioners to pay entire arrears of rent within a period of one month from the date of receipt of notice and to vacate the accommodation in ques tion within the said period and it did not indicate that the tenancy of the petitioner was to determine on the expiry of thirty days period. Learned Counsel for the petitioners placed reliance upon a number of decisions which may be referred to hereunder: