ALLAHATALA Vs. SECOND ADDITIONAL MUNSIF

JUDGEMENT

(1.) -Whether a suit for relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from making any construction over the land in suit (a private graveyard and a private Imambara), can be held to be not maintainable and barred by the provisions of Section 64 of U. P. Muslim Wakfs Act, 1960, (for short the Act), is the short question for determination in the present petition filed by the petitioners under Atticle 226 of the Constitution of India.

(2.) A portrayal of essential facts are these. The petitioners filed a suit (Suit No. 270 of 1985) in the Court of Munsif, Ghazipur, for the aforesaid relief against the defendants, respondent nos. 3 to 14, who were trying to raise construction over the land in dispute, which is in the nature of Wakf Alalaulad, in which dead bodies of the family of petitioners are buried. The said suit was contested by the aforesaid defendants and the suit was alleged to be barred by Section 64 (2) and Section 66 of the Act. It was further alleged that the notice under Section 66 of the Act was necessary. The learned Munsif framed preliminary issues and held by order dated 6-9-85 that the suit was barred by Section 64 (2) of the Act and the notice under Section 66 of the Act was necessary. Against that order the petitioner filed a revision and the same was dismissed by order dated 15-1-88. These are the two orders which have been challenged by this petition, and a prayer has been made to quash them by issuing a writ of Certiorari.

(3.) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties I am of the view that there are two principal questions, which require determination. The first question is whether the suit can be said to be barred by Section 64 (2) of the Act, and the next is whether granting such other and further relief as the nature of case may require, as indicated under Section 92 (1) (h) of the Code would include relief totally different than provided under Section 92 (1) (a to g) of the Code. Both these questions can be taken together. Under Section 92 (1) (a to g) the nature of relief has been indicated, which was obviously in respect of removal of any trustee, appointing new trustee etc. pertaining particulary to the trustee or any mismanagement of the trust property. The administration of trust property in relation to a trustee was subject of relief which could be obtained under Section 92 (1) (a to g). But certain instances have been given about the reliefs, and Section 92 (1) (h) provides granting such further or other relief as nature of the case may require, and the same has to be interpreted keeping in view certain relevant Latin maxims : (i) Expressio Unius Exclusio Alterios (which obviously connotes the mention of one thing is the exclusion of another) ; and (ii) Ejusdem Generis (i. e. of the same kind) ; and (iii) Noscitur Asociis (i. e. word is known by its companions). These maxims are particularly known as rules of language. As a number of nature of reliefs has been mentioned under Section 92 (1) (a to g), hence Section 92 (1) (h) of the Act has to be interpreted by applying these maxims. The first maxim indicates that mention of one thing is exclusion of another. In case the nature of aforesaid relief has been mentioned under Section 92 (1) (a to g) it means no contradictory or totally opposite relief could be claimed. Similarly the maxim ' ejusdem generis' is an example of broader linguistic rule or in practice to which reference is made by the maxim ' Noscitur Asociis '. It is better to quote an observation in this respect about the nature of words and their interpretation from Bourne v. Norwich Crematorium Ltd., (1967) 2 All. ER 576 at 578 as follows ;