ANARUDDIN Vs. STATE OF U P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner was appointed in the post of Lekhpal under the Dying-in-Harness Rules. Admittedly, though he possessed the essential qualification but he did not possess the pre-requisite qualification for the post of Lekhpal. viz., the training. In order to be appointed tn the post of Lekhpal, a candidate has to undergo training and requisite examination as provided in the U. P. Land Records Manual in Part-II. A circular was issued on 15.2.1991 to the effect that such untrained candidates appointed under the Dying in Harness Rules should be sent for the same training as are meant for the general candidates with the condition that after the training is over, if he fails in the examination. In that event he would be removed from the service. It Is alleged that pursuant to the said circular, he was sent for training but he had failed. By an order dated 2.4.1996, the petitioner's service was dispensed with under the provisions of the U. P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules. 1975 on the ground that the service of the petitioner was no more required after giving him one month's pay in lieu of notice. This order has since been challenged in this petition.

(2.) Shri A. B. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that Part-11 of the U. P. Land Records Manual contains the provisions for maintenance of Lekhpal Schools and the procedure to be followed in respect of such training. Relying on paragraph 226 of Part-11. Chapter XIV. Shri Singh contends that the general candidates selected for training in the Lekhpal School are allowed three chances to succeed in the examination. Since the petitioner has been treated at par with the general candidates for the purpose of training as provided in the Government Order, it should be deemed that he is also entitled to three chances as is available to the general candidates. According to him, the entire contents of the circular has to be reconciled and read together. The different part of the said circular cannot be isolated so as to arrive at different meaning for two different parts. Therefore, the clause providing condition that after the training is over, if the candidate fails he would be removed is to be read along with earlier part where it is provided that he should be sent for the same training for the general candidate. If these two parts are reconciled. In that event, the natural conclusion would be that such candidates would also be eligible to the same advantage as provided in paragraph 226, Chapter XIV of the said manual. He also relies on in support of his contention in a decision in the case of Surya Nath Pandey v. State of U. P. and others, 1984 AWC (Suppl) 117. Relying on the said decision, he contends that the examination and the training given to such persons are special, and, therefore, they would be entitled to a special consideration with regard to the Dying-in-Harness Rules. His next contention was that the order of termination does not specify the reason that his service is being terminated on account of his unsuccess in the examination. He contends that person appointed under the Dying-in-Harness Rules is not subject to the provisions of U. P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules 1975. On these grounds, he prays that the writ petition should be allowed and the order of termination should be set aside.

(3.) Mr. V. K. Rai, learned brief holder on behalf of the State Government contends that Part-II of the manual applies to the general candidates who are described as scholar. Therefore, Part-II is not applicable to an employee. The scholar is a person who is selected for a training. The training being prerequisite, it also falls within the definition of prescribed educational qualification. Therefore, unless a person possesses the prescribed qualification he cannot continue in service. He next contends that since a special provision has been carved out and special examination has been provided for the general candidate contained in para 226 of Chapter XIV cannot be attracted with regard to the candidate appointed under the Dying-in-Harness contrary to the Government Order which provides that after the training is over if a person fails in the examination, in that event, he would be removed from service. He relies on the same decision in the case of Surya Nath Pandey (supra) in order to contend that the Government Order dated 24.4.1980 which has been relied on in the said judgment require a special examination. Relying on this observation he contends that if it is a special examination in that event general rule in paragraph 226 cannot be attracted and such special examination should be covered by the Government Order. He relies on paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the said judgment in order to contend that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the standard by which it professes its action to be judged and it must scrupulously observe those standards. He also contends that question of giving appointment without undergoing requisite training is dehors the recruitment rules. The Dying-in-Harness Rule, applied to the threshhold of the appointment. The provisions contained in Dying-in-Harness Rules does not contain anything that makes it applicable after the appointment is made. Therefore, according him, if the petitioner does not possess the prescribed qualification and a chance is given to him to acquire such qualification and if he is unable to cash in on such chance. In that event, he cannot claim any right to continue. Service of the petitioner was dispensed with under the provisions of the U. P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975 since he was not suitable to be continued in service which fact is well-known to the petitioner which is apparent from the grounds mentioned in the writ petition itself. The said contention has also been supported by the statement made in the counter-affidavit to the extent that the petitioner's service was dispensed on account of his unsuitability due to unsuccess in the training. Therefore, there is nothing illegal in dispensing with the service of the petitioner under the 1975 Rules, therefore the writ petition should be dismissed.