(1.) M/s. Raza Textiles Limited, Rampur was running a branch known as M/s. Jwala Fabrics Shankha where mosquote netting and hosiery goods were manufactured This branch was closed down with effect from 1st of July, 1967. Compensation as required to be paid under the Industrial Disputes Act was paid to the workmen. Nearly two years later, this branch was re-started. The Management of the concern issued notices requiring all the past workers to rejoin. As some of the ex-workmen were not reemployed, they raised an Industrial Dispute, which was referred by the State Government to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The Tribunal held that in the totality of circumstances, it seems that the employers have kept the workmen concerned out of employment without justification. It was also found that the workmen of a Factory which was closed down were also entitled to the benefit of Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act. On these findings the Company was directed to re-employ the workmen and to pay them compensation as mentioned in the award.
(2.) The Company filed a writ petition in this Court. A learned single Judge held that Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act was not applicable to a case of closure. It was also found that it was not disputed between the parties that the closure of the branch in 1967 was genuine. On these findings the writ petition was allowed and the award of the Industrial Tribunal was quashed. Aggrieved, the workmen have now come up in appeal.
(3.) The circumstances, in which Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act is applicable or otherwise has been the subject-matter of consideration by the Supreme Court in the case Anakapalle Corporative Agricultural and Industrial Society Ltd. v/s. Workmen and others(1963 6 FLR I=1950-67 4 SCLJ 2457=AIR 1963 SC 1489). Relying upon its earlier decision in Hari Prasad Shiv Shankar v. A.D. Divelkar(1950-67 6 SCLJ 36=AIR 1957 SC 121), the Court held that the word 'retrenchment' means the discharge of surplus labour or staff by the employer for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicated by way of disciplinary action and does not include termination of services of all workmen on a bona fide closure of Industry. It is true that in that case the question arose on transfer of the business, but, in our opinion, it will equally apply to the closing down of the business because in both the situations the common factor is the termination of the services of all the employees or workmen together and not individually. Section 25-H when it gives preference to a retrenched workman indicates that preference will be available to those workmen who were retrenched individually. It does not seem to apply to a case where either because of transfer of business or closure the services of all the workmen are terminated. This is the only possible view because the definition of word 'retrenchment' occurring in Section 2-00 of the Act does not specifically include the case either of transfer of business or of a closure of an Industry. We are, however, satisfied that the decision of the Supreme Court is equally applicable to the case of a closure. In the writ petition Sri J. N. Tewari, appearing for the workmen, did not dispute that the closure of the branch in 1967 was genuine. We are hence unable to entertain the plea raised in the present appeal that the closure was mala fide with a view to get rid of certain workmen.