DEVI SHARAN Vs. SUB-DIVISIONAL OFFICER AND ORS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated July 12, 1988 passed by the Parganadhikari, Michcha, Nainital, directing that in the meanwhile the petitioner Devi Sharan may not be administered oath of office of the Pradhan. The profile of the petitioner's case may be set out briefly. The petitioner was elected in the last general elections held on June 5, 1988. He was a candidate for the office of Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha Danpur -Vijaipur, Block Gederpur, District Nainital, alongwith respondent No. 4 Jagdish Singh. But on counting of ballot papers on June 6, 1988 the petitioner was declared elected. An election petition has been filed by respondent No. 3, who filed an application for interim order with prayer that successful candidate, the petitioner, may be restrained from taking oath of office of Pradhan. The impugned order July 7, 1988 was passed in favour of respondent No. 4 on the election petition.

(2.) SRI K.S. Chauhan learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the impugned order was without jurisdiction inasmuch as there is no provision either in the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act or under the Code of Civil Procedure that after declaration of result of the election of Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha the successful candidate cannot take oath of the office of Pradhan. In other words, the result of the election of the office of Pradhan cannot be stayed in a democratic set up. Sri T.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 4 Sri Jagdish Singh, on the other hand, urged that under the circumstances of the case for a short while the oath was not to be administered to the petitioner and thereafter the election petition itself could be decided. As the Code of Civil Procedure applies to the trial of election petition in view of Rule 25 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Rules, hence temporary injunction can be granted under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and Section 151 C.P.C.

(3.) IT is the elementary rule of interpretation of statutes that to interpret a particular provision it is necessary to ascertain the intention of the legislature. Even part of the statute and the section has to be read together. In other words the interpretation of statutes has to be textual and also contextual. It is said that passing from the external aspects of the statutes to its contents the construction is to be made of all the parts together and not of one part only by itself. See Attorney General v. Browa, (1920) 1 K.B. 773.