CHET RAM Vs. PRESCRIBED AUTHORITY ORAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition is directed against an appellate order passed against the petitioner under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised only the following two points on which the findings of the Prescribed Authority were in favour of the petitioner, but the appellate authority has given its findings in favour of the State, allowing an appeal of the State in that behalf. The first point is that one daughter of the petitioner, namely, Saroj Kumari was unmarried on 8th June, 1973. She was married in May, 1974. The Prescribed Authority treated her as a member of the tenure- holder's family. The appellate authority, however, felt that having regard to the provisions of section 29, the tenure-holder should be deprived of the benefit of the circumstance that this daughter of his was unmarried on 8th June, 1973, because of her subsequent marriage. The learned Civil Judge has quoted section 29 of the Act in his judgment. THIS section does not refer to a case of increase or decrease in the members of the family of the tenure-holder. It deals only with subsequent acquisition of land or with change in the character of unirrigated land or grove land or of any land exempted under section 6 of the Act. Apparently, the learned Civil Judge felt that the principle of section 29 could by analogy be extended to a case of change in the number of members of the tenure-holder's family. THIS extension of the express provision of the Act was clearly unwarranted. The second point was that certain land stood in the name of certain deities, namely, Laxmi Ji Maharaj and Mahavir Ji Maharaj. The dedication was not made by the petitioner, but by some other person as far back as in July 1959. The petitioner was appointed as one of the co-managers. The Prescribed Authority rightly held that the land belonged to the deities and, as such, it could not be treated as part of the land held by the petitioner. The learned Civil Judge, however, thought that in view of the fact that the actual cultivation on the land was being done by the petitioner as Manager and that he had not proved what the income from the land was and what the expen diture on the deities was, it should be presumed that the was deeds were fictitious. The finding about the fictitious character of the waqf deeds is based solely on the circumstance of actual cultivation by the petitioner. If agricultural land is attached to a temple, it must necessarily be either personal ly (or through servants) cultivated or let out to others by the Managers. Oral evidence was led to the effect that the entire income from this land was being spent on the deities. In the face of this evidence, it could not be held that the waqf deeds of July 1959 were fictitious. The finding in this regard is based on no evidence whatsoever and cannot, therefore, be sustained. Learned counsel for the State has referred me to section 6 (f) of the Act and has contended that the land was not exempt because the dedication was made after the 1st day of May, 1959. The exemption provided in clause (f) of section 6 has a different purpose. The effect of this exemption is that even land in excess of the statutory ceiling area held by waqf of the nature described in clause (f) of section 6 is totally exempt from the operation of the Act. But if any land had been donated in favour of any institution, including a public, religious or charitable waqf, trust or endowment before 24th January, 1971, then the laud would vest in that institution or waqf or trust and cannot be said to have continued to be held by the donor. The only effect of clause (f) being not attracted to these waqfs is that the deities would be subject to the provisions of the Act and they can be proceeded against as independent tenure-holders. Thus, on both the points the petitioner, succeeds. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed, and the judgment of the Civil Judge dated 15th July, 1977, annexure 2 to the petition, in so far as it relates to Ceiling Appeal No. 1410 of 1976, which was filed by the State against the petitioner, is hereby quashed. The rest of the judgment, so far as it relates Ceiling Appeal No. 371 of 1976, which was filed by the petitioner, shall remain unaffected. No order is made as to costs.