GYAN CHAND JAIN Vs. BISHAMBER SAHAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE point which arises for determination in this second appeal is whether the tender of the arrears of rent due, by a money order on 29 -9 -1964 amounted to the payment of the arrears due within one month of the receipt of the notice demanding arrears of rent Under Section 3(1)(a) of the UP (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The word "month" used in the said section as contended by the Learned Counsel for the Defendant -Appellant ought to be reckoned as a British calendar month, while according to the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff Respondent it connotes a period of 30 days, that is, a lunar month. There is no definition of the word 'month' in the UP (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The definition of the word 'month' as given in the UP General Clauses Act, therefore, will apply. Under Clause (28) of Section 4 of the UP General Clauses Act, 'month' shall mean a month reckoned according to the British calendar. The learned Judge of the court below, I do not know how, was under an impression that even under the General Clauses Act a month always meant a period of 30 days, that is to say, a lunar month. The learned Judge of the court below was obviously in error. A decision of a Division Bench of this Court was cited by the Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff -Respondent in support of his proposition that in the cases of landlord and tenant one month is always understood to be a period of 30 days. The case relied upon is Misri Lal v. Jawala Prasad, 162 AWR 177 (1), I do not think the Learned Counsel can draw any assistance from the ratio of that case. The learned Judges in that case were concerned with the interpretation of the words 'ek mah' used by the landlord in the notice sent by him terminating the tenancy Under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. I think the learned Judges rightly held that the definition of month given in the General Clauses Act would not apply in interpreting the words 'ek mah' used by the landlord in the notice sent by him. It is well settled that the definitions given in the General Clauses Act apply to the interpretation of the words used in Statutes and Laws and not to the words used in documents relating to private contracts and correspondence. Here I am concerned with the interpretation of the words "within one month" as used in Section 3(1)(a) of the UP (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. Applying the above said definition of the "month" as given in UP General Clauses Act, the words 'within one month' in Section 3(1)(a) of the UP (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act would mean within the period as reckoned according to the British Calendar. It will not mean a period of thirty days as there is nothing in the context of that section to show that the definition in the UP General Clauses Act would not apply and what was intended was a period of thirty days.

(2.) IT is not disputed by the Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff Respondent that if the period is reckoned in accordance with the British Calendar then the Defendant would be entitled to a period of thirty -one days and not thirty days in as much as the month of August in which the notice for demand of arrears of rent was served according to British Calendar was a month of thirty -one days. It has been found that the notice Under Section 3(1)(a) of the UP (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act was served on the Defendant on 29 -8 -1964. Counting, a period of thirty -one days from that day the arrears of rent ought to have been tendered by the Defendant before 30 -9 -1964. A finding has been recorded by the lower appellate court that the money order remitting the arrears of rent demanded was tendered to the Plaintiff on 29 -9 -1934. The tender of arrears of rent thus was within the period of one month from the date of the service of notice within the meaning of Section 3(1)(a) of the UP (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act.

(3.) SINCE my decision on the interpretation of Section 3(1)(a) of the UP (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act concludes the appeal, it is not necessary to consider another question involved in the argument of the Learned Counsel for the Appellant that in any view of the matter the money order having been remitted within thirty days it would amount to tender of rent within that period even though it was received by the addressee at a later date.