TINNU Vs. STATE OF U P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) P. K. Jain, J. Heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned A. G. A.

(2.) SOLE ground on which this applica tion is pressed is that the charge-sheet was not submitted within sixty days of remand of the accused to judicial custody under Section 167 (2), Cr. PC. and the applicant was entitled to bail in view of the proviso (a) (ii) to Section 167 (2), Cr. P. C.

(3.) SUBSEQUENT to the aforesaid decision in the Central Bureau of Investiga tion case, the apex Court had occasion to consider whether the date to remand is to be included in the period of sixty or ninety days as the case may be. This question came up for decision in State of M. P. v. Rustam,1995 SCC (Cri) 830. That was a case in which accused was remanded to judicial custody on 3-9-93, charge-sheet was submitted on 2-12-93 where after the accused applied for bail under the proviso to Section 167 (2), Cr. P. C. contending that period of ninety days expired on 1-12-93. The apex Court while considering the provisions of the General Clauses Act held that the prescribed period of 90 days, in our view, would instantly commence either from 4-9-93 (excluding from it 4-9-1993) or 3-9- 1993 (including it 2-12- 1993 ). Clear 90 days have to expire before the right begins. Plainly put, one of the days on either side has to be excluded in computing the prescribed period of 90 days. Sections 9 and 10 of the General Clauses Act warrant such an interpreta tion in computing the prescribed period of 90 days. The period of limitation thus com puted on reckoning 27 days of September, 31 days of October and 30 days of Novem ber would leave two clear days in Decem ber to compute 90 days and on which date the challan was filed, when the day running was the 90th day. The High Court was, thus, obviously in error in assuming that on 2-12-1993 when the challan was filed, period of 90 days had expired.