BANKEY Vs. STATE OF U P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE applicant has been convicted under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, and has been sentenced to six months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. His conviction and sentence were confirmed in appeal by the Sessions Judge, Basti. Hence this revision.

(2.) I have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have also perused the impugned order and the record of the case. According to the case of the prosecution on 14th December, 1975, Food Inspector Satendra Pratap Narain Singh reached the shop of the accused-applicant and after disclosing his identity took from him a sample of mustard oil, in three separate phials from the tin containing the mustard oil. One such phial was sent to the Public Analyst. The report of the Public Analyst disclosed that the sample contained 55.22% linseed. After obtaining the necessary sanction from the District Medical Officer of Health, Basti the applicant was prosecuted and convicted as above.

(3.) IN this very connection counsel for the State has urged that under Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, only written consent of the authority concerned is required. He submits that there is difference between 'written consent' and 'sanction'. 'Written consent' according to him does not necessarily in ply the application of mind by a person in authority. It is merely a permission to prosecute. As such the argument is that sanction is not required under the P.F. A. Act as in the case of several other offences where under different enactments the word 'sanction' has been specifically used. IN support of his submission learned counsel has relied upon a single Judge decision of the Bombay High Court- State of Maharashtra v. Janardan Ram- Chandra Narwankar, 1978 CrLJ 811. IN para 54 of the aforesaid judgment the learned Judge has made the following observations: "Besides, it must be remembered, that under Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act only consent of the Commissioner is necessary and not sanction. There is obvious difference between 'consent' and 'sanction'. 'Consent' implies mere concurrence or agreement whereas 'sanction' confers authority on the person in whose favour sanction is granted. Therefore, the considerations applicable in the case of 'sanction' would, in my opinion, not be applicable to a case where mere consent is required." With all due respect, , I do not agree with the observations of the learned Judge to the effect that the considerations which apply in the case of sanction would not apply in the case where mere written consent is required. It is true that consent implies concurrence or agreement, whereas 'sanction' confers authority on the person in whose favour sanction is accorded. To be more precise, in Food Adulteration cases written consent is granted by the District Medical Officer of Health to prosecute an accused for an offence under the Act. If the word 'sanction' had been used instead of 'written consent' that also would have meant approval for prosecution of the accused for an offence under this Act Whether it is written consent or sanction in either case, it is an official act of a superior by which he grants permission for the prosecution of an accused for an offence under the Act.