(1.) I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by my brothers Yashoda Nandan and K.C. Agrawal, JJ. Hence, I am advisedly referaining from elaborating the reasoning which has persuaded me to arrive at the conclusions stated in my judgment. I have considered it suffi cient to refer to the conclusion formulated in the two judgments aforesaid and I respectfully adopted the reasoning employed in those judgments in support of those conclusions. I have also had the opportunity of seeing the judgment dated 15-9-1978 tendered by K.R. Goyal, J. in Civil Revision No. 511 of 1978 (Lucknow Bench Mjs. Indira Finance Corporation v. Sri Prem Shanker Awasthi). I am in complete agreement with the opinion expressed by Yashoda Nandan and K.C. Agrawal, JJ. that U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976 was a later Act than the Central Act No. 104 of 1976. The main reason for my coming to this conclusion is that the mere fact that certain sections of the Central Act No. 104 of 1976 were enforced with effect from 1-2-1977 whereas the U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976 had been enforced from 1-1-1977 would not make the Central Act a later Act. The crucial date in the case of these two enactments would be the dates when they received the assent of the President, which in the case of the Central Act was 9-9-1976 while in the case of U. P. Act it was 30-9-1976. A very striking argument in support of this proposition is that the provision fixing the date from which certain other provisions of the statute are come into force would remain ineffectual if the very statute had not already come into force at all. The provision prescribing the date from which some parts of the Act would be enforced is also an integral part of the statute and unless the statute is operative, no other provision of that statute can oversee the light of the day because the provision prescribing the date of enforcement will itself remain in abeyance. This was the first of the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in T.K. Mudaliar v. Venatachala A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 246. I find myself unable to agree with the view expressed by K. N. Goyal, J. in Civil Revision No. 511 of 1978 that "the Central Act has to be treated as later in point of time." With respect I am of the opinion that this statement of law is not correct and the case must be over-ruled on that point. Article 254 of the Constitution of India provides : "254(1) If any provision of law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parlia ment is competent to enact, or to any provision of any existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated is the concurrent List, then, subject to the provision of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the re pugnancy, be void. (2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State.........with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent list contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parlia ment or an existing law with respect to that matter, than, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State." The Central Act No. 104 of 1976 and the U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976 were enacted in pursuance of Entry 13 of List III of the Constitution-Concurrent List. Clause (1) of Article 254 of the Constitution says that if a State law relating to a 'concurrent subject' is repugnant to a Union Law relating to that subject, then, whether the Union Law is prior or later in time, the Union Law will prevail and State Law shall, to the extent of such repugnancy, be void. To this general rule embodied in clause (1), clause (2) engrafts an exception viz., that if the President assents to a State Law which has been reserved for his consideration, it will prevail notwithstanding its repugnancy to an earlier law of the Union. The Principal Act as amended by Act No. 104 of 1976 did not contain any proviso to rule 2 (2) in the First Schedule of Order XXXIX of the Code. On the other hand, U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976 incor porated the following proviso therein : "Provided that no such injunction shall be granted- (a) where no perpetual injunction could be granted in view of the provisions of section 38 and section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (Act 47 of 1963), or (b) To stay the operation of an order for transfer, suspension, reduc tion in rank, compulsory retirement, dismissal, removal or otherwise termination of service of, or taking charge from any employee including any employee of the Government, or (c) To stay, any disciplinary proceedings pending or intended, or the effect of any adverse entry, against any employee of the Government, or (d) To effect the internal management or affairs of, any educational institution including a University, or a society, or (e) To restrain any election, or (f) To restrain, any auction intended to be made or, the effect of any auction made, by the Government, or (g) To stay the proceedings for the recovery of any dues recoverabls as land revenue unless adequate security is furnished, or (h) In any matter where a reference can be made to the Chancellor of a University under any enactment for the time being in force, and any order for injunction granted in contravention of these provi sions shall be void." This demonstrates that while the U.P. Act strips any court of its power to grant any injunction "to effect the internal management or affairs of any educational institution including the university or a society" the Central Act does not impose any such restriction. Thus, the repugnancy between the two provisions operating in the same field is apparent and since clause (2) of Article 254 is attracted, the U.P. Act prevail. Consequently, the court was bereft of the power of issuing an injunction after the enactment of the U.P. Act i.e., 30th December, 1976, with respect to a matter covered by clause (d) of the proviso to sub-rule (2) of rule 2 in the First Schedule of Order XXXIX extracted above. In the suit giving rise to F.A. P.O. No. 49 of 1977 the plaintiffs had instituted a. suit for a permanent injunction restraining the defen dants from interfering with their rights to function as Manager and member or the duly constituted committee of the Management of the college con cerned. An application for an interim order of injunction was also filed res training the defendants in the same terms as in the suit itself. The learned Civil Judge, Muzaffarnagar by his order dated 21-12-1976 rejected the applica tion for interim order of injunction, which order was challenged by the plaintiffs in the First Appeal from order. In deciding this appeal this court has to consider the preliminary question as to whether the provisions of order XXXIX, rule 2 of the Code as amended by U P. Act No. 57 of 1976 would appeal after coming into force of the Central Act No. 104 of 1976. I have already observed that in this regard the U.P. Act would prevail over the Central Act. The First Appeal from order, therefore, cannot succeed and I would dismiss the same with costs to the contesting respondents. In Civil Revision No. 912 of 1977 the following two questions were refer red to the Full Bench for decision: "(1) Whether rule 5 inserted in order XV, C. P. C. by the U. P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972 and substituted by new rule 5 by the U. P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, 1976 is inconsistent with the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by the Central Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976 and stands repealed ? (2) Whether section 97 (1) and (3) of the Central Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976 are retrospective and the-orders passed before 1.2.1977 striking off the defence for non-compliance of rule 5 are to be set aside." In order to answer the questions formulated above it is necessary to take into consideration the background of the legislation which inserted rule 5 in Order XV, C. P. C. The law reflects the history of the people. The dialectics of legislation are directly governed by contemporary pressures and the felt necessities of the times. Nearly the middle of the present century witnessed in India population explosion and an increasing concentration of the people in urban areas which involved an exodus from the villages. This resulted in actue shortage of residential and non-residential accommodation in the cities taking advantage of this situation the landlords tended to indulge in rack-renting and resort to other evil practices which made it necessary to enact Rent Control and Urban Buildings Legislations in various States. These enactments by and large had the effect of restricting the rights of the landlord and affording protection and security to the tenants. This, however, brought in its wake another evil which could not be easily anticipated. The tenants were placed in a position of such evident advantage by the protective and beneficial legislation that the landlords' rights unjustly suffered. They could be easily dragged into interimable litigation by tenants who on their part could manage to remain indefinitely in occupation of the accommodation in their tenancy without even caring to pay the huge arrears of rent against them. In order to restore the equilibrium between landlords and tenants which had been upset by the Rent Control Legislations U. P. Act No. 37 of 1972 introduced rules in Order XVI which runs as under :- "5. Striking of defence on non-deposit of admitted rent, etc.-(1) In any suit by a lesson for the eviction of a lessee from any immovable pro perty after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him of rent in respect of the period of occupation thereof during the conti nuance of the lease, or of compensation for the use or occupation thereof, whether instituted before or after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972, the defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, (or in the case of a suit instituted before the commencement of a said Act, the first hearing after such commencement) deposit the entire amount of rent, or compensation for the use and occupation, admitted by him to be due, and thereafter throughout the continuance of the suit, deposit regularly the amount of monthly rent or compensation for use and occupation, due at the rate admitted by him, and in the event of any default in this regard, the court may, unless after considering any representation made by him in that behalf it allows him further time on security being furnished for the amount, refuse to entertain any defence, as the case may be, strike off his defence." The above provision was evidently aimed at assuring the landlords pay ment of rent by tenants and preventing default of pain of the latter forfeiting the right of defence in a suit for eviction and recovery of rent. Formerly suit for eviction were not cognisable by small cause courts. In order to expedite the hearing and disposal of such suits the power was conferred on the Small Cause Courts to take cognizance of such suits. This was done by section 4 of the Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Act No. 37 of 1972) which amended the second schedule of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (Act No. 9 of 1887) and for the old Article (4) substituted a new Article which was to the effect : "(4) A suit for the possession of immovable property or for the recovery of an interest in such property, but not including suit by a lesson for the eviction of a lessee from a building after the determi nation of his lease, and for the use and occupation of that building after such determination of lease." The intention of the legislature was however, virtually defeated by reason of the fact that U. P. Act No. 37 of 1972 did not effect a corresponding amendment in order L, rule l(b) of the Code which provides that Order XV shall not extend to courts constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887" except so much of rule 4 as provides for pro nouncement at once of judgment." It will be convenient to reproduce rule 4 of Order XV in this context : "4. Failure to produce evidence. Where the summons has been issued for the final disposal of the suit and either party fails without sufficient cause to produce the evidence on which he relies, the courts may at once, pronounce judgment, or may, if it thinks fit, after framing and recording issues, adjourn the suit for the production of such evidence as may be necessary for its decision upon such issues." The result of retaining clause (b) in Rule 1, Order L, C. P. C. naturally was to exclude the applicability of the rest of rule 4 as also rule 5 added by U. P. Act No. 37 of 1972 to cases cognizable by Small Cause Courts. The object of U. P. Act No. 37 of 1972 was to enforce clearance of arrears of rent by the defaulting tenants under threat of having their defence struck off if they did not make deposit of the entire amount of rent prescribed by the new provision. This object was completely frustrated inasmuch as the Small Cause Court itself was not armed with the powers embodied in Rule 5 of Order XV of the Code which related to the striking off the defence on non deposit of admitted rent, etc. This glaring anomaly was eventually removed by the U. P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973 (President's Act, 1973) which was passed on 19.10.1973 and published in the U. P. Gazette of the same date. Sub-section (3) of section I of this Act provided that while section 1(3) thereof shall come into force at once, sections 5 and 6 shall be deemed to have come into force on 15th day of July, 1972 and the remaining sections shall be deemed to have come into force on the 20th day of September, 1972. By Section 3 of the Presidents' Act No. 19 of 1973 in clause (b) of rule 1 of Order L for the words and figures "Order XV except so much of rule 4 as provides for the pronouncement at once of judgment" the words and figures "Order XV, except so much of rule 4 as provides for pronouncement at once of judgment "and rule 5" were substituted. This amendment in clause (b) of rule 1 of Order L was made effective from 20th September, 1972 vide sub-section (3) of section 1 of the President's Act No. 19 of 1973. This Act was subsequently repealed and re-enacted with certain amendments and modifications (not relevant for the present case) by the Uttar Pradesh President's Act (Re-enactment with Modifications) Act, 1.974 (U. P. Act No. 30 of 1974) enacted by the U. P. Legislature. It is noteworthy that the Central Act No. 104 of 1.976 did not touch order L of the Code. It is obvious that if the power conferred by rule 5 of order XV is not available, the defence cannot be struck oil" for non-payment of admitted rent, etc. but in case the law permits such power to be exercised the defence in the event of failure of a tenant to deposit the admitted rent etc. can be struck off. One of the questions which has arisen in the revision is as to whether rule 5, Order XV inserted by U. P. Act No. 37 of 1972 and later substituted by rule 5 of the U. P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment)%Act, 1976 is inconsistent with the provisions of the principal act as amended by Central Act No. 104 of 1976 stands repealed. The question of repugnancy and repeal in this context are largely governed by Article 254 of the Constitution. The proviso to clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution provides that even though a State legislation has received the assent of the President, it is open to the Parliament to vary or repeal, the same. In view of my observations already made it may be stated that the power of striking- off the defence was virtually conferred by the U. P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973 (Presidents Act 19 of 1973) and the Uttar Pradesh, President's Act (Re-enactment with Modifications) Act, 1974 which were evidently legislations prior to the Central Act No. 104 of 1976. It has, therefore, been argued that the aforesaid U. P. Acts must be deemed to have been repealed by the Central Act which was later in point of time. This would, however, be true only if the conditions contemplated by Article 254 are satisfied and the cardinal condition thereof is that a State law must be repugnant to the Central law. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Deep Chand v. State of U. P. A. I. R. 1959 S. C. 648 the principal test for ascertaining the repugnancy or in consistency are : (1) Whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions. (2) Whether the Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the subject-matter replacing the Act of the State Legislature ; and (3) Whether the law made by the Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature occupied by the same field. In my opinion none of the above tests is fulfilled in the present case. There is surely no direct conflict between the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5 as inserted by U. P. Act 37 of 1972 and the Central Act which does not contain Rule 5. Order XI, rule 16 substituted by Central Act No. 104 of 1976 also contains a provision for striking out pleadings. Rule 5 of order XV merely adds other cases in which the same power may be exercised. It, therefore, multiplies the situations for the exercise of that power and does not make any innovation which may be regarded as inconsistent with the Central Act. I am also inclined to agree with K. C. Agrawal, J. who after quoting extensively from the reports of the Law Commission came to the conclusion that the object of enacting Central Act No. 104 of 1976 was not to provide a exhaustive Code but it was a limited object namely, to "consider what amendments are needed to avoid delay and minimise cost in civil proceedings" In other words, the Union Parliament did not intend this legislation to be complete and exhaustive code relating to the subject. to direct a party to deposit the to the party to whom it is due. It merely amended the code on specific points and consequently the special provisions of the State local law cannot be said to be repugnant to the Union Law. See Megh Raj v. Alia Rakha (1942) 46 C. W. N. (F. R.) 61 and State of U.P. v. Moradhwaj A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 796. Further I am of the opinion that the Central law and the State law aforesaid do not occupy the same field. Act no. 104 of 1976 retains rule 10 in Order XXXIX of the. Code which reads : "10. Deposit of money, etc. in court where the subject-matter of a suit is money or some other thing capable of delivery and any party thereto admits that he holds such money or other thing as a trustee for another party, or that it belongs or is due to another party, the court may order the "same to be deposited in court or delivered to such last named party, with or without security, subject to the further direction of the court."' This rule gives power to the court admitted amount in court and pay the same. It is general power and the local Acts already referred to above merely extend that power to special situations arising in cases between landlords and tenants such as those of eviction of recovery of rents. In other words, the local law in question deals with distinct matters though resembling the Central law. It is well settled that if the law made by the Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature deal with separate and distinct matters though of cognate and allied character, repugnancy does not arise. See TikbRamji v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A. I. R. 1956 S. C. 676 and Deep Chand v. State of I. P. A. I. R, 1959 S. C. 648 and Tanmkh Raj v. Nilratan Prasad A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 1780. For these reasons I hold that there is no conflict between rule 5 inserted in Order XV, C. P. C. by the State Legislature and the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by Act No. 104 of 1976. I, therefore, answer the first question in the negative. The same conclusion also flows from a consi deration of section 97 (1) of the Central Act. Since the relevant provisions of the State Acts are consistent with the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by Act No. 104 of 1976, the provisions of the local law do not stand repealed. As regards question No. 2 referred in the Civil Revision I answer that also in the negative and hold that the orders striking off the defence before 1.2.1977 are not liable to be set aside. K. C. Agrawal, J.- I have had an opportunity of reading and considering the judgment prepared by my brother Yashoda Nandan, J. I respectfully agree with his conclusion, but desire to say a few words of my own. The fact of the case, which led to the filing of the present appeal and to the reference to the Full Bench, have been lucidly mentioned in the judg ment of Hon'ble Yashoda Nandan, J. and I need not mention them in the judgment. The argument of Sri V. K. Khanna, counsel appearing for the appellant, was that the proviso imposing limitation on power to grant injunction under Order XXXIX, rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure introduced by the U. P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, 1976 (U. P. Act 57 of 1976), here in aftere referred to as U. P. Act 57 of 197o), stood repealed by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976, passed by the Parliament. The argument of the other side, however, was that U. P. Act 57 of 1976 having obtained the assent of President of India will prevail over the Central Act 104 of 1976. For appreciating the point, the following dates may be noted. CENTRAL ACT 104 of 1976 (i) Date of passing (ii) Date of assent by the President. (iii) Date of publication in Gazette. Before 9.9.1976 9.9.1976 10.9.1976 U. P. ACT 57 of 1976 Bill introduced-5.11.1978 Before 30.12.1976. 30.12.1976. 31.12.1976. (iv) Date of enforcement 1.2.1977 1.1.1977. Order XXXIX, rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure was amended by section 86 of Central Act 104 of 1976. The amendment made was that sub-rules (3) and (4) were omitted and after rule 2, rule 2-A was inserted. At this place, I may also note the amendment which was made by U. P. Act 57 of 1976. i he relevant provision by which order XXXIX, rule 2 was amended, is section 13 of said act. It provides that in the first Schedule in order XXXIX (a) in sub-rule (2), the following proviso shall be inserted, namely, Provided that no such injunction shall be granted- (a) * (b) * (c) * ** ** **** **** *** ** ** (d) To affect the internal management or aifairs of any educational institution including a University or a Society ***." Sri S. S. Bhatnagar, counsel appearing for the respondent, contended before us that in view of the aforesaid provision made in sub-rule (2) of rule 2 of order XXXIX by U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976, the application for injunction filed by the plaintiff restraining the defendant from interfering with the working of plaintiff 1 as Manager of the aforesaid College and also with the working of the committee of Management of that College, was liable to be rejected. As already stated above, Sri V. K. Khanna contended that U. P. Act 57 of 1976 stood repealed by Central Act 104 of 1976, hence the application for injunction could not be rejected on the ground suggested by the learned counsel for the other side. The arguments stated above, give rise to the following controversies : (1) Whether the proviso introduced by U. P. Ac. 57 of 1976 stands repealed by Section 97( 1) of the Central Act 104 of 1976 ? (2) Whether the proviso introduced by U. P. Act 57 of 1976 becomes void under Article 254(1) of the Constitution being inconsistent with the provisions of the code of civil procedure after its amendment by Central Act 104 of 1976?'. It was agreed on all hands that the proviso added by U. P. Act 57 of 1976 could not be affected by either of the two contingencies, mentioned above, if the same could be treated as later. Before coming to the aforesaid question it appears appropriate to con sider briefly the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant who argued that Central Act 104 of 1976 was a consolidating Act, and that while interpreting the provisions of section 97 of the said Amendment Act as well as other provisions made by the same, the Court should approach the problem treating Central Act 104 of 1976 as an Act codifying the entire law of civil procedure. The purpose, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, or Central Act 104 of 1976 was to present the whole body of statutory law on the subject of the Code of Civil Procedure in a completed new form repealing the former statute. The submission made is devoid of substance. The Central Act 104 of 1976 is not a consolidating Act. It is only an Amending Act. The Preamble of the aforesaid Act 104 of 1976 itself recites .: "An Act further to amend the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the Limitation Act, 1963." Sub-section (1) of section 1 provides that the Act will be called as the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976. Similarly various other provision of the aforesaid Act would also show that by the said Act the provi sions of the Principal Act were amended. It was designed to change the prior and existing law by adding and taking from it. Thus, Central Act 104 of 1976 being an Amending Act it is not possible to hold that the provisions con tained therein wholly alter or change the character of law. The fact that the present is an Amending Act finds support from the fifty-fourth report of the Law Commission of India on the Code of Civil Procedure submitted on February 6, 1973. In Chapter 1, the law commission stated that the Government of India being of the opinion that the cost required to be incurred in a litigation should be minimised and further for avoiding delays in litigations, requested the law commission to examine the various provision of the Cod, of Civil Procedure afresh and to give a report to enable it to make amendments in the Code of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the com mission examined the Code from the angle of: (a) Minimising cost ; (b) Avoiding delays in litigations, and (c) The revised terms of reference of the commission, the most impor tant of such terms being the implementation of the Directive Principles. This would show that the law commission was not seized with the re quirement of considering the entire Code of Civil Procedure and to make recommendations for the changes to be made from that point of view. It had a limited object before it and in the words of the law commission itself, "We shall as we have been specifically requested-consider what amendments are needed to avoid delay and to minimise cost in civil proceedings." After the report of the law commission was submitted, the Central Government came out with a Bill, which was Bill No. 27 of 1974. Towards the end of the Bill, the statement of objects and reasons for the Bill has been given. This would also show that the Bill was brought with a view only to amend some of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure keeping in view, among others, the basic considerations which have already been referred to in the earlier part of this judgment. Clause (5) of the statement of objects and reasons reads as under :- "After carefully considering the recommendations made by the law commission in its Twenty-seventh, fortieth, forty-fourth and fifty fifth reports, the Government have decided to bring forward the present Bill for the amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.' The details given above would show that it would be incorrect to call Central Act 104 of 1976 as a consolidating Act. This was only an Amending Act and that while interpreting the provisions of the same we will have to keep into account the rules of construction which are applicable to Amend ing Act. Next comes the question whether U.P. Act 57 of 1976 is later in point of time. If the answer of the said question is in the affirmative, neither would sub-section (1) of section 97 nor Article 254 (1) of the Constitution will apply. At this place, reference may be made to sub-section (1) of section 97 of Central Act 104 of 1976. It reads as under : "Any amendment made, or any provision inserted in the Principal Act by a State Legislature or a High Court, before the commencement of this Act, shall, except in so far as such amendment or provision is consis tent with the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by this Act, stand repealed." An analysis of the aforesaid provision would show that only those provi sions which are consistent with the provisions of the Principal Act as amended would survive. At this place, I wish to make it clear that since the appeal is liable to fail on another ground, I do not wish to deal with the true and correct scope of section 97 (1). It would, however, be seen that by this provi sion only the amendments made before the commencement of the Act have been repealed. But, if after the Central Act 104 of 1976 had been enacted, and some State Legislation came thereafter, the provision of sub-section (1) of section 97 will not apply. Central Act 104 of 1976 as well as U.P. Act 57 of 1976 were enacted in pursuance of entry 13 of List III of the Constitution Concurrent List. Under Article 246 of the Constitution, the Parliament as well as the State Legislature have been empowered to make Laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in list III in the seventh schedule. Article 254 (1) of the Constitution, however, provides that if there is any inconsistency between laws made by the Parliament and Laws made by the State Legislatures, the former will prevail, Article 254 (2) is, an exception to what has been said in article 254 (1) of the Constitution. It empowers a State Legislature to make law with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the concurrent list containing any provision repugnant to the provision of the earlier law made by the Parliament, provided that the law made by the legislature of such State has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent. In such a case the State law will prevail over that of the Central law, in the area under its control. In Deep Chand v. State of U. P. A. I. R. 1969 S. C, 648 the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the scope of article 254 of the Constitution. It laid down ; "Article 254 (1) lays down a general rule. Clause (2) is an exception to that article and the proviso qualifies the exception. If there is repugnancy between the law made by the State and that made by the Parliament, with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent list, the law made by Parliament shall prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the law made by the State shall, to the extent of such repugnancy, be void. Under Cl. (2) if the legislature of a State makes a provision repugnant to the provisions of the law made by Parliament, it would prevail if the legislation of the State received the assent of the President. Even in such a case, Parliament may subsequently either amend, vary or repeal the law made by the Legislature of a State." It is settled as held by the Supreme Court, in Board v. Indian Alumlnlmum Company A. I. R. 1976 S. C. 1031 that : "That the question of repugnancy can arise only with reference to a legislation falling under the concurrent list, is now well settled." The law as propounded by the Supreme Court in the above case and article 254 of the Constitution itself would make it clear that if any provision of a law made by the legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament, in that event, the law of the Parliament shall prevail and the State law, to the extent of repugnancy, be void. Accordingly, S. 13 of U. P. Act 57 of 1976 would certainly be liable to be declared void on the ground of repugnancy, if the same would have fallen within the ambit of Article 254 (I) of the Constitution. In the instant case, however, it appears that since U. P. Act 57 of 1976 was later in point of time than Central Act 104 of 1976, the former will fall within the exception provided by Article 254 (2) of the Constitution. This raises a controversy as to whether U. P. Act 57 of 1976 could be considered as later. Article 254 uses the phrase "law" in claues (1) and (2) of the said article. The term "law has been used to denote acts framed or made by a competent legislature in exercise of its legislative powers. Dias in his book on jurisprudence, 1964 Edition, at page 77, defines as to what a law is. In doing so, he says : "Every proposition that has been enacted in an Act of Parliament has unquestioned y the quality "law." Legislation by Act of Parliament may be described as law made deliberately in set form by an authority which the courts have accepted as competent to -exercise that function." That apart, it is significant to note that Article 254 of the Constitution speaks of "laws made by Parliament and laws made by legislatures of the States." Parliament is a defined as to consist of "the President and two Houses to be known as Council of States and House of the People". Similarly, "legislature of States" is defined in Article 168 of the Constitution as consisting of "the Governor and two Houses of legislature" in the States where there are two Houses. It would be found from Articles 79 and 168 of the Constitution that the President and the Governor respectively are integral part of the Parliament and Legislature of a State respectively. A law is made as soon as the two Houses have passed a Bill and the President in case of the Union of India and Governor in case of a State gives his assent to it. As soon as the assent is obtained, the enacting operations are complete and no further action is required to be taken on the part of the legislature for giving authority to the law. In Umaval AM v. Lakshmi Achi A. I. R. 1946 P. C. page 25, at page 40 it was held that the Act became law on the date when the Governor General declared his assent. The position under the Constitution is not different. Under the Constitution also there is no ground for supposing that a Bill will become an Act prior to the assent. After it becomes an Act, the same is law for all purposes, including for the purposes of Article 254 of the Constitution. After it becomes law, it is known as a Statute. It is a provision made in such an Act that the commencement or enforcement of provisions of the Act may be postponed to a future date. If the legislature does not say anything about the date of its coming into force, the Act comes into operation from the date on which it receives the assent of the President by virtue of section 5 of the General Clauses Act (Act X of 1897). Similarly, since section 5 of U. P. General Clauses Act is the same as that of the Central Act, the provincial legislation would also come into operation on the date on which the Act receives the assent of the Governor. As already stated above, the commencement of an Act can be postponed and so long as it is not to be in operation, the Act remains in abeyance. But, even in such a case, though the operation of the substantive provisions of the Act remain in abyeyanoe until the date which is specified by State Government, it is obvious that the section which empowers the State to appoint the date of commencement of the Act, comes into operation on the passing of the Act. Consequently, an Act shall be deemed to have come into operation in the sense noted above from the date on which the assent is received. This will be a governing factor to decide the question whether that Act is former or later. In the instant case, the assent was given by the President to Central Act 104 of 1976 on 9.9.1976 whereas the U. P. Act 57 of 1976 received the assent on 21.12.1976. That apart, it would be further seen that the Bill of the State law was introduced in the State Legislature on 5.11-1976. It may further be noted that all these details would show that U. P. law is a subsequent law and it will prevail in the State under Article 254 (2) despite any inconsitency with the provisions of the Principal Act or with the provisions as amended by Central Act 104 of 1976. In A. Thangal Kunju Mudallar v. N. Venatachalam Potti A. I. R. 1956 S. C. 246 a similar controversy arose for decision. In that case, the Travancore State Legislature enacted Act XIV of 11.24 (M. E.) to provide for investigating case of evasion of tax. The Act was to Come into force by section 1(3) on the date appointed by the State Government. The States of Travencore and Cochin merged on July 1, 1949. By Ordinance 1 of 1124 (M, E.) all existing laws were to continue in force in the United State. After action was taken against certain tax payers under Act XIV of 1124, a controversy was raised that the aforesaid Act being not a law in force, when the United State was formed, the notification bringing the Act into force was ineffective. The argument was accepted by the High Court. The Supreme Court, however, held that section 1(3) of Act XIV of 1124 was in operation July 1, 1949, and the power to bring into force the provisions of the Travancore Act was exercisable by the successor State, Act XIV of 1124 being an existing law, could be enforced by notification. The same law was laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Salat Pragji A. I. R. 1957 S.C. 517. Accordingly, sections 1 and 2 of Central Act 104 of 1976 being the law in force on 30.12.1976, when the assent was accorded by the President to U. P. Act 57 of 1976, would be the subsequent Act and will prevail against the former. In my opinion, it is not necessary to decide the scope and amplitude of the expression "existing law'' used in article 254 of the Constitution. It may be correct that there is no material difference between the expressions "an existing law" and "a law in force", as defined in articles 266(10) and 372 of the Constitution respectively, but as Central Act 104 of 1976 was not the existing law. it is not necessary to go into that controversy. Act 104 of 1976 was an Act which was "made by Parliament". Hence the question of repugnancy of U. P. Act 57 of 1976 had to be decided only with reference to the aforesaid amending Act. A decision of Hon. K. N. Goyal, J. in Civil Revision No. 511 of 1978 M/s. Indira Finance Corporation v. Prem Shanker Awasthi, (decided on 15.9.1978) was brought to our notice in which he held that although the Central Act had been passed and assented to by the President earlier, but since it was enforced with effect from a later date, the Central Act had to be treated as later in point of time. With great respect to the learned Judge, I am unable to subscribe to the view taken in that case. It, however, appear that the aforesaid view was taken by the learned Judge because the decision given by the Supreme Court in A. Thangal Kunju Mudaliar v. N. Venatachalam Potti (supra)-had not been brought to his notice. In ray view, the decision of brother K. N. Goyal, holding that the Central Act will, prevail over the State Act does not lay down the law correctly. To this extent, I am unable to agree with him. In my view, therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. As the appeal is liable to be dismissed on this legal ground, it is not necessary to examine the merits of the same. Yashoda Nandan, J.- In Civil Revision No. 912 of 1977 and First Appeal From Order No. 49 of 1977 practically similar, if not identical, questions of law arise for consideration and they are consequently being disposed of by this common judgment and opinion. We are basically concerned in these cases with the effect and impact of recent amendements introduced in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (hereinafter referred to as the Code) by the State Legislature and the Parliament. When the Civil Revision came up for hearing before a learned single Judge of this Court, he referred the following two questions to a larger Bench for its opinion : "(1) Whether rule 5 inserted in Order XV, C. P. C. by the U. P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972 and substituted by new rule 5 by the U. P. Civil Laws Reforms and Amendement Act, 1976, is inconsistent with the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by the Central Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976 and stands repealed ? (2) Whether section 97 (1) and (3) of the Central Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976, are retrospective and the orders passed before 1.2.1977 striking off the defence for non-compliance of rule 5 are to be set aside ?" The Civil Revision, it may be mentioned here, is one filed by the defen dants in a suit for recovery of arrears of rent against them and for their ejectment from the premises in for their ejectment from the premises in question. While the suit was pending, the plaintiff opposite-party filed an application praying that the defence of the applicants be struck off as they had failed to make the deposits contemplated by Order XV, rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it stands after its amendment by section 7 of the U. P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976). The application was resisted by the defendants but the learned Second Additional District Judge, Fatehpur, by his order dated 25th February, 1977 held that there had been failure on the part of the defendants to make the deposits envisaged by Order XV, rule 5. The plaintiff's application was consequently allowed and the defence was directed to be struck off. Aggrieved by that order, the defendants filed the abovementioned Civil Revision. When the Civil Revision came up for hearing before a learned single Judge of this Court, it appears to have been urged before him that as a result of the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act No. 104 of 1976) passed by the Parliament, Order XV, rule 5 as it stands after the amend ment of the Code by U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976 stood repealed as a consequence of section 87 (1) of Act No. 104 of 1976. After hearing counsel for the parties, the learned single Judge has observed in the referring order that there was a controversy before him as to the comparative fields covered by the U. P. Act No. D7 of 1976 particularly with reference to rule 5 in Order XV and Order 50 (I) (b) of the Code. Another controversy, according to the learned Judge, which arose for consideration was as to whether section 97 (1) of Act No. 104 of 1976 is retrospective or prospective and as the effect of section 97 (3) thereof. In these circumstances, the learned Judge observed that :- "Without going into the merits it may be stated that it is necessary to examine whether there is any such inconsistency involved and, if so, which of the two amendments introduced by the respective Legislatures should prevail in different cases as they arise before the court of law." Since the controversion that arose before the learned Judge were involved in a large number of cases pending in this Court as well as in the subordinate courts, he thought it fit to obtain an authoritative decision on the controversial points. He accordingly referred the two questions, quoted earlier, for opinion of a larger Bench. When the questions referred in the Civil Revision came up for decision before a Division Bench of this Court, it was brought to its notice that very similar questions were likely to arise for consideration in First Appeal From Order No 49 of 1977 which had been referred to a larger Bench by a Division Bench of this Court. The Division Bench, before which the questions referred in the Civil Revision had come up for consideration, consequently expressed the opinion that in the circumstances of the case it would be more appropriate if the questions referred in it by a learned single Judge are also heard and answered by a larger Bench along with First Appeal From Order No. 49 of 1977. First Appeal From Order No. 49 of 1977 was itself referred to a Full Bench for decision by a Division Bench of this Court in the following circumstances :- Ramdei Vidyawardhini Parishad, Muzaffarnagar, appellant no. 3, is a Society which runs as an educational institution known as Ramdei Intermediate College at Muzaffarnagar, Appellant no. 1 claimed to be the Manager and appellant no. 2 a member of appellant no. 4 alleged to be a duly elected Com mittee of Management of the College. They instituted a civil suit for per manent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with this rights to function either as Manager, member or duly constituted Committee of Management of the College concerned. An application for an interim order of injunction was also filed restraining the defendants in the same terms as in the suit itself. The defendants resisted the application for interim order of injunction alleging that they were ineffective control of the Management of the College and they really formed a legally elected Committee of Management thereof. The learned Civil Judge, Muzffarnagar, by his order dated 21st December, 1976, rejected the application for interim order of injunction. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Civil Judge, the plaintiffs filed the above-mentioned First Appeal From Order. When the First Appeal From Order came up for hearing before a Bench of this Court, one of the preliminary questions which arose for consideration before the Bench was as to whether the provisions of Order 39, rule 2 of the Code as amended by U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976 would apply after the coming into force of Act No. 104 of 1976. This question arose because the order passed by the court below was sought to be supported on behalf of the respondents by placing reliance on the amend ment introduced in Order 39 of the Code by section 13 of U. P. Act No 57 of 1976 by introducing a proviso in sub-rule (2) of rule 2 of Order 39, which as far as relevant for our purposes is in the following terms :- "Provided that no such injunction shall be granted :- (a) .............................. (b) .............................. (c) .............................. (d) To effect the internal management or affairs of any educational institution including a University or a society, or (e) .............................. (f) .............................. (g) .............................. (h) .............................. and any order for injunction granted in contravention of these pro visions shall be void." On the other hand, it was urged on behalf of the appellants that the amendment to Order 39 introduced by U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976 stood abro gated as a consequence of Act No, 104 of 1976 which came into force on a later date and has consequently superseded and repealed any amendments to the Code, introduced by the State legislatures or by the High Courts as a con sequence of Section 97 (I) thereof being repugnant to the provisions of the Code as amended by Act No. 104 of 1976. The Bench before which the First Appeal From Order came up for hearing appears to have been of the view that the rival contentions raised by the counsel for the parties involved considera tion of the vital question as to whether there was any repugnancy or inconsis tency between the two Acts, and if so, which of the two amendments intro duced by the respective legislatures should prevail in different cases as they arise before courts of law. The questions which in the opinion of the Bench arose for consideration were of fundamental importance on which an authorita tive decision by this Court is called for in order to furnish guidance to the subordinate judiciary. It consequently directed the papers of the case to be laid before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constitution of a larger Bench for -the decision of the same. This is how these two cases happen to be before this Full Bench. Before proceeding to express my opinion on the questions referred to this Bench in the Civil Revision or which arise for consideration in the First Appeal From Order, the relevant provisions of law which have a bearing on the cases might be briefly surveyed. As far as the Civil Revision is concerned, the relevant legislations having a bearing on the questions referred to this Bench are the Code, U. P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act No. 37 of 1972, U. P. Civil Laws ; (Amendment) Act, 1973 (President's Act No. 19 of 1973) subsequently repealed and re-enacted with certain insignificant modifications by the Uttar Pradesh, President's Act (Re-enactment with Modifications) Act, 1974 (U.P. Act No. 30 of 1974) enacted by the Legislature Parliamentary Act No. 104 of 1976, and U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976. U. P. Act No. 37 of 1972, which amended certain provisions of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, the Code the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, received the President's assent on the 12th September, Iy72, and was published in the U. P. Gazette dated 16th September, 1972, Section 1 (3) of this Act provided that it shall come into force on such date as the State Government may in the official Gazette appoint. By means of a notification, U.P. Act No. 37 of 1972 was enforced with effect from 20th September, 1972. As a result of section 9 of U. P. Act No. 37 of 1972 and a corresponding amendment introduced by the same Act in the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, suits by lessons for the eviction of lessees from buildings after the determination of the lease or for recovery of rent and compensation became cognizable by Courts of Small Causes and such suits if pending on the 20th September, 1972, on the original side stood transferred to Courts of Small Causes if the recording of evidence of any party had not commenced or concluded before that date while similar suits in which recording of oral evidence commenced or concluded remained in the courts of Munsifs and Civil Judges on the regular side. Before coming into force of U. P. Act No. 37 of 1972, Order XV of the Code comprised of only four rules. By section 7 of U. P. Act No. 37 of 1972, rule 5, which was in the following terms, was introduced in Order XV after rule 4 thereof :- "(5) In any suit by a lesson for the eviction of a lessee from any im-moveable property after the determination of his lease, and for the recovery from him of rent in respect of the period of occupation thereof during the continuance of the lease, or of compensation for the use or occupation thereof, whether instituted before or after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972, the defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, (or in the case of a suit instituted before the commencement of the said Act, the first hearing after such commencement) deposit the entire amount of rent, or compensation for use and occupation, admitted by him to be due, and thereafter throughout the continuance of the suit, deposit regularly the amount of monthly rent, or compensation for use and occupation, due at the rate admitted by him, and in the event of any default in this regard, the Court may, unless after considering any reprsentation made by him in that behalf it allows him further time on security being furnished for the amount, refuse to entertain any defence or, as the case may be, strike-off his defence." At that time Order 50 (1) (b) of the Code provided inter alia that Order XV, except so much of Rule 4 as provides for the pronouncement at once of judgment shall not extend to courts constituted under the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, 1887, or to Courts exercising the jurisdiction of the Courts of Small Causes under the said Act. Because of the omission to amend Order 50 thus the power under Rule 5 of Order XV could not legally be availed of as courts exercising small causes jurisdiction were concerned. Inspite of the above-mentioned provision contained in Order 50 (1) (b) of the Code after it stood amended by U. P. Act No. 37 of 1972 the Courts of Small Causes in numerous cases struck-off" the defence where the requirements of rule 5 as introduced by U. P. Act No. 37 of 1972 in Order XV were not complied with. Since the U. P. State Legislature stood dissolved, as a consequence of Presi dential declaration under Article 356 (1) of the Constitution, the Parliament enacted the U. P. State Legislature (Delecation of Powers) Act, 1973, under Article 357 (1) (a) and in exercise of powers under section 3 thereof the Presi dent was pleased to enact Act No. 19 of 1973 (U. P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1973) which brought about certain amendments in the Code, the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts' Act, 1887, in their application to the State of Uttar Pradesh as well as the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. President's Act No. 19 of 1973 was passed on the 19th October, 1973, and was published in the U. P. Gazette of the same date. Sub-section (3) of section 1 of this Act provided that while section 1 (3) thereof shall come into force at once, sections 5 and 6 shall be deemed to have come into force on the 15th day of July, 1972, and the remaining sections shall be deemed to have come into force on the 20th day of September, 1972. By section 3 of the President's Act No. 19 of 1973 clause (b) of rule 1 of Order 50 for the words and figures "order XV, except so much of rule 4 as provides for the pronouncement at once of judgment", the words and figures "Order XV, except so much of rule 4 as provides for the pronouncement at once of judgment and rule 5" were substituted. This amendment of Order 50 (1) (b) was apparently intended to remove the anamoly that was brought about by amendment of Order XV by U. P. Act No. 37 of 1972 while leaving Order 50 of the Code unaltered. As a consequence of the legislative charge brought about in Order 50 by President's Act No. 19 of 1973, the powers under rule 5 of Order XV became available retrospectively with effect from 20th September, 1972 which was the date on which U. P. Act No. 37 of 1972 had come into force to courts exercising small cause jurisdiction. In 1974 the State Legislature as envisaged by Article 357 (2) passed U. P. Act No. 30 of 1974 repealing and re-enacting, inter alia, President's Act No. 19 of 1973 only with the modification that it substituted the title of President's Act No. 19 of 1973. U. P. Act No. 30 of 1974 received the assent of the President on September 28, 1974 and was published in U. P. Gazette (Extraordinary) dated September 30, 1974. In the year 1976, the Code was amended by the Legislature of Uttar Pradesh as well as by the Union Parliament. The Bill which subsequently became Act No. 104 of 1976 was passed by the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha sometime prior to 9th September, 1976 and it received the assent of the President on the 9th September, 1976, it was published in the Gazette on the 10th September, 1976. Sub-section (2) of Section 1 of Act No. 104 of 1976 provides that:- "It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may by notification in the official Gazette, appoint, and different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this Act, and any reference in any provision to the commencement of this Act or to the commencement of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, as the case may be, shall be construed as a reference to the coming into force of that provision." By means of notification published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary dated 14th January, 1977 in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 1 of Act No. 104 of 1976, the Central Government appointed the 1st day of February, 1977 as the date on which the provisions of the said Act (Except sections 12, 13 and 50) were to come into force and the 1st day of May, 1977 as the date on which sections 12 and 50 thereof would come into force. Section 65 of Act No. 104 of 1976 amended Order XV and provided that rule 2 thereof shall be renumbered as sub-rule (1) of that rule and after sub-rule (1) as so re-numbered, a sub-rule (2) shall be inserted in the terms mentioned in that section. Section 86 introduced amendments in Order 39 of the First Schedule of the Code and, inter alia, provided that in rule 2, sub-rules (3) and (4) of Order 39 shall be deleted. Certain other amendments were introduced in (Order 39 of the Code with which we are not concerned here. Order 50 of the Code was left unaffected by Act No. 104 of 1976. Chapter V of Act No. 104 of 1976 bears the heading "Repeal and Savings" and section 97 thereof might have a bearing on the question under consideration by this Bench. Section 97 (1) is in the following terms :- "Any amendment made, or any provision inserted in the Principal Act by a State Legislature or a High Court before the commencement of this Act shall except in so far as such amendment or provision incon sistent with the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by this Act, stand repealed. (2) * * * (3) Save as otherewise provided in sub-section (2), the provisions of the Principal Act, as amended by this Act, shall apply to every suit, proceeding, appeal or application, pending at the commencement of this Act or instituted or filed after such commencement, notwihstanding the fact that the right, or cause of action, in pursuance of which such suit, proceeding, appeal or application is instituted or filed, had been acquired or had accrued before such commencements." "Principal Act" has not been defined in Act No. 104 of 1976 but a mere reading of section 97 (1), as quoted above, leaves no room for doubt that the "Principal Act" means the Code as amended by the Union Parliament but unaffected by any State or High Court amendments. U.P. Act 57 of 1976 also introduced far-reaching changes in the Code. The Bill which ultimately emerged as U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976 was introduced in the State Legislature on the 5th November, 1976, nearly two months after the President had accorded his assent to Act No. 104 of 1976. This Amending Act was passed by the two Houses of the State Legislature some time prior to 30th December, 1976 and received the assent of the President on the 30th Dec., 1976. It introduced amendments in certain provisions not only of the Code but certain other Acts with which we are not concerned in these cases. Apart from introducing amendments in Order 39, as already noticed, sub-rule (5) of Order XV as existing after enforcement of U.P. Act No. 37 of 1972 was substituted by section 7 of U.P, Act No. 57 of 1976. Order XV, rule 5, as it stands after the amendment of Order XV as a consequence of U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976 to the extent relevant for our purposes, is in the following terms :- "5. (1) In any suit by a lesson for the eviction of a lessee after the determination of this lease and for the recovery from him of rent or compensation for use and occupation, the defentdan shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per centum per annum and whether or not he admits any amount to be due, he shall throghout the continuation of the suit regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual, -and in the event of any default in makaing the deposit of the entire amount admitted by him to be due or the monthly amount due as aforesaid, the court may subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), strike off his defence. Explanation 1 Explanation 2 Explanation 3 (2) Before making an order for striking off defence, the court may consider any representation made by the defendant in that behalf, provided such representation is made within 10 days' of the first hearing or, of the expiry of the week referred to in sub-section (1) as the case may be Through the arguments advanced before us have covered a wide field, the primary question, in my opinion, for consideration the F. A. F. O. is as to whether U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976 continues to be effective as a piece of legislation or such of its provisions are repugnant to the Code as amended by Act No. 104 of 1976 have been abrogated and repealed. Act No. 104 of 1976 as well as the State amendments with which we are concerned in these cases are laws in respect of "Civil Procedure, including all matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure at the commencement of the Constitution, Limitation and Arbitration" (Item No. 13 List III Seventh Schedule). Both the legislatures thus were competent to enact these laws. U. P. Act No. 37 of 1972, U. P. Act No. 30 of 1974 and U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976 had all been reserved for consideration of the President and received his assent while the President's Act No. 1.9 of 1973 was enacted by the President himself. U.P. Act No. 37 of 1972, U.P. Act No. 30 of 1974 and U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976 are thus laws made by the State Legislatures envisaged by clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution. Learned counsel appearing for one set of parties before us contended that since Act No. 104 of 1976 was a law later in point of time than U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976 and had been made by the Union Parliament in exercise of the powers contemplated by the proiviso to clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution, it consequently either expressly or impliedly repealed and superseded such provisions as were either introduced or amended in the Code by U. P. Act. No. 57 of 1976 and were repugnant to the Code as amended by the Parliamentary Act. It was urged that a mere enactment by the Legislatures even after it receives the assent of the President or the Governor did not beco me law unless it was enforced so as to become a binding rule of conduct for those effected by them and was enforceable in a court of law. It was submitted that for the decision of the question as to whether U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976 or Act No. 104 of 1976 was a law later in point of time the relevant factor is the date of their enforcement by the authority empowered to do so by the enactment. Apparently while advancing the argument learned counsel had in mind the classical definition by Salmond that, law consists of the rules recognised and acted on in Courts, since an enactment inoperative and not in force cannot be acted upon by Courts, it is not now, according to the contention, within the meaning of Article 254 of the Constitution. It was submitted that while Act No. 104 of 1976 was enforced on the 1st of February, 1976, U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976 was enforced with effect from 1st of January, 1976 and consequently Act No. 104 of 1976 became law at a later date and hence prevailed over the State enactment having been made in exercise of powers by the Union Parliament under the Proviso to clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution. On the other hand, it was urged by counsel representing the other set of parties that as soon as the Parliament or State Legislature had passed a Bill and it had received the assent of the President or the Governor, as the case might be, it becomes a law for the purposes of Article 254 of the Constitution. It was urged that U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976 having received the assent of the President on the 30th December, 1976 and having been published in the U. P. Gazette, Extraordinary, on the 31st December, 1976, was a later law since Act No. 104 of 1976 had already received the assent of the President on the 9th September, 1976, a date anterior to 31st December, 1976. Our Constitution is unique in the sense that while adopting a Federal form of Government it has not only enumerated the matters in respect of which the Union Parliament is alone entitled to make laws but has also provided for the matters in respect of which the State Legislature has exclusive powers to make laws (List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution) and also enumerates matters in respect of which either of the two legislatures can enact laws (List III of Schedule VII of the Constitution). At the time when the Constitution came into force empowering the Union Parliament and the State Legislatures to enact laws, there were also already 'existing laws' with respect to matters included in the Concurrent List made either by the Central Legislature or by the Provincial Legislatures under the Government of India Act, 1935. There were also laws framed under earlier Constitution Acts saved and adapted by the Government of India Act, 1935. Conflicts were bound to arise between 'existing law' saved and adapted by the Constitution and laws made by the Union Parliament or the State Legislatures after the coming into rorce of the Constitution in respect of the matter included in the Concurrent List. The Constitution was consequently required to provide as to how in the event of repugnancy and conflict between such laws they were to be resolved. This problem was met with by Article 254 of the Constitution. Article 254 (1) of the Constitution provides that irrespective of the date when the law is made, if there is a repugnancy between a State law and a Union law in respect of the matters included in the Concurrent List, to the extent of the repugnancy the Central law will prevail. It further provides that if there is any repugnancy between an 'existing law' and a law made by a Legislature after coming into force of the Constitution, the law made after the coming into force of the Constitution will, to the extent of the repugnancy, supersede the 'existing law/Article 254 (1) of the Constitution is, however, subject to caluse (2) of Article 254. Article 254 (1) in my opinion deals only with the situation where the State enactment has received only the assent of the Governor. Clause (2) of Article 254, on the other hand, is concerned within a situation where the State legislation in respect of a matter covered by the Concurrent List has been reserved for and has received the assent of the President. In such an event, according to clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution in case there is any inconsistency between a Parliamentary legislation or an 'existing Law' in respect of a matter covered by the Concurrent List and a State Legislation which has received the assent of the President to the extent of the repugnancy, within the State, the State law will prevail. The Proviso to clause (2) of Article 254, however, provides that even though a State legislation has received the assent of the President, it will be open to the Parliament to amend, vary or repeal the same, if it is in respect of a matter convered by the Concurrent List. The proviso to clause (2) of article 254 of the Constitution clearly in my opinion contemplates a situation where a State law which has received the assent of the President is already on the Statute book. Constitutional Provisions like all legislative enactiments must primarily be construed as far as possible by their own terms. We shall consequently consider the question as to whether U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976 or the Central Act No. 104 of 1976 is the later law for the purposes of Article 254 (2) of the Constitution, first with reference to the provisions of the Constitution itself unembarrassed by any case law or any other general principle of interpretation. In clause (1) of Article 254 the significant words used are 'provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State', "any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament in competent to enact" 'the law made by Parlia ment, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, 'and' the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.' 'Again clause (2) of Article 254 speaks of a law made by the Legislature of a State, 'an earlier law made by Parliament' and 'the law so made by the Legislature of such State' (emphasis supplied). Thus it is a noticeable that throughout Article 254 the emphasis is on law-making by the respective legislatures. Broadly speaking it is exclusively the function of the Legislatures to make laws. As far as the Union is concerned, Article 79 of the Constitution provides that :- "There shall be a Parliament for the Union which shall consist of the President and two Houses to be known respectively as to Council of States and the House of the People.'' Article 168 similarly provides that :- "For every State there shall be a Legislature which shall consist of the Governor, and (a) In the States of Uttar Pradesh and two Houses, (b) In other States, one House.'' Thus the President and the Governor are part of the Legislatures of the Union or of the State as far as the Union Legislature is concerned, the legislative process is complete as soon as the procedure prescribed by Article 107 of the Constitution and connected provisions have been followed and the Bill passed by both the Houses of Parliament have received the assent of the President under Article 111 of the Constitution. Similarly a State legislation becomes an Act as soon as a Bill has been passed by the Legislature and it has received the assent of the Governor in accordance with Article 200 of the Constitution. It is only in the situation contemplated by clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution that a State legislation i s required to be reserved for consideration and assent by the President. Thus irrespective of the date of enforcement of a Parliamentary or State enactment a Bill becomes an Act and comes to be on the State book immediately it has received the assent of the Persident and in the case of a State legislation when after the assent of the Governor has been published in the official Gazette. When the Chief Executive of the Union or the State has accorded his assent after the people have expressed their will through their elected representatives the function of the legislative branch of the Governor is complete and no part of the law-making process remains to be fulfilled. In an Act which has been passed and received the assent of the President or the Governor, as the case might be the Legislature, in exercise of its legislative powers, may either enforce it from a specified date or leave it to some designaged authority to fix a date for its enforcement. Such legislations have been invariably considered as conditional legislations because in such cases no part of the legislative function is left unexercised. In legislations of this character merely because the Legislature has postponed the enforcement of the Act, it does not mean that law has not been made. In such enactments it is a provisions in the law it self which postpones its enforcement to some future date, or leaves it to a designated authority to determine the date of its enforcement. In A.K. Musaliar v. Venkatachalam, A. I. R. 1956 S. C. p. 246 it was held that :- "The general rule of English law, as to the date of the commencement of a statute, since 1797, has been and is that when no other date is fixed by it for its coming into operation it is in force from the date when it received the royal assent 33 Geo. 3.C. 13. The same rule has been adopted in S. 5 of our General Clauses Act, 1887. We have not been referred to any Travancore Law which provides otherwise. If therefore, the same principle prevailed in that State, Travancore Act 14 of 1124 would have come into force on 7.3.1949 when it was passed by the Traavncore legislature. What prevented that result, the answer obviously points to S. 1 (3) which authorised the Govern ment to bring the Act into force on a later date by issuing a notification. How could S. 1 (3) operate to postpone the commencement of the Act unless the section itself was in force ? One must therefore, concede that S. 1 (3) come into operation immediately the Act was passed, for otherwise it could not postpone the coming into operation of the Act. To put the same argument in another way, if the entire Act including S. 1 (3) was not in operation at the date of its passing, how could the government issue any notification under that very section ? There must be some law authorising the Government to bring the Act into force..........Seeing therefore, that it is S. 1 (3) which operates to prevent the commencement of the Act until a notification is issued there under by the Government and that it is S. 1 (3) which operates to authorise the Government to issue a notification there under, it must be conceded that S. 1 (3) came into force immediately on the passing of the Act." There is therefore, no getting away from the fact that the Act was an 'existing law' from the date of its passing right up to 1.7.1949 and was, consequently, continued by Ordinance I of 1124. This being the position the validity of the notification issued on 26.7.1949 under S. 1 (3) the reference of the case of the petitioner, the appointement of respondent t as the authorised official and all proceedings under the Travancore Act 14 of 1124 cannot be questioned on the ground that the Act lapsed and was not continued by Ordiance I of 1124 ? This decision of the Supreme Court clearly supports the conclusion that the mere fact that all sections of Act No. 104 of 1976, (except sections 12, 15 and 50) were enforced with the effect from 1st February, 1976 did not make it an Act later than U.P. Act No. 67 of 1976 which came into force on the 1st January, 1976. The material dates, in my opinion are the dates when the two enatctments received the assent of the President which in the case of the Central Act was 9th September, 1976 while in the case U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976 it was the 30th December, 1976. The definition of the expressions 'laws in force' in Article 13 (3) (b) and Article 372 (3) Explanation I and of existing law in Article 366 (10) of the Constituion, in my view completely demolishes the argument that a law has not been made for the purposes of Article 254 of the Constitution unless it has been enforced. The definitions mentioned above may be quoted here for ready reference, Article 13 (3), provides that :- In this article, unless the context otherwise requires :- B-Laws in force 'included laws passed or made by a legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commence ment of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that any such law or any part of thereof may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas.' Similarly Article 372 (3) Explanation I is in the following terms :- The expression law in force 'in this article shall include a law passed or made by a legislature or other comptent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that it or parts of it may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas.' According to Article 366, Clause (10): 'Existing Law' means any law, Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation passed or made before the commencement of this Constitution by any Legislature, authority or person having power to make such a law, Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation. Though the definition of 'law in force' in Article 13 (3) (b) and Article 372 (3) Explanation I are for the purposes of those Articles alone, it would not, in my opinion, make any difference to the question we are considering. The expression 'existing law- has been used in section 254 of the Consti tution which we are considering. In State of Bombay v. Hemanant Lal Iraja A.I.R. 1952 Bom. 16, the difference in the definition of 'existing law' and 'law in force' inspired the argument that 'existing law' is narrower in scope than 'law in force' for whereas by express definition 'law in force' includes a law even if it is not in operation at all or not in operation in any particular area a 'law In force' cannot be said to exist if it is not in operation. Chagla, C. J. (as he then was) rejected this contention holding that, "Now it may be remembered that the expression used in Art. 13 (I) is 'law in force' and not 'existing laws' and yet the learned Judge reads that expression as meaning 'existing laws'. Frankly the point is not free from difficulty or doubt, but on the whole we have come to the conclu sion that in the Constitution the expressions 'existing laws' and 'laws in force' have been used without any distinction or difference." In arriving at this conclusion the learned Judges placed considerable reliance on the legislative history pertaining to the Constitution and Constitu tion of Acts preceding it. The Bench observed :- "The ways of draftmen like those of Providence are very often inscrut able. But Mr. Seervai has pointed out an explanation which according to him does not make the ways of draftmen so inscrutable as we think they are. He has drawn our attention to the Government of India Act, 1935, which was the constitutional predecessor of our Constitution and he points out that S. 292 Government of India Act in terms corresponded to Art. 372. Section 293, Government of India Act dealt with adapta tion of laws which is dealt with in our Constitution by Art. 372 (2), and just as in Art. 372 the expression used in Ss. 292 and 193 is 'law in force' and not 'existing law', the expression 'existing law' is also to be found in y' the Government of India Act, but the actual expression used is not 'existing law' but 'existing Indian law' and 'existing Indian law' is also defined similarly to its definition in the Constitution as any law, ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation passed or made before the commencement of Part III of this Act by any Legislature, authority or person in any territories for the time being comprised in British India being a Legislature, authority or person having power to make such a law, ordinance, order, bye- law, rule or regulation. Neither S. 292 nor S. 293, Government of India Act contained the explanation which was find in Art. 372. Parliament passed a statute on 18th February, 1937, in 1 Geo. VI, C. 9, for the purpose of explalning and amending Ss. 292 and 293, Government of India Act, and S. 1 of the Act provided that, "a law passed or made before the said date by a Legislature or other competent Authority in British India, and not previously repealed, is for the removal of doubts, hereby declared to be a law in force immediately before that date notwithstanding that it, or parts of it, may not then be in operation, either at all or in particular areas." Therefore, by this Act Parliament incorporated in Ss. 292 and 293 the explanation that we now find in the Constitution in Art. 372. It is significant to note that this Act was passed for removal of doubts and for explalning the expression used in Ss. 292 and 293. Therefore, it is clear that Parliament felt that it was possible to content that there was difference between the expression 'law in force' and 'existing law', and 'law in force' might not include laws not in operation or not extended to all areas. What the Constitution has now done is, has reproduced in Art. 372 the language of Ss. 292 and 293 and has added by way of an explanation what was contained in 1 Geo. VI, C. 9. But this explana tion does not remove all difficulties. because Mr. Palkhivala has pointed out that whereas S. 299 (4) Government of India Act, provides that nothing in this section shall affect the provision of any law in force at the date of the passing of this Act, when we turn to Art. 31 (5) (a) the expression used is 'existing law' and not 'law in force.' There is one indication which we might resort to, althouth with some hesitation, and that is the marginal note both to the Government of India Act and the Constitution. It is clear that marginal notes to sections in statutes may not be looked at for the pur pose of construing the section. But as Maxwell points out at p. 45 the rule regarding the rejection of marginal notes for the purposes of inter pretation is now of imperfect obligation, and the learned authorities with approval the language in calling M. R. in Bushell v. Hammond (1904) 73 L.J. K.B. 1005 at p. 1007, the side notes, although it forms no part of the section, is of some assist ance, inasmuch as it shows the draft of the section." The Supreme Court in Edward Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Ajmer A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 25, also observed that, "He do not think that there is any material difference between 'an existing law? a 'law in force'. In view of these two decisions, the expres sion 'existing law' as defined in Article 366 (10) of the Constitution and occuring in Article 254 thereof can be equated with 'law in force' as defined in Article 13(3)(b) and Article 372(3) Explanation 2(1). Thus an 'existing law' as used in Article 254 may be a law inoperative and not in force when the Constitution came into force. I can find no rational justification for holding that the word 'law occuring in Article 254 with reference to enactments other than existing laws' has a different scope and is confined to enactments when enforced. In view of these provi sions in the Constitution itself, I find no difficulty in concluding that the date of enforcement of an enactment is immaterial for the purpose of Article 254 of the Constitution and consequently it must be held that U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976 was made on a date later than Act No. 104 of 1976. In this view of the matter assuming that there is an inconsistency between any provision of the Code as amended by Act No. 104 of 1976, the U. P. amendments having received the assent of the President shall prevail. There are, in my opinion, other wieghty reasons which lead to the same conclusion. Article 254 is in substance concerned with the power of repeal. There can be little doubt that irrespective of the question whether a particular Act passed by a Legislature has come into force of the same Legislature can un disputably repeal it. If that be so, 1 see no justification for construing Article 254 in a fashion which may inhibit the Parliament from repealing, amending or varying any State amendment before it has come into force, or a State legislation which has received the President's assent overriding within the State territory an earlier Parliamentary enactment in the concurrent sphere. Moreover exercise of the power of repeal, expressly or by implication necessarily imports the idea that the legislature while repealing is aware of what it is repealing. An enactment repealed must be on the Statute book and exist. In the instant cases, it has already been noticed that when Act No. 1.04 of 1976 received Presidential assent, U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976 had not even been introduced in the Legislature. It would, in my opinion, be absurd to hold that section 97 of Act No. 1.04 of 1976 operated to repeal any provision of U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976 which all till then had not even been concieved. I cannot overlook the fact that the State as well as the Union Legislatures both enjoy plentary powers of legislation in the concurrent field. For the reasons given, I have no hesitation in holding that section 86 (ii) which brought about amendments in Order 39 by omitting sub-rules (3) and (4) from rule 2 thereof did not in any fashion affect the amendments introduced in Order 39 by section 13 of U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976 which provides that no injunction shall be granted to effect the internal management or affairs of any educational institution including a University or a society........................". First Appeal From Order No. 49 of 1977 must consequently fail and is hereby dismissed with costs to the contesting respondents. If the suit giving rise to the Revision had been pending trial in a court other than one exercising powers of a Court of Small Causes, in the view I have taken that U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976 remained unaffected by Act No. 104 of 1976, I would have concluded by merely giving an unqualified answer in the negative to question No. 1 referred to this Bench since the order impugned in the Revision had been passed on the 25th February, 1977. The questions, however, have been referred in a suit pending in a court exercising the power of Small Causes Courts and consequently, in my view of the impact of Act No. 104 of 1976 on the earlier U. P. amendments of the Code have to be taken into account. Rule 5 was introduced in Order XV of the Code for the first time by U. P Act No. 37 of 1972 which was published in the U. P. Gazette dated 16th September, 1972, U. P. Act No. 37 of 1972, as already noticed, brought about no change either in section 7 of the Code which excluded application of certain provisions of the Code to courts constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act or to those exercising the jurisdiction of courts of small causes or in Order 50 (1) (b) which provided that 'Order XV, except so much of rule 4 as provides for the pronouncement at once of judgment' shall not extend to courts constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act or to Courts exercising the jurisdiction of Courts under the said Act or law. Thus though rule 6 of Order XV was introduced in the Code by U. P Act No. 37 of 1972 its application to suits of the Small Cause Court nature remained excluded because of Order 50, rule 1 (b) of the Code. It was only as a result of the President's Act No. 19 of 1973 subsequently repealed and replaced by U. P. Act No. 30 of 1974 that Order XV, rule 5 as introduced by the U. P. amendment became applicable to suits in courts constituted under the Small Cause Courts Act or to courts exercising jurisdiction of Courts of Small Causes with effect from 20th September, 19/2 retrospectively. This remained the position till the enactment of Act No 104 of 1976. This brings us to a consideration of the scope of Section 97 (1) of Act No. 104 of 1976. By enacting Act No. 104 of 1976 the Parliament, as already held, exercised its powers under the provision to clause (2) or article 254 of the Constitution and section 97 (1) provides that any amendment made or any provision inserted in 'Principal Act- by a State Legislature or a High Court before the commencement of Act No. 104 of 1976 shall stand repealed in so far as such amendments or provisions are not consistent with the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by Act No. 104 of 1976. Section 97 must be construed in the light of Article 254 of the Constitution and in substance it provides that if there is any amendment made or any provision inserted in the Principal Act by a State Legislature or a High Court before the commencement of Act No. 104 of 1976 in so far as such amendment of provision is cnconsis- tent with the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by Act No. 104 of 1976 it shall stand repealed. That which is not consistent is necessarily inconsistent or repugnant. To give full effect to the meaning and intent of section 97 (1), in my view we have to read to the Code along with the amendments made or provisions inserted in the Code by a State legislature or a High Court as existing on the date Act No. 104 of 1976 was enacted and examine it in Juxta-position with the Principal Act ignoring the State and High Court amendments but as amended by Act No. 104 of 1976. Examining the position of the legislations in this manner, the result is that on the date when Act No. 104 of 1976 became law, Order 50 (1) (b) of the Principal Act as amended by Act No. 104 of 1976 specifically provided that except to the extent that rule 4 thereof provides for the pronouncement at once of the judgment, no other part of Order XV would apply to courts constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act or to courts exercising correspon ding jurisdiction. It appears to me that no great imagination or ingenuity is needed to hold that the amendment introduced in Order 50 by President's Act 19 of 1973 later enacted by U.P. Act No. 30 of 1974 making applicable order XV, rule 5 to suits in courts constituted under the Small Cause Courts Act or the Courts exercising such jurisdiction became inconsistent and repugnant to Order 50 as it stood on the coining into force of Act No. 104 of 1976. While Order 50, rule 1 (b) as amended President's Act 19 of 1973 reenacted by U. P. Act 30 of 1974 makes applicable order 15, rule 5 to suits in courts of small cause the Code as amended by Act No. 104 of 1976 does not. Thus not only impliedly but expressly virtue of section 97 (I) the amend ment to Order 50 (1) (b) stood abrogated on the 10th September, 1976. To my opinion consequently after the 10th September, 1976 courts constituted under the Small Causes Courts Act or other courts exercising corresponding powers ceased to have any power to take recourse to the provision of Order XV, rule 5 as introduced in the Code by U. P. Act No. 37 of 1972. The Parliament while enacting Act No. 104 of 1976 must be assumed to have been aware of the amendments made by the U. P. Legislatures in Order XV and Order 50. The notes on various clauses of the Bill appended to 'Statement of Objects and Reasons' disclose that the Parliament while enacting Act No. 104 of 1976 had in mind the amendments introduced in the Code various High Courts and State legislatures. There is a specific a mention of the amend ment to section 35-A by U. P. Act 24 of 1954. Yet it in its wisdom chose to leave untouched Order 50 of the Principal Act and omitted to make it consis tent with Order 50 as amended by President's Act No. 19 of 1973 and I find no option but to give effect to the legislation. I am compelled to take this view with considerable reluctance because Order XV, Rule 5 is a very salutary provision and was meant evidently to prevent harassment of the plaintiffs and protect their interests in long drawn suit. In the Civil Revision, the order challenged, striking off the defence of the defendants for non-compliance with Order XV, rule 5, was passed on the 27th February, 1977 when Act No. 104 of 1976 had already received the President's assent. It was open to U. P. legislature while enacting U. P. Act No. 57 c f 1976 to amend Order 50 again retrospectively so as to make applicable Order XV, rule 5 as substituted by it to courts constituted under the Small Cause Courts Act or to courts exercising the powers of courts of small causes but the U. P. legislature most probably by oversight or obvious failed to do so. The result, in my opinion, is that even after the coming into force of U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976, Order XV, rule 5 as substituted by section 7 of U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976 remained inapplicable to suits of a small cause nature. My answer to question No. 1 referred to by the learned single Judge in Civil Revision No. 912 of 1977 is consequently as follows: "Rule 5 as substituted to Order XV C. P. C. by U. P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, 1976 is not inconsistent with the provi sions of the Principal Act as amended by Act No. 134 of 1976 and does not stand repealed but it is not applicable to suits instituted or pending in courts constituted under the Small Cause Courts Act or Courts exercising similar jurisdiction after the commencement of Act No. 104 of 1976." On Question No. 2 referred in the Civil Revision no arguments were advanced by learned Counsel and moreover the question does not arise for consideration on the facts of the case and consequently I decline to answer it. K. C. Agrawal, J.- This case has been referred to the Full Bench for deciding the following two questions : "I-Whether Rule 5 inserted in Order XV, C.P.C. by the U. P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972, and substituted by new Rule 5 by the U. P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, 1976, is inconsistent with the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by the Central Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976, and stands repealed ? 2-Whether Section 97(1) and (3) of the Central Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976, are retrospective and the before 1-2-1977 striking off the defence for non- compliance be set aside ?" The facts, briefly, are that a suit was filed for ejectment against the tenant. The tenant did not deposit the rent in accordance with the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5, C.P.C. There upon, the plaintiff filed an application for striking off the defence. The application was allowed on 25-2-1977. Against the aforesaid order, the present revision was filed. The main contention of the counsel for the applicant was that since Order XV of Rule 5, C. P. C. as amended by U. P. Act 57 of 1976 repugnant to Section 97 (1) of Central Act 104 of 1976, the former was liable to be declared as invalid. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant in the civil revision was that even if Rule 5, order XV of the Code of Civil Proce dure, as amended by U. P. Act 57 of 1976, is held to be valid, being not inconsistent with the provisions of Central Act 104 of 1976, the provisions of the said Rule did not apply to a small cause court suit. Elaborating the argument, the learned counsel contended that since Order L, Rule 1, Clause (b) thereof provides that Order XV, except so much rule 4 as provides for the pronouncing atonce of judgment, did not apply to Small Causes Courts, the provision of Rule 5 of Order XV should also be deemed to have been excluded. In order to appreciate the submission of the applicant, it is necessary to mention, in brief, some of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and that of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, which have bearing on the controversy in issue. The Code of Civil Procedure was enacted to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the procedure of the courts of civil jurisdic tion. The Small Cause Courts as well, Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act lays down that the procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1898, shall, save in so far as is otherwise provided by that Code or by this Act, be the procedure followed in a court of small cause in all suits cognizable by it. The word 'Code- has been defined in Section 2 (I) thus: "In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context : 1. Code includes rules. Section 2 (18) contains the definition of Rules, it reads : " 'Rules' means rules and forms contained in the First Schedule or made under Section 122 or Section 125." Accordingly, when Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act provides, that the procedure prescribed by the Civil Procedure Code shall apply to the proceedings of the suits cognizable by Small Cause Courts Act, it includes within itself the rules in the First Schedule. Had the matter rested at that place, there would have been no difficulty in saying that the whole of provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, including the rules, will apply to a suit filed before a Judge Small Causes. Section 7, however, itself lays down that all the provisions excepting otherwise provided will not apply to the suits filed under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Section 7 of the Code contains a list of the provisions which shall not extend to courts constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Order L of the Code contained in the First Schedule bears the heading "Provincial Small Cause Courts". Rule 1 of the said Order provides that the provisions hereinafter specified shall not extend to courts constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. There are two caluses in Rule 1 of Order L, Clause (a) reads : (a) so much of this Schedule as relates to (i) ...... (ii) .....- (iii) ...... (iv) ...... (b) following rules and orders- Order XV except so much of rule 4 as provides for the pronouncement at once of judgment." Reading the provisions of the Small Cause Courts Act along with the Code of Civil Procedure one finds that Order XV except Rule 4 to the extent indicated in Clause (b) of Rule 1 of Order L does not apply to the suits filed before a Judge, Small Causes. This was the position of Order L, Rule 1, C.P.C., till 1973, when by President's Act XIX of 1973, Order L was amended and in Clause (b) of Rule 1, Order L the words and figures 'Order XV except so much Rule 4 as provides for the pronouncement of judgment and Rule 5' was substituted. It, however, appears that while amending Order XV, Rule 5, C.P.C., by U.P. Act 57 of 1976, the Legislature did not make any amend ment in Order L. This gives to the argument that since by virtue of amendment made by Central Act 104 of 1976, the amendment made by President's Act XIX of 1973 in Order XV would be deemed to have been repealed it, as incumbent on the legislature, if so desired, to amend Order L again. This would have been no doubt necessary if without mentioning Rule 5 in Order XV the purpose of the legislature would have been served. Counsel for the tenant referred to sub-section (1) of Section 97 of Central Act 104 of 1976 and contended that as Section 7 of U. P. Act 57 of 1976 is not consistent with the provision of Central Act 104 of 1976, the former was repugnant and was, as such, liable to be declared void. I have already held F.A. F.O. 49 of 1977 that U. P. Act 57 of 1976 is subsequent Act, and that it will prevail against Central Act 104 of 1976. But, apart from the same I am unable to find any inconsistency which could render section 7 U. P. Act 57 of 1976 as invalid. Section 97 (1), in fact is no doubt a provision dealing with repeal and savings. Section 97 (1) more or less provides for the same consequences, which are dealt with in Article 254 (I) of the Constitution. It is true that under Article 254 (1) whether an Act of Parliament prevails against a law of a State, no question of repeal arises. But in substance the provision made by sub section (I) of Section 97 is to the same effect and for achieving the same object. According to sub-section (1) of S. 97 any amendment made or any provision inserted in the Principal Act by a State Legislature or a High Court shall, except in so far as such amendment or provision is consistent with the provi sions of the Principal Act, as amended by this Act, stand repealed. Conse quently, what is saved is that which is consistent. A thing is said to be consis tent if it is in conformity with or congruous with the other. In other words, what is not inconsistent is consistent. The word 'Inconsistency' is used with reference to two laws a stage where there is an impossibility of simultaneous operation of both laws. It signifies the idea of incompatibility. In a case therefore, where two laws can exist side by side, one law cannot be said to be inconsistent with the other. In the instant case, Order XV, rule 5, C.P.C., was enacted providing for striking off the defence. This provision was made applicable to Small Cause Courts Suits by President's Act XIX of 1972. his position continued to obtain on the 9th of September, 1976, when Central Act 104 of 1976 was assented to. Subsequently, by Section 7 of U. P. Act 57 of 1976, order XV, Rule 5, was amended. However, no amendment was made in Order L was the Civil Procedure Code providing that the amended provision of Order XV, Rule 5, will apply to Small Cause Courts. To my mind such a necessity was not called for. Order L, Rul(d) was not inconsistent with anything said in the Central Act 104 of 1976. Consequently,, the same did not stand repeal under sub-section (1) of S. 97. The effect of Amending Order XV, rule 5, by Section 7 of U. P. Act 57 of 1976 only was that the amended pro vision of Order XV, Rule 5, became applicable after 1st of January, 1977, to the matters pending at the stage of the trail of the suits. Nothing could be pointed out from Act 104 of 1976 which could show that either Order XV, rule 5 or Order L, Rule 1 (d), as amended by U. P. Acts earlier, was not consistent with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Central Act 104 of 1976. The question of inconsistency could arise if none of them could be given effect to without infringing the other. But where, as here there is no such contingency, it would be far fetched to postulate an inconsis tency. Things are consistent and not inconsistent when they can stand together at the same time. Accordingly, the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5, C.P.C., could continue to apply as before, the only difference being that be fore 1st of January, 1977, the proceedings pending in the court of the First instance were liable to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Code, as amended by U. P. Act 57 of 1976. It would be noticed that when Central Act 104 of 1976 had come into force, Rule 5 of order XV, was not on the Statute Book. The amended Rule 5 came into existence after U. P. Act 57 of 1976 was enacted.' The Parlia ment, therefore, could not have, by providing that Order XV will not apply to Small Cause Courts, meant that Rule 5, which did not exist at that time, would also apply to courts constituted under the Provincial Small Cause courts Act. Order XV as mentioned in Act 104 of 1976, could not include the provisions not in existence. It was, however, sought to be argued by the learned counsel for the applicants that since Order L, Rule 1 (b) provides that Order XB will not apply, the whole of the provisions of Order XV whether amended before or afterwards, would be deemed to be inapplicable to the courts constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The submission made appears to be unfounded. Order XV mentioned in order L could not refer to the provisions which had not even seen the light of the day. In the context in which the provision of Older XV was mentioned in Order L, one will have to find that the same did not include Rule 5, which was amended by U. P. Act 57 of 1976. It is settled rule of interpretation that in case a provision, if read literally, is patently incomparable with the provisions of that instrument, the court would he justified in construing the words in the manner it may make the particular provision purposeful. If, therefore, we were to read in Order XV as including Rule 5 which came into existence afterwards that would be making it absurd. The words used in a Statute cannot be read in isolation. Their contents derived their colour from their context in which it has been used. That being so, it does not appear that Order L excluded the applicability of Rule 5. In this connection, what may now be examined is that Rule 5 having not been included in the list of the provisions given in Rule L of Order L, the same should apply to the courts constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. It is only the provisions excluded either by Section 7, C.P.C., or by order L which do not apply to such courts. Learned counsel for the applicant thereafter referred to the provisions of Section 3 of the President's Act XIX of 1973 and urged that if the provi sions of Rule 5 of Order XV could be applied to the courts constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, as the amendment as made by Section 3 was not called for. The submission made has no substance. It would be noticed that while giving the reasons for the enactment, the legislature laid down that the amendment made in Order L of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure was only clarificatory in nature. Being clarificatory, it must be understood to have a limited function of explalning the ambiguity and should not be interpreted to mean that but for that amendment the pro visions of the Rule 5 of order XV could not apply to the courts constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. As already stated above, its applicability depended on the fact whether the same was mentioned in Rule 1 of Order L of the Code. Since this was not done, the provisions of Rule 5 of Order XV would have applied, to the Small Cause Courts without even an amendment made to the above effect. The amendment was made to ally groundless apprehensions. Apart from the above, it may further be pointed out that by U. P. Act XXXVI of 1972, all suits between landlords and tenants have became cognizable by a Court of Small Causes. Rule 5 of Order XV is a provision requiring a lessee to deposit rent in the manner prescribed in that provision. The consequence of not making a deposit in accordance with Rule 5 of Order XV is that defence of such a lessee can be struck off. This amendment was mide with a view to make it applicable to all suits filed for ejectment by a lesson against a lessee. As stated above, by U.P. Act XIII of 1972 all suits of the above nature have become cognizable by a Judge of Small Causes. If the argument of the learned counsel for the applicant is accepted, the result would be that the provision of Rule 5 of Order XV would become otiose. This could never be intended by the legislature. The intention obviously was that the provisions of Rule 5 of Order XV should apply to the suits which may be filed or were pending before the courts constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The duty of a court is not to put an interpretation of a provision which may defeat the purpose of an enactment. 1, therefore, find no substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the applicant. The question of inconsistency of Order XV, Rule 5 C. P. C. with the Central Act had come up for decision before Hon. K. N. Goyal, J. in Civil Revision No. 511 of 1978, M/s. Indra Finance Corporation. Prem Shanker Awasthi, (decided on 15.9.1978). Brother Goyal held that'Order XV, Rule 5 C. P. C. was not inconsistent with the view taken-by him in this controversy. Section 97 (1) of the Central Act leaves the power of the State Legislature and the State High Courts to amend the Code of Civil Procedure intact. This section does not lay down that all the local amendments made by the State Government or the High Courts would stand repealed. It only provides that only those local amendments would stand nullified or repealed which were incosistent with the Principal Act, as amended by the Central Act. That apart even the power of High Court conferred by section 122 of the C. P. C. has been left untouched. In this view of the matter, it is not possible to say that the Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive Code in respect of the subject-matter replacing all provisions of State legislation made on the Code of Civil Procedure as well as High Court's amendments. As observed above, Section 97 (1) will apply only where the amendments were inconsistent and not those which were not inconsistent. For the reasons given above, I answer both the questions in the negative, and hold that neither Rule 5 of Order XV amended by U. P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972 nor Rule 5 of Order XV substituted by Section 7 of U. P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, 1976, is inconsistent with the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by the Central Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976. It is also held that Sections 97(1) and (3), of the Central Civil Procedure and Amendment Act, 1976, are not retrospective and orders striking off the defence before 1.2.1977 are not liable to be set aside. By The Court- We, therefore, dismiss First Appeal From Order No. 49 of 1977 with costs. In view of the majority opinion in Civil Revision No. 912 of 1977 our answer to the first question is in the negative. Rule 5 of order XV of the Code of Civil Procedure substituted by section 7 U.P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, 1976 is not inconsistent with the provi sions of the Principal Act as amended by the Central Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976 and does not stand repealed. It is applicable to suits instituted or pending in courts constituted under the Small Cause Courts Act or courts exercising similar jurisdiction even after the commencement of Act No. 104 of 1976. Our answer to the second question is also in the negative and we hold that the orders striking off the defence before 1.2.1977 are not liable to be set aside.
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