(1.) THE opposite party no. 1 filed a complaint against the peti tioner and 11 others on 23rd July, 1976 to the effect that on 23rd January, 1976, at about 12 noon, he had been surroun ded by the accused persons who had threa tened to teach him a lesson and beaten him with kicks and fists and his compa nion Maqsood with knife/knives and Dandas. It was also stated that he had sent a report about the occurrence through post to the District Superintendent of Police and as no action had been ta ken on that report, the complaint was being filed. THE complainant was exa mined by the Magistrate on 13th August, 1976. In that statement on oath he did not make any mention of the report alle gedly sent to the Superintendent of Police. It further appears that only the com plainant was medically examined on 23rd 1975, at 6.30 p. m. and one contusion 1/6 cm. x 11/2 cm. on the right side of chest was found. It was a simple injury apparently caused by some blunt object. THE Magistrate has summoned the accused persons and has refused to dis charge them. Aggrieved thereby, the revi sionist has come to this court under sec tion 482 of the Code of Criminal Proce dure, 1973, praying that the proceedings in the trial court may be quashed. Although the complaint was filed under sections 323, 324, 147 and 148, it appears that there was no medical evi dence in support of any injury caused by any knife as alleged in the complaint. THEre was no explanation whatsoever for the long delay in filing the complaint. THE law prescribes one year's limitation for filing a complaint under section 323. Even the lodging of the first informa tion report was not established. It, is accordingly, contended by learned coun sel for the applicant that the allegations relative to sections 324, 147 and 148 I. P. C. have been made only by way of exaggeration so as to take the case out of the bar of limitation. Learned counsel for the opposite-party no. 1, has, on the other hand, contended that it is not open to this Court at this stage to believe or disbelieve the evidence and that if the complaint, assumed to be true, makes out in the eye of law a case under these sections, there would be no occasion for interference under section 482 Cr. P. C. In R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab(A. I. R. 1960 Supreme Court 866.) it was observed by their Lorpships as follows : "It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for qua shing the proceedings (Emphasis sup plied). Out of the categories enumerated, the third category mentions cases in which there is no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. From this it cannot, however, be as sumed that the categories mentioned in Kapur's case were exhaustive. As would appear from the extract quoted above, their Lordships clearly meant the enu meration of categories to be illustrative. Moreover, it was also observed at the end that they were dealing with a case on Special Appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution against a decision of the High Court which had refused to exercise its inherent jurisdiction in favour of the appellant. Whether or not they would have come to the same conclusion if they were dealing with the same matter themselves under section 561-A, was, according to their Lordships, not really very material. Non-the-less, they did examine the evidence and held that it was not a case where the appli cant-appellant could justly contend that on the face of the record the charge level led against him was unsustainable. In a recent decision reported in State of Karnataka v. Muniswamy(1977) 2 Supreme Court cases 699.) it has been held that the three instances cited in the judgment in Kapur's case were only illustrative. THEir Lordships added that considerations justifying the exercise of inherent powers for securing the ends of justice naturally would vary from case to case and a jurisdiction as wholesome as the one conferred by section 482 ought not to be encased within the strait jacket of a rigid formula. In conclusion it has been stated that : "For the purposes of determining whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against an accused the court possesses a comparatively wider discretion in the exercise of which it can determine the question whether the material on the record, if unrebutted is such on the basis of which a con viction can be said reasonably to be possible." (Emphasis supplied). It appears thus that it is not required that the court should proceed on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint, howsoever widely stated are correct and then to examine only whether legally a charge would be main tainable and if so then necessarily to stay its hands. THE court can interfere also in a case where although the alle gations, if wholly correct, be legally sufficient for conviction the court consi ders that they are prima facie unlikely to be accepted on their face value. In the present case, the complaint has been filed long after the expiry of prescribed period of limitation in res pect of an offence under section 323. No explanation whatsoever has been fur nished for not making a first informa tion report to the police of for the delay in filing the complaint. THE medical evidence does not support the charge un der section 324. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that the case should result in a conviction under section H7 or section 148 I. P. C. merely on the basis of the allegations made by the complainant. As observed by the Supreme Court in Muniswamy's case (supra) an order of framing a charge affects a person's liber ty substantially and, therefore, it is the duty of the Court to consider judicially whether the material warrants the fram ing of the charge and the Court cannot blindly accept decision of the prosecu tion that the accused be asked to face a trial. Sections 202 and 203 also con template that Magistrate should exercise his judicial discretion while holding whe ther or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. He is not required to accept blindly whatever the complainant deposes, but has to con sider it in the context of the relevant cir cumstances. In the circumstances mentioned ear lier, it is highly unlikely that this pro secution should result in conviction. It would, therefore, be an abuse of the process of the Court to allow it to be continued. THE petition is, therefore, allowed and the proceedings pending in the Ma gistrate's court are quashed.