COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT SHRI SHIVAJI NATIONAL INTER COLLEGE HANSIPUR Vs. DISTRICT INSPECTOR OF SCHOOLS MIRZAPUR AND ANOTHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The order suspending the petitioners having since been refused to be approved by the District Inspector of Schools by an order dated 2nd June, 1998, pursuant to the direction contained in the order dated 6th February, 1998, passed in Writ Petition No. 4329 of 1998 by this Court, has since been challenged in this writ petition. Mr. Arun Tandon, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that while disapproving the order of suspension by the school authority, the District Inspector of Schools has over-stepped the limit of Jurisdiction conferred on him under Section 16G (7) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, in that he had asked for a reply from the delinquent and had examined the evidence that might be put forth in defence as well as the materials produced by the Committee of Management and had come to a conclusion that the charges could not be proved or established and as such, he has refused to approve. Therefore, according to him. the order is wholly without jurisdiction and is liable to be quashed and the District Inspector of School should be directed to decide the question afresh in accordance with law within the ambit of. Section 16G (5) and (7), read with Regulation 39, Chapter III of the Regulation framed under the 1921 Act.

(2.) This contention of Mr. Tandon has since been opposed by Mr. Surendra Tewari, counsel for the delinquent respondents as well as Mr. K. R. Singh, learned standing counsel. Mr. Tewari had contended relying on various decisions that the Districl Inspector of Schools by virtue of Section 16G (5] is empowered to scrutinize the papers sent to him by virtue of Regulation 39 of Chapter III of the Regulation framed under the 1921 Act in order to ascertain as to whether the. Committee of Management had formulated its opinion having regard to clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (5). In the present case, the District Inspector of Schools, according to him has acted within the scope and ambit of his jurisdiction. Therefore, sitting in writ jurisdiction, this Court should not interfere with the finding of fact, particularly when the order is reasoned one. He also draws my attention to the fact that on two earlier occasions, the petitioners were suspended and since no papers were forwarded along with the order of suspension as required under Regulation 39 of Chapter III of the Regulation framed under the 1921 Act, on both the occasions the order of suspension was disapproved by the District Inspector of School. The Committee of Management had suspended him on the third occasion when certain papers were forwarded. In this background, the District Inspector of Schools was Justified to scrutinize the papers and come to such a finding. According to him. sub-section (8) provides for hearing, which is also implicit tn sub-section (7). which also requires hearing before ascertaining as to whether approval should be granted or not. According to him. otherwise, the entire purpose of providing the provision for grant of approval to an order of suspension and the conditions on which the delinquent can be suspended, would be completely frustrated. He contends that while interpreting a section, it has to be interpreted according to the scheme further the object and purpose and not impair. On this ground, relying on the decisions cited by him in support of his contention he submits that the writ petition should be dismissed.

(3.) Mr. K. R. Singh, learned standing counsel, on the other hand contends that since Regulation 39. Chapter III of the Regulation requires forwarding the papers, it is open to the District Inspector of Schools to look into the same and come to its independent decision as to whether, he should grant or refuse the approval to the order of suspension. !n deciding such question, the District Inspector of Schools has to find out as to whether the tests laid down in sub-section (5) of Section 16G are satisfied, namely, whether the charges are serious enough to merit his dismissal, removal or reduction in rank ; or continuance of the delinquent is likely to hamper or prejudice the conduct of disciplinary proceedings against him or any criminal case for an offence Involving moral turpitude against him is under investigation, inquiry or trial. He contends that in none of the orders of suspension, the school authority had expressed either of these contingencies to have been satisfied. In absence of any such formulation of opinion having been recorded in the order of suspension, the order of suspension is void ab-initio and. therefore, even if the order contained in Annexure-VI may be outside the scope and jurisdiction conferred on the District Inspector of Schools, still then it cannot be Interfered with, since there is a defect in the order of suspension itself.