(1.) HEARD counsel for the petitioner and the learned standing counsel.
(2.) THIS petition has been filed challenging the Government Orders dated 19-9-85 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition) and 4-4-1987 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition) by which the industrial units are required to obtain the licence under the U. P. Coal Control Order 1977 and permission from the District Magistrate before disposal of the unused coal and coal dust. THIS controversy had already been settled by a Full Bench of this Court in case of Ashwani Cement Private Ltd. Shamli v. State of U. P. reported in 1991 (1) EFR 160: (AIR 1991 All 62) wherein it has been held that the U. P. Coal Control Order 1977 seeks to regulate the import purchase, movement, storage and sale of coal within the State. It has evolved the system of licensing as a measure of such regulation and after considering the various provisions of the Control Order Full Bench upheld the validity of the Government Order impugned in this petition. The learned counsel for the petitioner has however, submitted that after the aforesaid judgment of the Full Bench of this Court Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of State of U. P. v. M/s Gulshan Sugar and Chemicals Ltd. reported in AIR 1996 SC 62 has held that the disposal of the rejected coal and coal dust which was collected during storage, loading and unoloading of coal, and there being nothing on record to show that there was continuity in transactions of sale of coal dust or rejected coal by the Company, the Company cannot be said to be in the business of sale or storage for sale of coal, and consequently cannot be held to be dealer so as to require licence.
(3.) WE have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the two judgments. Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 9 of its judgment has concluded the controversy in following words "having been satisfied that there is nothing on record to show if the respondent was in the business of sale or storage for sale of coal, it is not necessary to express our views on the second reason of the High Court in accepting the case of the respondent. WE dismiss the appeal on the limited ground that the respondent could not be proved to be in the aforesaid business. WE leave open the legal question covered by the second reason. "