SMT. SHANTI AGARWAL Vs. RAM MURTI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a Defendant's appeal. It arises out of a suit for recovery of Rs. 2000/ - on the basis of an amount acknowledged between the parties. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on the finding that it was barred by time. On appeal, the appellate court came to the conclusion that the delay in instituting the suit was liable to be condoned Under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It confirmed the finding that the Plaintiff have proved their claim. It then held that not only the period during which the Plaintiffs had been prosecuting a case in another court but also the period between the return of the plaint and its presentation in the present court, was also liable to be excluded because the Plaintiffs has justifiably explained the lapse of time before instituting the plaint in the present court.

(2.) FOR the Appellant it has been urged that in law the time spent by the Plaintiffs after the return of the plaint and before its actual presentation in the proper court could not be deducted. In this case the accounts were settled between the parties on 6 -4 -1952. The Plaintiffs instituted the suit for recovery of the money on 5 -4 -1955 in the court of Munsif, Ghaziabad. The Defendant took objection to the jurisdiction of the court and on 10 -12 -1957, the court directed the plaint to be returned to the Plaintiffs for presentation to the proper court on the finding that the courts at Ghaziabad had no jurisdiction. The plaint was actually returned to the counsel for the Plaintiffs on 11 -12 -1957. It was presented in the Court of Munsif at Budaun on 18 -12 -1957. There is no dispute that the period between 5 -4 -1955 and 11 -12 -1957 was liable to be deducted in computing the period for the Limitation of the suit. For the Appellant it has been urged that the period after the actual return of the plaint on 11 -12 -1957 and till its presentation on 18 -12 -1957 could not be deducted Under Section 14 of the Act, no matter what the reasons might have been for the delay.

(3.) ASSUMING , however, that the previous proceedings remained pending till 11 -12 -1957, it is clear, that they could not be deemed to be pending after 11 -12 -1957, when that plaint was actually returned to the Plaintiffs through their counsel. The proceedings having not remained pending after 11th December, it is difficult to hold that the Plaintiffs can be characterised as prosecuting with due diligence that proceeding after that date. Section 14 only authorises a court to exclude the period during which the Plaintiff has been prosecuting another proceeding. The period of time when the Plaintiff could not be said to be prosecuting another proceeding could not be excluded Under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In my opinion, the period after the actual return of the plaint could, in any event, not be a period during which the Plaintiff would be said to be prosecuting the civil proceedings. After the plaint had been returned, no proceeding was pending in any court which could, possibly, be prosecuted by the Plaintiff. Consequently, the period from 12 -12 -1957 to 17 -12 -1957 could not be excluded Under Section 14 of the Act. This view of law has been upheld by the decisions of Patna and Madras High Courts in Firm Jiwan Ram Ram Chandra v. Jagarnath Sahu and Anr. : AIR 1937 Pat 495 and Subbu Naidu and Ors. v. Varadarajulu Naidu and Ors., AIR 1948 Mad. 26.