BALDEO RAJ Vs. VII ADDITIONAL DISTRCIT JUDGE ALLAHABAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) -Baldeo Raj, petitioner, is the tenant in a portion of House No. 535-C, Mohalla Nehru Nagar, Meerapur. Allahabad on ground floor (as stated in the copy of the judgment of the trial court). Smt. Ram Piari Devi, respondent no. 3, is the landlady. Initially a suit was filed for ejectment, arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation and also for costs etc. This suit was filed primarily on the ground that the accommodation was not covered by U. P. Act no. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Subsequently, by an amendment, which was allowed, the plaintiff landlady alleged, in alternative, that even if the Act was found to govern the disputed accommodation, the defendant-tenant was a defaulter in the payment of rent under section 20 (2) (a) of the Act as tenant had failed to pay the arrears of rent outstanding against him inspite of the service of the notice. This suit was obviously filed in the year 1976 and the Judge Small Causes Court, Allahabad by his judgment and order dated 22-1-1985 decreed the suit for ejectment from the disputed accommodation and for the recovery of arrears of rent etc. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed Civil Revision No. 111 of 1986, which was dismissed by VII Additional District Judge, Allahabad on 2-5-1988. Hence, this writ petition.

(2.) I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner. The first argument raised is that the deposits were made under section 39 of the Act, therefore, the tenant was entitled to the benefit of this provision and the decree for ejectment is a nullity. This argument has no force in view of the case decided by Hon'ble the Supreme Court reported in case Nand Kumar Marwah v. Smt. Samundari Devi, 1987 AWC 1261, which has clearly laid down that section 39 of the Act applies to those suits which were pending on the date of the commencement of the Act. This Act came into force on 15th July, 1972. Admittedly, the suit itself was filed in the year 1976. The suit was not pending on the date on which this Act came into force. Thus, this contention is repelled. The other argument is that the deposit should be taken as a deposit under section 20 (4) of the Act. This argument has no legs to stand because this is not the case of the petitioner that the deposit was made on the first date of hearing immediately after the Act was attracted to the accommodation in question. In this view of the matter, this argument has also no force.