JAGDISH SINGH Vs. DISTRICT JUDGE NAINITAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Case No. 22/250 of 1977-78 under the provisions of U. P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was decided against by the petitioner by an order dated 7.11.1979. Appeal No. 888 of 1979 preferred by the petitioner was dismissed by order dated 19.8.1981. These two orders are being challenged in the present writ petition.

(2.) Mr. G. N. Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner assails the Impugned orders on four grounds. His first contention was that the premises being a land held by hereditary tenure-holder does not come within the definition of public premises. Secondly, he contended that the petitioner having been holding the land derived from hereditary tenure-holder, his occupation does not come within the definition of unauthorised occupation. Thirdly, he contended that the prescribed authority cannot assume jurisdiction In respect of the land which is excluded from operation of the Act by virtue of definition of premises in Section 2 (b) of the Act providing that the premises does not include land for the lime being held by tenure-holder under any law relating to tenure. Inasmuch as the petitioner has been holding the land under a law relating to land tenure. His fourth contention was that the prescribed authority and the appellate authority had not taken into consideration the materials and evidence produced by the petitioner in the proceedings itself. On these grounds, according to the learned counsel, the Impugned orders are liable to be quashed.

(3.) Mr. A. Upadhyaya, learned standing counsel, contended that from the Khatauni it appears that the land belonged to the Government and occupation of the petitioner being without title, he cannot claim any right as a tenure-holder. He further contended that predecessor of the petitioner being unauthorised occupants as held by both the authorities, the petitioner cannot claim title and that he is not in occupation of the Government premises. He further contended that after decision of the appellate authority, the petitioner having asked for time to vacate the premises, he had accepted the order and could not have challenged the same. According to him, the petitioner cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate in the same breath.