GYAN CHAND JAIN Vs. BISHAMBHAR SAHAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Point which arises for determination in this second appeal is whether the tender of the arrears of rent due by a money order on 29.9.1964 amounted to the payment of the arrears due within one month of the receipt of the notice demanding arrears of rent under Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The word "month" used in the said section as contended by the learned counsel for the defendant appellant ought to be reckond as a British calendar month, while according to the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent it connotes a period of 30 days, that is a lunar month. There is no definition of the word "month" in the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The definition of the word "month" as given in the U.P. General Clauses Act, therefore, will apply. Under clause 28 of Section 4 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, month shall mean a month reckond according to the British calendar. The learned Judge of the court below, I do not know, how was under an impression that even under the General Clauses Act a month always meant a period of 30 days, that is, to say a lunar month. The learned Judge of the court below was obviously in error. A decision of a Division Bench of this court was cited by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent in support of his proposition that in the cases of landlord and tenant one month is always under-stood to be a period of 30 days. The case relied upon is Misri Lal v. Jawala Prasad,1962 AllLJ 222. I do not think the learned counsel can draw any assistance from the ratio of that case. The learned Judges in that case were concerned with the interpretation of the words 'ek mah' used by the landlord in the notice sent by him terminating the tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. I think the learned Judges rightly held that the definition of month given in the General Clauses Act would not apply in interpreting the words 'ek mah' used by the landlord in the notice sent by him. It is well settled that the definitions given in the General Clauses Act apply to the interpretation of the words used in Statutes and Laws and not to the words used in documents relating to private contracts and correspondence. Here I am concerned with the interpretation of the words "within one month" as used in Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. Applying the above said definition of the "month" as given in U.P. General Clauses Act, the words "within one month" in Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act would mean within the period as reckoned according to the British calendar. It will not mean a period of thirty days as there is nothing in the context of that section to show that the definition in the U.P. General Clauses Act would not apply and what was intended was a period of thirty days.

(2.) It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent that if the period is reckoned in accordance with the British calendar then the defendant would be entitled to a period of thirty-one days and not thirty days inasmuch as the month of August in which the notice for demand of arrears of rent was served according to British calendar was a month of thirty-one days. It has been found that the notice under Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act was served on the defendant on 29.8.1964. Counting a period of thirty-one days from that day the arrears of rent ought to have been tendered by the defendant before 30.9.1964. A finding has been recorded by the lower appellate court that day the money order remitting the arrears of rent demanded was tendered to the plaintiff on 29.9.1964. The tender of arrears of rent thus was within the period of one month from the date of the service of notice within the meaning of Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act.

(3.) The view of the lower court to the contrary was legally erroneous. The arrears of rent having been tendered within the time stipulated by law the defendant as a tenant was protected and was not liable to be ejected. The decree for ejectment of the defendant granted by the learned Judge of the lower appellate court legally erroneous has to be set aside.